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AVANT-PROPOS
Olivier Moréteau ∗
This publication is part of the revival of the Center of Civil
Law Studies (CCLS) at the Louisiana State University Paul M.
Hebert Law Center. Two projects, started in the year 2006, the
year of the Centennial of the Law Center, are coming to fruition
with this Number One volume of the newly created Journal of
Civil Law Studies, coming out at the close of 2008, the year of the
Bicentennial of the Louisiana Civil Code.
The first project was the creation of a new Journal, devoted to
comparative studies, with a focus on the civil law and the common
law traditions, bijuralism being what makes LSU so special and
unique in the United States academic world. This Journal is
intended to promote a multidisciplinary and pluralistic approach,
and to focus on the following themes:
- The evolution of the law in mixed jurisdictions, chiefly
Louisiana;
- The evolution of the civil law in an English speaking
environment;
- The impact of globalization on the evolution of the civil
law and the common law;
- The impact of the civil law and the common law outside
the western world and their interrelation with other legal
traditions;
- Bridging the divide between civil law and common law in
the American hemisphere and in the European area; and
- The combination of the civil law and common law
traditions in the harmonization and unification processes,
with a focus on linguistic issues.
First named Journal of Bijural Studies, the project has been
renamed Journal of Civil Law Studies (JCLS), to mark its close
connection with the CCLS and also the universal character of the
∗

Professor of Law, Russell B. Long Eminent Scholars Academic Chair,
Director of the Center of Civil Law Studies, Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University; formerly Professor of Law, Université Jean Moulin
Lyon 3 and Director of the Edouard Lambert Institute of Comparative Law.
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civil law, which never grew in an insulated way but in constant
relationship with other legal traditions.
The JCLS is published electronically, and yet it is laid out and
referenced exactly like a traditional hard-copy journal. English is
the main language, but articles may be submitted and published in
French or in Spanish with an abstract in English. The JCLS is
peer-reviewed. The Board of Editors is composed of distinguished
comparatists from all over the world, mostly civilians with a strong
knowledge of the common law systems but also common law
jurists with civil law experience, and in any case, scholars with a
strong expertise and interest in mixed jurisdictions. Room is made
for student participation. Volume One was carefully edited by a
group of Graduate Editors, selected among LSU talented and
devoted LL.M. students.
Every year, there will be at least two volumes. One of them
will function like a regular journal, with articles, review of
normative documents and cases, and book reviews. Another
volume will publish the papers of the annual Civil Law Workshop.
The second major project inaugurated in 2006 is the creation at
the CCLS of an annual Civil Law Workshop Series, focusing every
year on a broad topic, based on the civil law but to be treated with
large comparative and interdisciplinary perspectives. At every
session, the contributor is invited to make a presentation, followed
by an open discussion. All this takes place in a relaxed, congenial
atmosphere, with drinks being served. The Civil Law Workshop is
open not only to the legal community, but also to attendees that are
interested in interdisciplinary studies. It is hoped that in the years
to come, the Civil Law Workshop will attract a broader and more
diverse audience.
Credit must be given to my friend and former LSU colleague
Michael McAuley, who introduced me to the workshop experience
conducted at McGill University Faculty of Law, under the
leadership of a great supporter of the CCLS revival, Professor, now
Dean, Nicholas Kasirer. Nothing would have been possible
without the trusting support of former Chancellor John Costonis
and present Chancellor Jack Weiss, and the active participation of
the LSU law faculty. The daily work of a most dedicated staff
must also be praised: Agustín Parise, Research Associate, also a
contributor to the present volume, Jennifer Lane, CCLS
Coordinator and more than occasionally Megan Lawrence,
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Coordinator for European Studies. And last but not least, credit
must be given to my friend and accomplice in the Civil Law
Workshop First Series, Professor John Randal Trahan, who
accepted to embark with us in this new adventure. He is the coeditor of the present publication.
The contributions assembled in the present volume are
dedicated to a very unique scholar whose life covered most of the
20th century and who is still active in the 21st. Professor Emeritus
Robert A. Pascal started his academic career at the time of Roscoe
Pound, whom he witnessed inaugurating the LSU Law Building in
1938. 1 He then was a law student at the Loyola Law School in
New Orleans and served during the summer as a Research
Assistant at LSU. He published his first article in the first issue of
the Louisiana Law Review, also seventy years ago, 2 and his most
recent piece this year, 3 leaving us with almost uninterrupted
scholarship on a span of seventy years. Robert A. Pascal
conversed with some of the great pioneers of comparative legal
studies, such as Ernst Rabel, John P. Dawson, and Hessel Yntema
in Ann Arbor, Max Rheinstein in Chicago, Gino Gorla in Rome,
and René David in Paris. He is far too modest to accept being
portrayed as a living legend but may accept being referred to as a
living memory: few law schools having reached their centennial,
like LSU in 2006, can claim to have within their walls a faculty
member who has been on Earth nearly as long as the law school.
My Foreword to his latest article on legal education gives a short
account of his career and academic achievements. 4 He is a man
whose unique ambition was, and still is, to serve others; he
educated his students to become Priests of the Legal Order. He
does not like to be praised and calls every compliment flattery. He
attended all but one session of our Civil Law Workshop inaugural
series, and enriched all discussions.
This Civil Law Workshop First Series will be referred to in the
future as the Robert A. Pascal Series. A list of Professor Pascal’s
Writings About Law, 1937-2008, is published at the end of this
1. Roscoe Pound, The Influence of the Civil Law in America, 1 LA. L. REV.
1 (1938).
2. Robert A. Pascal, Comment, Duration and Revocability of an Offer, 1
LA. L. REV. 182 (1938).
3. Robert A. Pascal, A Summary Reflection on Legal Education (with
Foreword by Olivier Moréteau), 69 LA. L. REV. 125 (2008).
4. Id. at 125-128.
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volume. The editors thought there was no better tribute than an
invitation to discover or rediscover the writings of our great
Louisiana civilian.
* * *
The Robert A. Pascal Civil Law Workshop Series focused on
Revisiting the Distinction between Persons and Things. This is a
fundamental distinction in the civil law, going back to early
Roman law and presented, together with actions (better named
obligations), as the summa divisio in Gaius’ Institutes. The
distinction between persons and things may seem a mundane
distinction, an easy one to work out. And yet, in the past, western
societies were challenged with the following problems:
- Were the natives (then called savages) found in the
Americas human beings?
- May slaves be traded as other commodities?
- May animals be tried for their wrongdoings?
Today, the following issues do come up:
- May animals share some human rights?
- Are frozen human embryos persons or things?
- What is the legal status of body parts?
- May ownership be an absolute right in a world where many
resources are becoming scarce for a large part of mankind?
This turns out to be a huge topic, the literature showing a
contemporary tendency towards commodification. 5 There was no
ambition to cover all possible facets. Our speakers were set free to
address any topic of their choice, in relation with the general
theme, which is far from being exhausted.
The present publication follows the sequence of the Workshop
presentations, with the addition of Professor Trahan’s Introductory
Remarks in limine, giving a historical perspective to the project.
This may give the reader a feeling of the intellectual path and
experience of those having the privilege of attending all sessions.
Dr. Audrey Guinchard, a French trained scholar now in
England (University of Essex), opened the series with a
fundamental question about name. Is the name property? She
compares the evolution of English law and French law, and
5. See RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND
CULTURE (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
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concludes that “[t]he debate about the nature of the name is not on
whether the name is property or not, but on what the relationship
should be between a person and his name,” 6 with responses that
may borrow to property and personality.
Professor Jacques Vanderlinden (Université libre de Bruxelles
and Université de Moncton) then analyzes property in different
societies, taking us to the less familiar shores of “black” Africa.
From field-studies and with an anthropological outlook or a
pluralistic approach, Professor Vanderlinden tells us that the Zande
do not own land, since there is nothing corresponding to abusus or
way of disposing of land in their relationship with the land they
cultivate. They use it and derive the fruit of it, and follow their
chief, the ira, to a better sende when the resources of the occupied
land can no longer sustain the people. This is indicative of a
system where “man does not own the land, the latter owns him.” 7
There is much data to be observed in Africa, and as Professor
Vanderlinden explains, words are missing in our western
languages: we are still short of a legal science to help us do
anything with these facts.
Professor David Gruning, of the Loyola University College of
Law in New Orleans, contributed on Heirs of the Body: Cadavers,
Claims and Kin. His cadavers and body parts were not resurrected
in time for publication in the present volume.
Much was said about embryos, first by two Paris scholars, Ms.
Laurence Brunet and Dr. Sonia Desmoulin. Considering French
law applicable to human and animal embryos, they reflect on the
status of chimerical embryos. This may be the most troubling
paper in this series, taking us to the boundaries of the human
species. French law is silent on chimerical embryos, combining
human and animal genetic material. The authors go beyond the
taboos to explore possible solutions offered by intellectual
property. They make reference to the civilian rules concerning
“principal and accessories” or composite things. They venture into
considering animal and human embryos as legal persons, or
making animal embryos and human embryos in vitro things. As
the authors say, “[t]he range of genomic mixtures leads to infinite
6. Audrey Guinchard, Is the Name Property? Comparing the English and
the French Evolution, 1 JCLS 21, 58 (2008).
7. Jacques Vanderlinden, Analyzing Property in Different Societies, 1 JCLS
61, 71 (2008).
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questions,” 8 all too often ignored by the lawyers. Their paper is
fertile in possible answers.
Agustín Parise, of the LSU Center of Civil Law Studies, also
reflects on human embryos, this time with an interdisciplinary
perspective, focusing on the 16th century debate regarding the legal
status of Native Americans. He tells us of these 400,000 in vitro
embryos cryopreserved in the United States alone, and of their
possible use to produce stem cells. The moral debate comes close
to the Valladolid Controversy. Should human embryos in vitro be
regarded as persons or as things? Do they fall in an intermediate
category? The in-depth exploration of the opposing arguments of
Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda on the status
of Native Americans reveal the richess of the Spanish Scholastic
movement, proving that “[t]imes of great discoveries are also times
of great interrogations.” 9
Dr. Laura Franciosi and Professor Attilio Guarneri, both of
Bocconi University in Milan, raise the delicate question of the
protection of genetic identity, at a time where so much information
can be found in human DNA. Huge benefits may be derived for
human society, yet at the expense of individual interests. The
paper explores ways of protecting individual interests, using
privacy (a technic that pertains to the person) as well as property
paradigms. Though primarily based on American materials, this
paper shows that taxonomy alone does not solve complex issues.
This leads us to the final presentation in the series, by Professor
Eric Reiter, of Concordia University in Montreal. Based on
Domat’s monster, a taxonomic puzzle to which the author adds the
case of a human leg found in a barbeque smoker, Eric Reiter gives
the key to the mystery. Why keep it hidden till the end rather than
publishing the paper at the head of the series? Because scholars,
like readers of detective stories, all too often peek in to see the
final pages before reading the whole volume. Gaius’ division into
persons, things and actions (obligations) provides the basic
architecture of the civil law, the French Civil Code and the many
civil codes following the French model. It is static however, and
may only be useful for problem solving if one moves away from
8. Laurence Brunet & Sonia Desmoulin, Human Embryo, Animal Embryo,
Chimerical Embryo: What Legal Status in French Law?, 1 JCLS 79, 104 (2008).
9. Agustín Parise, The Valladolid Controversy Revisited: Looking Back at
the Sixteenth-Century Debate on Native Americans While Facing the Current
Status of Human Embryos, 1 JCLS 107, 138 (2008).
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the idea of categories as boxes in order to focus on the boundaries.
Professor Reiter recommends a triangle model with all three
categories mingling in the middle: “all three of the categories play
a role in virtually any classificatory decision,” 10 problem solving
becoming easier with fluid categories. This may imply a shift from
ontological status to relativism. May the two be reconciled? This
question is for the reader.

10. Eric H. Reiter, Rethinking Civil-Law Taxonomy: Persons, Things, and
the Problem of Domat’s Monster, 1 JCLS 189, 202 (2008).

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERSONS &
THINGS: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
J.-R. Trahan *
Of all the juridical distinctions, the most important opposes
persons and goods. More than a distinction, it is a
hierarchy: the person is the grandest of riches, for he has
an infinite value. The riches of the world are given to man
so that he may be the master of them; sometimes, they
become the master of him.
Philippe Malaurie & Laurent Aynès

1

If the summa divisio of the civil law–the distinction between
“persons” and “things”–can be traced back through the pages of
history to a single source, then that source may well be the
following line of the Institutes of the second century Roman
jurisconsult Gaius: 2 “Now, all the law that we make use of pertains
either to persons or to things or to actions.” 3 This is not to say that
the concepts “person” and “thing” were unknown to Gaius’
predecessors and contemporaries; they were not. But Gaius seems
to have been the first to have set these concepts in an apparent
binary opposition to each other and almost certainly was the first to
have attached great significance to that opposition, 4 making of it
*

James Carville Alumni Professor of Law. I wish to thank Agustín Parise,
Research Associate at the Center of Civil Law Studies, for his invaluable
contributions to the research on which this preface is based.
1. PHILIPPE MALAURIE & LAURENT AYNES, DROIT CIVIL: LES BIENS (2d ed.
2005) (J.-R. Trahan trans., 2008).
2. On Gaius and his INSTITUTES, see generally PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW
IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 19-20 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999); and BARRY
NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 34-36 (1984).
3. GAI. INST. bk. I, tit. II, no 8 (J.-R. Trahan trans., 2006).
4. 1 FREDERICK CARL VON SAVIGNY, TRAITÉ DE DROIT ROMAIN § LIX,
389-90 (Charles Guenoux trans., Firmin Didot Frères 1840) (“[I]t has often been
claimed, or at least tacitly acknowledged, that among the Romans there had been
had a very ancient custom of relating the rules of law to three classes of objects:
persona, res, actio, and that the Roman jurisconsults had all, or nearly all,
followed these division in their treatises . . . Now, not a single historical fact
serves to support it [this claim], and diverse circumstances seem to contradict it.
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part of the very organizational backbone of his Institutes. 5
Though Gaius considered “persons” and “things” to be
fundamentally different from each other, it is less than entirely
clear of what he considered this difference to consist. Absent from
his Institutes–the only writing of his that has survived–is any
definition of either term, any explanation of the supposedly
distinctive “nature” or “essence” of one or the other, on the one
hand, or “things,” on the other, or any account of the criterion(a)
that must de used in determining whether a given “something” is
one or the other. The basis for the distinction, like the distinction
itself, Gaius appears to have taken to be so “self-evident” as to
require no explanation.
Despite Gaius’ silence regarding the basis for the distinction, it
may be possible to get some idea of his understanding of it by
looking at the various “somethings” that Gaius and, in addition, his
predecessors and contemporaries treated under the rubrics
“person” and “thing,” respectively. Many Romanists have, in fact,
attempted to do precisely that. 6 And they have arrived at
something of a consensus. Let us consider, first, the concept
“person.” The Roman jurisconsults seem to have taken the
concept to include, first and most fundamentally, a “human being”
or, better yet, every human being properly so called, 7 even
including “slaves.” 8 To this extent, the term “person” was given

. . . Thus, we have no reasons to regard the division of Gaius as generally
accepted; rather, we must regard it as a particular idea of this jurisconsult . . . .”)
5. Gaius’ Institutes are divided into three parts, called “books,” which bear
the captions of “persons,” “things,” and “actions,” respectively.
6. See, e.g., 1 SAVIGNY, supra note 4, § LIX, at 391-401; 1 JOHN AUSTIN,
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW) lect. XII,
at 348-55, & lect. XIII, at 337 & 360-64 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885);
NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 60-61 & 98-99 (8th ed. 1982).
7. 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 346, 350, 352; NICHOLAS, supra note
2, at 60-61.
8. 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 348-49; NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at
60-61.
The temporal span of this “human being” stretched from the moment of
“live birth” (or, for certain limited purposes, such as successions, from the
moment of conception) until the moment of natural death. JUST. DIG. bk. 1, tit.5,
no 7 & bk. 50,tit. 16, no 231 “Live birth” required, among other things, that the
child be born with “human form” (as opposed to that of a “monster”). TWELVE
TABLES tab. IV, law III.
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its common sense. But for the Roman jurisconsults the concept did
not stop there. To the contrary, it was also extended, at least for
some purposes, to certain groups or collectivities of human beings
(e.g. the collegia) 9 and, in at least one case, to an aggregate of
rights and duties, namely, those of an hereditary estate (haereitas
jacens). 10 As applied to such “somethings,” the term “person” was
used in an analogical or fictitious sense.11 Next, let us consider the
concept of “thing.” For the Roman jurisconsults, this concept
encompassed, first and foremost, physical objects external to the
human body that can be detected by means of the senses (res
corporales). 12 The term “thing,” to this extent, had its common
sense. But the Roman jurisconsults went further, extending the
concept to cover (1) what we moderns would call “rights” and
“duties” (so called res incorporales) 13 and (2) even, in one
instance and for limited purposes, a certain class of “person,”
namely, the slave to the extent that he (or should one now say
“it”?) might constitute the object of a revindicatory action brought
by his master. 14 Evaluated according to the standards of modern
legal science, this schema, obviously enough, leaves much to be
desired. 15
9. 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 354.
10. Id. at lect. XII, at 354 & 355.
11. There is yet another wrinkle in the fabric of the Romans’ understanding
of “person” that complicates any attempt at explicating that understanding. This
wrinkle is the Romans’ failure to differentiate sharply between–indeed, even to
confuse–“personality,” on the one hand, and “status,” on the other. See, e.g.,
G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT no 40, at 39 (T.M. Knox trans., 1962); 1
AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 352-53, & lect. XIII, at 363-64; NICHOLAS,
supra note 2, at 61; see also 1 SAVIGNY, supra note 4, § LIX, at 391-95; see
generally Jeanne Louise Carriere, From Status to Persons in Book I, Title 1 of
the Civil Code, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1268-69 (1999).
12. 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XIII, at 360.
13. Id. at lect. XIII, at 360 & 361.
14. Id. at lect. XIII, at 361 & 362-63.
15. HEGEL, supra note 11, no 40, at 39 (decrying the “perversity and lack of
speculative thought” in the schema); NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 60-61
(characterizing the schema as “rough and ready” and as lacking a “coherent
theory”); see also 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XIII, at 361 (complaining that
the inclusion of “incorporeals” in the category of things creates “perplexing
ambiguity”) & 2 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XLVI, at 777 (denouncing the
Roman distinction between corporeal and incorporeal things as “utterly
useless”); 2 Charles Aubry & Charles Rau, Droit Civil Français § 162 (Paul
Esmein rev., 7th ed. 1961), in 2 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 6 (La. St. L. Inst.
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For over a millennium after Gaius, the development of a more
scientific understanding of the distinction between persons and
things remained elusive. In his Institutes, Justinian simply
reproduced Gaius’ statement of the distinction 16 word for word and
without change. So things remained when, several centuries later,
first the Glossators 17 and then the Commentators 18 set to work
explicating the then recently “rediscovered” works of Justinian.
For example, Bracton’s Of the Legislation and the Customs of the
English, a work apparently influenced by the Glossator Azo of
Bologna, 19 we find yet another reproduction, without further
elaboration, of Gaius’original statement on persons, things, and
actions. 20 Then there are the Las Siete Partidas, a 13th century
Spanish law compilation that drew on the works of the Glossators
and early Commentators. 21
Though this work speaks of
“persons”and of “things,” it never defines either term and–this is
what is really surprising–it never sets the two over in opposition to
each other.
Not until the emergence of the new school of “natural law”
theory in the 16th century, of whom the earliest representative is
the Dutch Romanist Hugo Grotius, did anyone do much to improve
on the old Roman schema. Regarding “persons,” Grotius added
little to the stock of existing ideas, but what little he did add proved
to be important: “persons,” he wrote, are those who “have rights to
things.” 22 Though Grotius himself did not say as much, this
attribute of persons clearly implies–indeed, presupposes–another,
namely, that persons “can” have such rights, in other words, have
the “capacity” to receive of acquire them. (Re-) conceptualizing

trans. 1966) (characterizing the Roman distinction between corporeals and
incorporeal things as “arbitrary”).
16. JUST. INST. bk. I, tit. III (J.-R. Trahan trans., 2006).
17. On the Glossators, see generally STEIN, supra note 2, at 45-49;
NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 46-47.
18. On the Commentators, see generally STEIN, supra note 2, at 71-74;
NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 46-47.
19. See FREDERIC MAITLAND, BRACTON AND AZO (1895); CARL
GUTERBOCK, BRACTON (Brinton Coxe trans., 1866); STEIN, supra note 2, at 64.
20. See HENRICI DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSEUTUDINIBUS ANGLIÆ
bk. I, ch. VI, at 29 (Travers Twiss ed., 1878).
21 . See STEIN, supra note 2, at 65-66.
22. 1 HUGO GROTIUS, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF HOLLAND bk. I, ch. II, no 28,
at 15 (R.W. Lee trans., 1926).
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“persons” in this way, Grotius effectively made it possible to
uncouple “personality” from “humanity,” a development that was
to have lasting significance. So (re-) understood, the category of
person could easily embrace collectivities of human beings, though
Grotius himself seems not to drawn this inference. Regarding
“things,” Grotius broke new ground by providing a definition:
“that which is external to man and in any way useful to man.” 23
For Grotius, “man” evidently meant “mind” or “spirit,” for Grotius
included among that which is “external to man” not only natural
objects (such as trees) and man-made objects (such as houses), but
also the human body, human life itself (understood as physical
existence), and even certain attributes of human life, such as
“honor” and “reputation.” 24 Perhaps recognizing the potentially
dangerous implications of this reification of the body, life, honor,
and reputation, and the like, Grotius introduced a new
subcategorization of things, the point of which seems to have been
to foreclose those very implications. According to Grotius, things
can be subdivided into “alienable” and “inalienable,” and things
such as the body, life, honor, and reputation fall into the latter
subcategory. 25
To find still further innovations in thinking about the
distinction between persons and things, one must “fast forward”
the tape of history to the early 19th century. 26 At that time a
23. Id. at bk. II, ch. I, no 3, at 65.
24. This definition of “thing” anticipates that of Hegel two hundred years
later. See HEGEL, supra note 11, no 42, at 40 (“What is immediately different
from free mind is that which, both for mind and in itself, is the external pure and
simple, a thing, something not free, not personal, without rights . . . [W]hen
‘thing’ is contrasted with ‘person’ . . . it means the opposite of what is
substantive, i.e. that whose determinate character lies in its pure externality.
From the point of view of free mind . . . the external is external absolutely,
and it is for this reason that the determinate character assigned to nature by the
concept is inherent externality.”).
25. In drawing this new distinction, Grotius at the very least anticipated, if
he did not in fact lay the groundwork for, the development years later of the
distinction between “patrimonial” and “extra-patrimonial” rights. On this
distinction, see generally FRANÇOIS TERRÉ & PHILIPPE SIMLER, DROIT CIVIL:
LES BIENS no18, at24-25, & nos 23-26, at 29-32 (7th ed. 2006); JEAN
CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION no 166, at 321; Aubry & Rau, supra
note 15, § 162, at 5-6.
26. One familiar with the history of the civil law tradition will recognize
that, in passing from the 16th century to the 18th century, I have skipped over a
number of “big names” within that tradition, including Jean Domat and Robert
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number of scholars, most of them in Germany, 27 provided
something of a new “take” on “persons,” “things,” or both and, in
so doing, developed what many now call the “modern”
understanding of persons and things. 28
Regarding “persons,” the modern theory breaks new ground at
two points. First, the modern theory (re-) defines “person” as the
“subject of rights and duties,” in the sense of that which is
“capable” of being “subjected” to duties and/or of being “invested”
with rights. 29 The following passage from the work of the German
Romanist Anton Thibaut is fairly typical:

Pothier. This is not an oversight. Though both of these great civilists
recognized the distinction between persons and things, neither of them did much
to clarify either concept or to fix with greater precision the boundaries between
the two. Their theoretical interests clearly lay elsewhere.
27. Austin attributes this development to “modern civilians.” 1 AUSTIN,
supra note 6, lect. XII, at 348, 350, & 351. Given Austin’s background, the
scholars he had in mind were probably the early German Pandectists, such as
Hugo, Thibaut, Puchta, and Savigny.
28. See NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 60; see also 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6,
lect. XII, at 348, 350, & 351.
29. See ANTON THIBAUT, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
JURISPRUDENCE § 101, at 88 (Nathaniel Lindley trans., 1855); G.F. Puchta,
Outlines of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right § 28, in WILLIAM HASTIE,
OUTLINES OF THE SCIENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE 100 (1887); 2 SAVIGNY, supra
note 4, § LX, at 1; also 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 348, 350-51, 352,
353 & lect. XIII, at 358. Austin considered the (re-) conceptualization of
“person” in terms of “subject of rights and duties” to be the result of an error. 1
AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 348, 350-54. Is it not possible, however, that
it is, on the contrary, the result of an attempt to “re-think” the traditional Roman
distinction between person and thing so as to put it on a sounder scientific
footing? See 1 SAVIGNY, supra note 4, § at 400 (“[N]o reason obliges us to
imitate servilely what are acknowledged defects, and we can, without being
presumptuous and without being prideful, try to put the historical materials of
the Roman law into operation in a rational manner and to present them under
another form than that adopted by Gaius.”).
This new notion of the “subject” of rights and duties formed one of the
conceptual cornerstones of the distinction, elaborated sometime later, between
the two senses of “law” or “right,” namely, “subjective” law or right (in French,
droit subjectif) and “objective” law or right (in French droit objectif). On this
distinction, see generally MALAURIE & AYNES, supra note 1, no 41, at 40;
CARBONNIER, supra note 25, no 104, at 191; no 105, at 193; & no 163, at 315
(26th ed. 1999); Aubry & Rau, supra note 15, § 162, at 1; HANS KELSEN, PURE
THEORY OF LAW 169-70 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed. 1978); JEAN DABIN, LE
DROIT SUBJECTIF (1952).
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We have next to consider the subjects of rights and duties,
that is to say, the persons to whom something is possible
or necessary. In the first place we must examine who or
what, either from its very nature or by the precepts of
positive law, can be considered as capable of rights and
duties. By Person is meant whatever in any respect is
regarded as the subject of a right: by Thing, on the other
hand, is denoted whatever is opposed to person. 30
This manner of (re-) defining person marks an important shift–
indeed, a reversal–in thinking about “personality.” Whereas in
earlier times “being a person” was thought to be logically prior to
and to be the cause of “having legal capacity,” hereafter “having
legal capacity” will be thought to be logically prior to and to be the
cause of “being a person.” 31 Second, the modern theory establishes
a new “umbrella” category into which the various non-natural
persons (collegia, corporations, etc.) can be conveniently placed,
namely, “moral” (in the sense of “psychological”) or “juridical”
person. 32 This passage from the work of the German Romanist
Savigny is representative:
[Up to this point] I have dealt with the capacity of law as
something that corresponds to the idea of the individual;
here, I will envision it as something that is extended
artificially to fictitious beings. One calls them “juridical
persons,” that is to say, persons who exist only for
juridical ends, and these persons appear to us alongside
the individual, as subjects of relations of law. 33
Attempts at specifiying the “true nature” of such “juridical
persons,” though often made, have usually ended in failure or, at
the very least, confusion. 34
30. THIBAUT, supra note 29, § 101, at 88.
31. See Carriere, supra note 11, at 1266-67 (1999) (“. . . Aubry and Rau in
the late nineteenth century, and Planiol and Ripert in the early twentieth,
regarded juridical capacity as definitional of personality, rather than as a
consequence of it: Persons are ‘[t]hose beings capable of having rights and
obligations.’ Nicholas characterizes this view as that of ‘the modern lawyer’.”).
32. See THIBAUT, supra note 29, § 113, at 93; 2 SAVIGNY, supra note 4, §
LX, at 1.
33. 2 SAVIGNY, supra note 4, § LXXXV, at 234.
34. See generally Puchta, supra note 29, § 28, at 101-02; 2 SAVIGNY, supra
note 4, § LXXXV, at 237-39; KELSEN, supra note 29, at 172; HANS KELSEN,
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Regarding “things,” the thinking of the modern theorists seems
to have headed off in two rather different, if not opposing,
directions. On the one hand, at least some theorists provided an
even more expansive definition of “thing” than did Grotius,
namely, “all that which is not a ‘subject’.” To this non-subject,
these theorists gave the new term “object.” As Thibaut put it, “By
thing (res) is meant whatever neither is nor can be the subject of a
legal relation, but yet may be the object of a legal transaction and
so mediately the object of a right . . .” 35 Other theorists, however,
provided a restrictive definition of “thing,” one that limited that
category to what the Romans called res corporales that is, natural
and man-made objects that exist in time and in space and that can
be sensed. 36 A good example of this restrictive definition is
provided by the German Romanist Puchta:
The jural relationships in which man stands as an
individual relate to the external goods which he needs for
his existence. These goods–the earth, with what it
produces and that man makes thereof–are primariy
destined for the supply of the wants which he has . . .
The principle of right does not deal with these external
goods in all their natural multiplicity, but it brings into
prominence their univeral character as destined for man
and his wants. This common characteristic is expressed by
the word “thing”. . . 37
The true point of restricting the category of “things” in this
way was to expel from that category a class of “somethings” that,
in the minds of these theorists, had never properly belonged there,
namely, so-called “incorporeal” things. For these theorists, that
class of “somethings,” scientifically understood, belonged in a
different category altogether, namely, that of “rights” or
“obligations.” 38 The effect of this reclassification, obviously

GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 97-98 (Anders Wedberg trans.,
1945).
35. THIBAUT, supra note 29, § 146, at 116. This seems to be the definition
Nicholas has in mind when he states that, for a modern lawyer, “things” refers to
“rights and duties themselves.” NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 60.
36. Puchta, supra note 29, § 23, at 69-70.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XIII, at 361-62, & 2 AUSTIN,
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enough, is a re-“materialization” of the concept of “thing.”
During the 20th century a number of thinkers within the civil
law tradition took yet another look at one or another of the aspects
of the distinction between persons and things. Perhaps the most
famous of these thinkers was the German civilist and positivist
legal philosopher Kelsen. As was his wont, when he came to the
traditional concept of “person,” he set about attempting to
demythologize 39 it. Because his point of view is so distinctive and
because it became so influential, at least in some quarters, his
remarks merit being reproduced at length:
The concept of the legal person–who, by definition, is the
subject of legal duties and legal rights–answers the need
of imagining a bearer of rights and duties. Juristic thinking
is not satisfied with the insight that a certain human action
or omission forms the contents of a duty or a right. There
must exist something that “has” the duty or the right. In
this idea a general trend of human thought is manifested.
Empirically observable qualities, too, are interpreted as
qualities of an object or a substance, and grammatically
they are represented as predicates of a subject. This
substance is not an additional entity. The grammatical
subject denoting it is only a symbol of the fact that the
qualities form a unity. . . 40
. . . What, now, does the statement of traditional theory
mean that the legal order invests the human being, or a
group of human beings, with the quality of legal
personality–with the qualify of being a “person”? It
means that the legal order imposes obligations upon, or
confers rights to, human beings, that is, that the legal
order makes human behavior to content of obligations and
rights. “To be a person” or “to have a legal personality” is
identical with having legal obligations and subjective

supra note 6, lect. XLVI, at 777; see generally NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 9899. The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) reflects this sharp
distinction between “things,” on the one hand, and “rights,” on the other,
together with this restrictive definition of the former. See BGB § 90 (“Only
corporeal objects are things as defined by law”).
39. See KELSEN, supra note 34, at 93.
40. Id.
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rights. The person as a holder of obligations and rights is
not something that is different from the obligations and
rights, as whose holder the person is presented–just as a
tree which is said to have a trunk, branches, and blossoms,
is not a substance different from trunk, branches, and
blossoms, but merely the totality of these elements. The
physical or juristic person who “has” obligations and
rights as their holder, is these obligations and rights–a
complex of legal obligations and rights whose totality is
expressed figuratively in the concept of “person.”
“Person” is merely the personification of this totality. 41
. . . The statement that a person has duties and rights . . .
is meaningless or an empty tautology. It means that a set
of duties and rights, the unity of which is personified,
“has” duties and rights. . . . But it is nonsense to say that
law imposes duties and rights upon persons such a
statements means that law imposes duties upon duties and
confers rights upon rights . . . 42
So (re-) conceived, the “person” dematerializes completely; he
ceases to be even the disembodied “mind” of Grotius. The person
is not something that, existing somehow apart from legal rules,
constitutes rights and duties on the basis of those rules; rather, he is
created by those rules and is constituted by those rights and duties!
In this way the person becomes a mere “ghost in the machine” of
the legal order. 43
Influential though it may have been, Kelsen’s
reconceptualization of legal personhood failed to gain the
allegiance of everyone. Take, for example, the Belgian civilist and
natural law philosopher Jean Dabin. In his view, talk of a subject
of rights presupposes some “being” that exists prior to its
becoming a subject of rights. 44 The argument runs as follows:
But if subjective right is, in fact, in a certain manner a
41. KELSEN, supra note 29, at 172-73.
42. KELSEN, supra note 34, at 95.
43. Law brings us back to the etymological meaning. The Latin word
persona first meant “theatrical mask.” The word was borrowed to the Etruscan
phersu, designating a mask, before moving to the Greek and the Latin:
DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE (Alain Rey ed., Robert,
2006), v. Personne.
44. DABIN, supra note 29, at 107.
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relation, insofar as it is opposable to another . . . every
relation presupposes, by definition, that there be beings in
relation. Now, one of the beings in relation is precisely
the legal subject, the others being the persons who are
obliged to respect the right of the subject . . . 45
This is not to say that Dabin advocates a return to some earlier
conception of “person,” such as that of the German Pandectists or
Grotius. He does not. In fact, Dabin raises the question whether it
might not be better to dispense with the notion of “person”
altogether, retaining, in its stead, that of “subject.” 46 According to
Dabin, the concepts “person” and “subject” are not, as has so often
been assumed, equivalent. In contrast to the relatively more
malleable and contentless concept of “subject,” that of “person,”
he contends,
is introduced into scientific and philosophical language in
order to signify a notion that, though it no doubt is related
to the notion of legal subjects, nevertheless is different:
that of a being endowed with a reasonable nature and, as
such, having an end (purpose) of its own . . . 47
As Dabin sees it, this concept, though apt for describing human
beings, fails as a description of collectivities of human beings. 48
“Human beings is a reasonable ‘substance,’ but groups are only
‘accidents:’ is not reasonable substance a necessary condition for
personality?” he asks rhetorically. 49 The answer, of course, is
“yes.”
Between the time of Kelsen and Dabin and the present time,
the distinction between persons and things seems to have fallen off
the research agendas of most civilian legal scholars.50 But that
may soon be changing. The impetus for this change comes not
from within but from without the academy, specifically, from the
45. Id.
46. Id. at 107-09.
47. Id. at 108.
48. Id. at 108-09.
49. Id. at 109.
50. There is one notable exception. Between the end of the 1970s and the
end of the 1980s, Michel Villey and the others associated with the “Archives of
the Philosophy of Law,” published two sets of essays on the distinction: Les
biens et les choses, 24 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT (1979), and Le sujet
de droit, 34 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT (1989).
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society at large. Thanks to recent social and technological
changes, our society now faces a number of new social problems,
problems as to which the distinction between persons and things is
highly pertinent. One such problem is the characterization of the
human fetus. As long as abortion was criminalized, the ancient
question of whether a fetus was merely a part of the mother’s body
(and, therefore, a “thing”) or an independent human being (and,
therefore, a “person”) was no great practical significance. But
when, thanks to the women’s rights movement and the so-called
“sexual revolution,” restrictions on abortion began to fall, this
question came to the forefront of public attention. Another such
problem is the characterization of animals. The rise of the
environmental movement has precipitated a reexamination, on the
philosophical plane, of the place of human beings within the larger
natural world. The traditional view–that the natural order was
created for man and that he, as master of it, is free to do with it
more or less as he pleases–has been increasingly challenged. As a
result, proposals made, but rejected, in times past to establish for
animals some kind of status intermediate between that of “things”
and “persons” are once again attracting attention. Finally, there is
the problem–perhaps one should say problems–that have arisen as
a result of the development of new artificial reproductive
technologies. Faced with the novel and, in some cases, utterly
fantastic products of these technologies–not only “supernumerary
embryos,” but also “clones” and “chimeras”–, our society grapples
with what to make of them (are they persons or things?) and what
to do with them (should they be given rights and, if so, what
rights?). If the law is to respond to these problems, it will require,
among other things, an adequate theory of the distinction between
persons and things. Revisiting that distinction, then, could not be
more timely.
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INTRODUCTION
“I will inhabit my name” writes the poet St John Perse 1 to
highlight how the name can make a person and symbolise his/her
∗

Doctor in Law; Lecturer, University of Essex (United Kingdom).
1. ST JOHN PERSE, EXIL, VI (1942). Alexis Saint Léger, French citizen of
Guadeloupe, took the pseudonym of Saint John Perse. Some also translate as “I
will live my name.”
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identity. Certainly, a person cannot be reduced to a name as Juliet
warns us:
What's in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet;
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call'd,
Retain that dear perfection which he owes
Without that title. Romeo, doff thy name,
And for that name which is no part of thee
Take all myself. 2
Nonetheless, “a necessary and usual sign of personality, the
name concentrates personality and expresses it.” 3 Some cultures
even believe that changing names could cure a person of illhealth. 4 Embodiment of a person, the name is protected both in
article 24-2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and in article 8 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties.
It thus should not come as a surprise that both England and
France declare that the name cannot be object of a property right.
Though the name embodies so much of a person, it cannot be
considered as a thing or good on which one holds property rights.
So to the question “is the name property?” the answer is a
straightforward “no.” End of the matter then? Not quite. The
study of Du Boulay v. Du Boulay, 5 where the Privy Council
affirms the English law position, reveals that France and England
did not have the same approach in 1869. The case revolved around
the question of what protection French law, as applied in the
Caribbean island of Saint Lucia, offered to the person whose name
was used by another. 6 If the Privy Council concluded that French

2. W. SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, Act 2, Scene 2, lines 43-48
(1594).
3. R. NERSON, LES DROITS EXTRAPATRIMONIAUX 33 (LGDJ 1939).
4. J. Carbonnier refers to the oriental beliefs that to change a person’s name
when ill will cure this person. 1 J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL: LES PERSONNES
190 (PUF 1957).
5. Du Boulay v. Du Boulay, L.R. 2 PC 430 (1869).
6. Because the Treaty of 1815, which marked the end of Napoleon’s
Empire, conceded to the United Kingdom the Caribbean island Saint Lucia,
former French colony alongside Martinique and Guadeloupe, French law was
applicable at the time. Martinique, from where the plaintiffs originated from,
and Guadeloupe remained French territories. For a history of Saint Lucia, see
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law offered no protection because the various pertinent legislations
in question had not been introduced in Saint Lucia for specific
registration, it did not dispute the fact that the said legislation was
presented as embodying a “property right” in the name. And
indeed, in 1869, the traditional justification in French law courts, a
justification which dated back to the 18th century, was that the
name is property, albeit a different kind of property than that of
other goods or things. Only at the very end of the 19th century was
this perception overturned, 7 allowing, in that respect, French law
to become identical to English law. But why, then, did France
maintain for so long a position so contrary to that of England? Can
the name be related to property? Do we have to revise the takenfor-granted distinction between persons and things, at least for the
name?
The question is even more puzzling when one compares in
detail the French and English laws of surnames. Indeed, despite
now the common affirmation that there is no property right on the
name, English and French laws differ significantly in their
specifics, and that difference appears to challenge their shared
agreement on the name not being property. English law considers
that a person is at liberty to change name with no limit other than
that of not committing fraud; correlatively, a person cannot forbid
a stranger to use his/her name: “the mere assumption of a name,
which is the patronymic of a family, by a stranger who had never
before been called by that name, whatever cause of annoyance it
may be to the family, is a grievance for which our Law affords no
redress.” 8 Those two attributes of English law reinforce the idea
that a person does not seem to “own” his/her name: s/he exercises
a liberty which stretches as far as allowing him/her to assume
different names, whatever inconvenience such attitude can create,
as long as there is no fraud.
By contrast, to an outsider, French law can appear to create a
property right or at least a proprietary interest in the name. Indeed,

H. BREEN, ST LUCIA: HISTORICAL, STATISTICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE (Longman,
Brown, Green and Longmans 1844), available also on Google Books.
7. See Du Boulay. The doctrine played a major role in this evolution which
became accepted “truth,” despite sporadic decisions of the courts affirming the
contrary until mid-twentieth century, See Cass. Civ., March 1st, 1957 BULL.
1957, 2, 129; Cass. Civ., June 11th, 1963, GAZ PAL. 2, 290 (1963).
8. Du Boulay.
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contrary to what happens in English law, a person cannot change
names on his/her own accord and has various rights of action
before the courts, notably when someone else uses his/her name
without his/her consent, even if there is no fraud. It is as if the
plaintiff “owns” his/her name and that “ownership” is sufficient to
trigger legal protection against any use of the name “owned.” 9
And yet, French law is adamant that there is no property right in
the name.
One can only wonder how English and French laws, opposite
in their features, can nonetheless reach the same conclusion.
Surely, one or the other got it wrong? Could it be French law, as it
used to affirm exactly the contrary until the early 20th century?
The Privy Council case of Du Boulay seems to suggest so.
However, the topic deserves a more thorough investigation,
especially when one looks at the third feature of the law of
surnames, i.e. whether a person can or cannot dispose of his/her
name by contract or by will.
In English law a will can be drafted so as to include a “name
and arms” clause, which typically transfers the land or any other
property to another person on the condition that he (or more rarely,
she) takes the name of the testator. This possibility to dispose of
one’s own name seems to contradict completely the English law’s
affirmation that a person has no property right to his/her name.
This time, is it English law that misunderstood the true nature of
the name?
Comparison with French law only increases the confusion.
Indeed, in France, a person cannot transfer his/her name by will or
even by contract, a prohibition that seems to confirm the claim that
there is no property right to the name in French law. But then, how
can it be reconciled with the other components of the French law
of surnames, which seem to suggest the contrary?
To provide the beginning of an answer to those various
questions, we will first have to go back in time, at least for French
law. As the work of the French legal historian Anne LefebvreTeillard demonstrated, the French law of surnames has changed
dramatically since the Middle Ages, whereas English law, as far as
we could gather, does not seem to have undergone any profound

9. See R. Munday, The French Law of Surnames: A Study in Rights of
Property, Personality and Privacy, 6 LEGAL STUDIES 79, 88-90 (1986).
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transformation. 10 This evolution of French Law affected not only
its features, but also the different theoretical rationales it developed
to explain those features.
Compared with English law, this analysis will shed new light
on our original question–“is the name property?”–in view of the
three elements of the law of surnames: whether a person can or
cannot dispose of one’s own name (I), protect it (II), and change it
(III).
I. TO DISPOSE OF ONE’S NAME:
SYMBOL OF A PROPERTY RIGHT?
Roman law recognized that a person could dispose of his name
(gens) by requiring a beneficiary of a donation or a will to bear his
name in exchange for receiving the goods or property. 11 Whether
this practice survived the collapse of the Roman Empire in the 5th
century is unclear, but it somehow reappeared in the Middle Ages
in connection with arms and land possessed by the nobility. In
English law, “inserted in a will or settlement by which property is
given to a person,” 12 the name and arms clause imposes on him
“the condition that he shall assume the surname and arms of the
testator or settlor, with a direction that if he neglects to assume or
discontinues the use of them, the estate shall devolve on the next
person in remainder.” 13
To what extent this ancient practice to dispose of one’s own
name is used nowadays is difficult to say, for the last legal
challenge was in 1962. 14 Yet it remains a feature of modern
English law, whereas French law currently ignores it. “Currently”
must we emphasize, because until the mid-nineteenth century, the
practice was still alive. English and French laws of surnames have
not always diverged in their features (A), albeit the theoretical
10. A. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, LE NOM: DROIT ET HISTOIRE (PUF 1990).
11. See H. HOULLIER DE VILLEDIEU, DE LA PROPRIETE DES NOMS
PATRONYMIQUES EN DROIT ROMAIN ET EN DROIT FRANÇAIS 32-34 (Oudin
Poitiers, thèse 1883); and E. PERREAU, LE DROIT AU NOM EN MATIERE CIVILE
153-154 (Sirey 1910). Both authors cite De Officiis by Cicero.
12. E. JOWITT, THE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW (Sweet & Maxwell
1959), v. “Name and arms clause.”
13. Id.
14. In Re Neeld, Carpenter v. Inigo-Jones and others, CA (1962) All E.R.
335, (1962) Ch. 643.
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justification by which French lawyers explained this opportunity to
dispose of one’s own name promotes a reassessment of whether
the name is property or not (B).
A. The Practice: French Variations and English Constancy
The name and arms clause is one of those features English law
seems to have always known but whose origins are quite uncertain.
According to Lord Evershed, “the existence of clauses of this kind
for a hundred years or more in the precedent books and the absence
until 1945 of any reported attempt to challenge their validity is, I
venture to think, somewhat impressive;” 15 a statement which Lord
Upjohn affirmed: “Names and arms clauses have been known for
the best part of two hundred years.” 16 Certainly, cases attesting of
the practice go back up to the 18th century, but it is probably safe to
presume that the clause, regarded as “relics of feudalism” by a
modern commentator, 17 was introduced around the 12th century
when surnames appeared and started to symbolise a noble
household, its reputation, and its wealth. Originally used by the
nobility, the clause allows for an estate to remain within the
family, under its name and arms, in a situation where the latter
would have disappeared, if it were not for the clause.
In accordance with custom, for the name and the law of arms,
only direct male heirs are entitled to take the name and arms; in
their absence, name and arms cease to be transmitted to the next
generation and simply disappear. So although the land and the
related property would be transmitted to the family through the
remaining female line, the connection between land and name, and
possibly coat of arms, would be lost. To avoid such possibility, a
testator who wishes to maintain his name and arms alive will use a
name and arms clause, requiring his daughter, her children and/or
her spouse, or even his nephew, to bear his name and arms as a
condition to inherit the estate or part of the estate 18 given. Failure
to comply with the clause would simply lead to the loss of the

15. Id. at 344 (dissent).
16. Id. at 354.
17. O. M. Stone, Name Worship and Statutory Interpretation in the Law of
Wills, 26 MOD. L. REV. 652, 656 (1963).
18. Barlow v Bateman, (1730) 3 P Wms 65.

2008]

IS THE NAME PROPERTY?

27

estate, which would pass in remainder to the next person identified
in the will, who also would have to take the name and arms.
The effectiveness of the clause in passing names, in connection
to estates, to several generations down the line is best illustrated in
In Re Neeld 19 decided by the Court of Appeal in 1962. T, the
testator, devised a will where two names and arms clauses were at
stake: one by which the name Inigo-Jones should be used, and
another by which the name and arms of Neeld should be taken.
What is interesting is that the first name was the testator’s initial
surname, before he changed it in 1941 to comply with a name and
arms clause, that of Neeld, as settled in Neeld’s will in 1855,
nearly a century before. In other words, one clause was a way of
perpetuating his own name (Inigo-Jones) despite his change of
surname; the other clause allowed for the other name (Neeld) to be
maintained, by making sure that the original name and arms clause
drafted in 1855 would still be complied with by the second and
third generations. 20 Obviously, ensuring the diversity of names
was not the sole purpose of the second clause: there were property
interests at stake that the testator did not wish to forfeit.
Notwithstanding, the name and arms clause is an effective means
to secure the use of a name that would otherwise become
extinguished.
Such possibility to transfer one’s own name to future
generations had not always found approval. In 1766, Lord
Mansfield considered the clause as “silly;” 21 and it is true that
nowadays the clause appears to be “a relic of a bygone age,” 22 for
some, “English law . . . show[ing] far too much tolerance of the
mythology which the dead past imposes on the living present.” 23
Not surprisingly then, from 1945 onwards, a series of cases
threatened the clause’s existence. The courts held a number of
clauses too uncertain in their requirements, e.g. the testator not
specifying when the change of name must be effective. 24 They
19. In Re Neeld.
20. Id. at 338.
21. Gulliver d. Corris v Ashby, (1766) 4 Burr 1930, 1941 (“so silly a
condition as this is”).
22. In Re Neeld, at 466 (Cross J.).
23. Stone, supra note 17, at 657.
24. Re Bouverie, Bouverie v Marshall, (1952) 1 All ER 408, (1952) Ch. 40;
Re Woods Will Trusts, Wood v Donnelly, (1952) 1 All ER 740, (1952) Ch. 406;
Re Murray, Martins Bank Ltd v Dill, (1955) Ch 69, (1954) 3 All ER 129, CA;
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also declared the clauses contrary to public policy “in so far as they
affect the names of married women or their husbands” 25 and force
either the wives not to adopt their husbands’ or husbands to adopt
their wives’ family name. The courts’ eagerness “to control these
relics of feudalism” 26 came to a halt in 1962 when the Court of
Appeal concluded that the “wind of change developed against
these clauses in a number of authorities . . . was but a light, fickle
and variable breeze.” 27 Even the dissenting Lord Evershed
thought that “if clauses of this king, which have been part of the
conveyancing system in our country for very many years, ought
now to be treated as contrary to public policy, that is a matter for
Parliament rather than for the courts.” 28 Parliament not having
intervened, the name and arms clauses continue to be a feature of
English law of surnames, allowing people to transfer their own
names, and sometimes their coats of arms, at the same time as their
property.
In the 21st century, the contrast with French law could not be
more striking. Modern French law ignores such possibility, and
the clause is conspicuous by its absence in current law books. Yet,
like in English law, the name and arms clause had been a feature of
the French law of surnames for hundreds of years. The clause was
part of the mechanism of the saisine, a concept born in the Middle
Ages. Literally, saisine means the action of seizing, of taking over
and in that sense, there may well be a connection with the English
concept of seisin which refers to feudal possession. 29 Legally
though, the saisine is the use of a “thing” (chose) corporeal or
incorporeal which closes, with time passing by, the possibility for
others to complain about it. 30

and Re Howard's Will Trusts, Levin v Bradley, (1961) Ch 507, (1961) 2 All ER
413.
25. Stone, supra note 17, at 656.
26. Id. at 656.
27. In Re Neeld, at 354 (Lord Upjohn, for the majority).
28. Id. at 347.
29. The scope of this article did not allow us to investigate the matter, but it
would be an interesting subject for a legal historian. See for example, E. LEHR,
ELÉMENTS DE DROIT CIVIL ANGLAIS § 368 (Larose-Forsel 1885), who uses the
term of “saisine” to translate the “livery of seisin” of English law. Whether the
author knew of the Middle Ages concept remains to be investigated, in a future
research project.
30. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 44.
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Applied to the name, 31 the saisine has exactly the same feature
as the name and arms clause in English law. It will allow for the
use of the name by persons other than those in the direct male line
and who are still part of the same household. Indeed, a nobleman
who has only daughters or has no heirs at all can transfer, to his
son-in-law, grandson, or nephew, his name which would otherwise
become extinguished for lack of direct male heirs. The clause
would be inserted either in his daughter’s wedding contract or in
his will, often on the condition that if other collateral male heirs
exist they would consent to the transfer. 32
Like in English law, assumption of the name was sufficient to
satisfy the clause. After all, the saisine is about the use of the
name for a certain period of time–the longer the better. Still, on
both sides of the Channel, those who changed their name to
comply with a clause may wish to secure their new name (and
position) by seeking the Crown’s approval, in the form of, in
French law, a letter patent,33 and in English law, a royal licence, an
Act of Parliament, or more rarely a letter patent. 34
With similar origins as its English counterpart, the name and
arms clause in old French law served the same purpose:
perpetuating a name in connection with arms and an estate,
primarily within the nobility. Hence, the French Revolution, with
its quest to abolish any sign associated with the nobility, should
have seen the disappearance of the clause. However, despite its
feudal origins, the practice survived the turmoil of the Revolution.
In the first half of the 19th century, the Cour de cassation
(hereinafter, Court of Cassation) the French supreme court for civil
and criminal matters, and even the Conseil d’Etat (hereinafter,

31. The “saisine” has been used in other areas, like inheritance law. See P.
OURLIAC & J. L. GAZZANIGA, HISTOIRE DU DROIT PRIVE 207-209 (1985).
32. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 46; 2 DENISART, COLLECTION
DE DECISIONS NOUVELLES ET DE NOTIONS RELATIVES A LA JURISPRUDENCE
ACTUELLE 256 (Desaint 1766); and 12 GUYOT, REPERTOIRE UNIVERSEL ET
RAISONNE DE JURISPRUDENCE CIVILE, CRIMINELLE, CANONIQUE ET BENEFICIALE

175 (Visse 1784).
33. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 107-109.
34. One is recorded in 1317 about arms, in DOM PEDRO DE ALCAZAR, LAWS
ARMS
IN
MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND,
available
at
OF
http://www.sca.org/heraldry/laurel/lexarm.html (last visited November 6, 2008).
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Council of State), 35 decided a few cases attesting to the use of
name and arms clauses either in wedding contracts 36 or in wills. 37
But that the practice survived was a Pyrrhic victory, and by the
second half of the 19th century, English and French laws stopped
converging. Indeed, the context in which the clause was born and
has developed has fundamentally changed in France, but not in
England. Whereas the liberty to change names remained in
English law, it was abolished in French law with the law of 6
fructidor an II (1794). From then on, nobody could assume a new
name by reputation as was the practice before the Revolution, or as
is still the practice in English law. In order to use a new name, one
has to ask for an official change of name prior to that use and in
accordance with the administrative procedure established by law of
11 germinal an XI (April, 1803). Copied more or less on the
administrative procedure used before the Revolution for the letters
patent granted by the King, 38 the procedure means that the person
has to establish what would later be called a “legitimate reason” to
change his name. 39
Whether a name and arms clause can constitute such
“legitimate reason” after the Revolution is unclear. The procedure
is mainly administrative and only extensive research in the French
Government’s archives would allow for an accurate answer.
However, one case of 1831 shows that the French Government, at
least in the early 19th century, was not necessarily adverse to the
name and arms clause. 40 An ordonnance (hereinafter, ordinance)
of 1815, taken in accordance with the procedure of 1803,
authorised the son-in-law to take the names (and title) of his wife’s
father, 41 once the latter died. Better, the same case reveals that
sixteen years later, the Council of State, the French ‘supreme
court’ 42 for administrative matters, is not hostile per se to the
clause. Indeed, the court considered that the period of one year to
35. CE, December 16th, 1831 S. 1832 II 103.
36. Cass. Civ., January 13th, 1813, S. 1812-1814, 1, 259.
37. Cass. Req., November 16th, 1824, S.V. 1822-1824, 1, 561; S. 1825, 1,
148. The case was actually cited by the plaintifs in Du Boulay.
38. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 128-130.
39. The requirement is in the French Civil Code, article 60 al.1.
40. CE, December 16th, 1831 S. 1832 II 103.
41. Id.
42. Until the law of May 24th, 1872, the Council of State was not fully
independent (possibility for its decisions to be overturned).
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oppose the ordinance does not start at the time when the ordinance
was granted but at the time when the condition realises itself, i.e.,
here, at the time when the father dies and leaves his name to his
son-in-law. In other words, the Council of State adapted the
administrative procedure to the specific features of the name and
arms clause.
Even the Court of Cassation may not be completely opposed to
the name and arms clause in this first half of the 19th century.
Indeed, in 1813, the Court rejected the argument that to promise to
bear another’s name as part of a wedding contract is, in principle,
contrary to the law of 6 fructidor an II. 43 Thus, the lack of liberty
to change one’s name established by this law does not render the
name and arms clause invalid per se. However, it does endanger
its survival, even though there may not be a direct antagonism to
the practice. Indeed, the loss of liberty to change one’s name goes
hand in hand with the obligation to comply with the procedure set
out in the law of 11 germinal an XI, an obligation that the French
courts, whether Council of State or Court of Cassation, enforce
strictly.
As a result, as long as the beneficiary of a name and arms
clause does not use the procedure, he will be considered as not
having complied with the clause. This is so even if he believed he
had already been authorised to change his name because the
French Government had granted an ordinance stating he could
change his name, but obviously without having respected the
procedure of law of 11 germinal an XI. 44
This loss of liberty to change names renders the name and arms
clause a much less attractive tool in French law. Its drafter runs
the risk that his wishes may not be respected despite the
willingness of those benefiting from the clause to comply with it.
If we add the fact that the procedure is costly 45 and involves a risk
of the request being rejected by the Government, in the long term
the clause would only lose its appeal and by the mid-nineteenth
century onwards, there is no case law attesting of the practice. 46
43. Cass. Civ., January 13th, 1813 S.1812-1814, 2, 259.
44. CE, December 16th, 1831 S. 1832, 2, 103; Cass. Req. April 22nd, 1846 S.
1848 I 417.
45. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 190 and n. 9. The procedure
became less costly closer to the 20th century.
46. The last case is of 1846: Cass. Req., April 22nd, 1846 S. 1848 I 417.
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Certainly, the clause is still mentioned in books related to
donations and wills, but the authors never cite a case less than fifty
to sixty years old, and they all affirm the necessity to comply with
the procedure of law of 11 germinal an XI. 47
In 1910, E. Perreau suggested that the clause was rarely used
and he noted indeed that “for more than sixty years, our case law
reports do not contain any decision on this question.” 48 Thereafter
the clause ceased to be mentioned anywhere. Hence, after
centuries of similar practice, French law finally departed from
English law. The impossibility to assume one’s name by
reputation without prior authorisation finally got the better of the
name and arms clause. 49 This is however only part of the story. If
the name and arms clause disappeared in French law, it is also
because it faced a new challenge at the end of the 19th and
beginning of the 20th century. Associated with the concept of
property until then, the name and arms clause could only be
affected by the movement among French scholars to condemn the
idea that the name could be property, an idea which will be from
then on considered as the correct interpretation of what the name
is. In that sense, French and English law have never been so far
apart, for even if English law does not consider the name property,
it still allows for the name and arms clause to be used in contracts
and wills.
47. See M. TROPLONG, DES DONATIONS ENTRE VIFS ET TESTAMENTS, OU
COMMENTAIRE DU TITRE 2 DU LIVRE 3 DU CODE NAPOLEON 276, §256 (H. Plon
1872): la condition de prendre le nom du testateur est très légale, et elle met
l’héritier dans l’obligation d’y satisfaire,” the author however cites no other
cases than a 1836 one (July 4th, 1836, D. 1836, 1, 302); id. G. BAUDRYLACANTINERIE & M. COLIN, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL:
DES DONATIONS ENTRE VIFS ET DES TESTAMENTS 77, § 177 (Larose 1895).
48. PERREAU, supra note 11, at 156.
49. Nowadays, the Council of State refuses to grant a change of name as a
condition to execute a will or to the person wishing to take that of his mother.
See respectively, D. Pepy, Les changements de nom dans le droit français, in
ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS DU CONSEIL D’ETAT 1966-67 31, 36; and F. Bernard, Le
Conseil d’Etat et les changements de nom, ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS DU CONSEIL
th
D’ETAT 1977-1978 67, 78. The law 57-133 of February 8 , 1957 (following a
nd
law of July 2 , 1923) remedied only partly to the loss of names due to lack of a
direct male line. See I. De Silva, Le changement de nom devant le Conseil
d’Etat: le relèvement du patronyme menacé d’extinction. Conclusion sous CE n.
236470 du 19 mai 2004, REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC ET DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE
1153, 1159 (2004); and F. Petit, La mémoire en droit privé, RRJ 17, 38-39
(1997).
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B. The Theoretical Justification of the Practice: Dispelling
Confusion
Confusion stems as much from the evolution French law went
through, as from French law contrasted with English law. Until
the early 20th century, the name was considered to be property in
French law, in contradiction to the English law’s understanding
that the name is not, as the Privy Council reminded the plaintiffs in
the 1869 case of Du Boulay. Afterwards, because of the
movement among French scholars in the 1900s, French law
adopted what is apparently the same position as English law, but
on grounds which make one wonder if the two laws of surnames
mean the same thing. To dispel this confusion, we must first
understand English law’s approach to the act of disposing of one’s
name, for it reflects on French law’s original conception of the
name. This initial analysis will shed light on the subsequent
rationales French law had adopted, highlighting where the
confusion lies.
In Du Boulay the Privy Council affirmed for the first time the
accepted understanding that the name was not property in English
law. Strictly speaking, the case does not involve a name and arms
clause, but rather raises the issue of whether a person can protect
her/his name against use by another in English law. Nonetheless,
the judgment’s wording is broad enough for the decision to
encompass the name and arms clause within its declaration that the
name is not property. A comparison between the name and the
arms or the title reinforces this conclusion. Indeed, a title is “an
incorporeal and impartible hereditament, inalienable and
descendible.” 50 In other words, it is property, 51 though it cannot
be

50. 35 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 906, at 568 (4th ed. 1994) v.
“Peerages and Dignities.” See notably Earl Cowley v Countess Cowley, (1901)
AC 450, at 457-458.
51. Note that the first meaning of the word “title” is not a dignity, but refers
to “a right of property . . . with reference either to the manner in which the right
has been acquired or as to its capacity of being effectively transferred,”
OSBORN’S CONCISE LAW DICTIONARY (Sweet & Maxwell, 10th ed. 2005), v.
“Title.”
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sold. 52 Similarly, arms are considered property, 53 although “the
right to bear arms is a dignity conferred by the Crown, and not an
incorporeal hereditament.” 54
As a consequence, both title and arms are protected against
assumption and use by another without grant, 55 whereas the name
can be assumed and used freely without formality. 56 If there is “a
personal right to bear arms” 57 and title, there is no right to bear
name, just a liberty to do so. Thus, to dispose of one’s own name
in a will is not a sign of a right of property on the name, but rather
the exercise of the liberty to make one’s will conjoined to the
liberty to assume names by reputation. 58 It is not so much about
disposing of or transferring a thing, object of property, than
exercising a liberty to assume a name in order to be able to
maintain its existence. The fact that English Law insists so much
on the name and arms clause being a voluntary assumption of a
name rather than a transfer of it can be seen in Doe d Luscombe v
Yates (1822) 59 where the beneficiary of the will had assumed the
testator’s name of Luscombe before he came into possession of the
estate, i.e. before the name and arms clause took effect. 60 If the
52. A contract for the purchase of a title is contrary to public policy and
void. Parkinson v College of Ambulance Ltd and Harrison, (1925) 2 KB 1.
53. Stubs v Stubs, [1862] 1 H & C. 257; In re Croxon, Croxon v. Ferrers,
[1904] 1 Ch. 252, 258. Note that the common law courts do not have
jurisdiction, see HALSBURY’S, supra note 50, at § 970, p. 599.
54. 42 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 749 (4th ed. 1994) v.
“Settlements”; and Manchester Corpn v Manchester Palace of Varieties Ltd,
(1955) P 133, (1955) 1 All ER 387.
55. Title: Earl Cowley v Countess Cowley, (1901) AC 450, 460; see 2
JARMAN ON WILLS 1532, 1533 (8th ed 1951).
Arms: In re Croxon, Croxon v. Ferrers, (1904) 1 Ch. 252, 258; In re Berens,
In re Dowdeswell, Berens-Dowdeswell v. Holland-Martin, (1926) 1 Ch. 596,
604-605; and Barlow v Bateman, 3 P. Wms 65, on appeal (1735) 2 Bro Parl Cas
272, HL.
56. Doe d Luscombe v Yates, (1822) 5 B & Ald 544; Davies v Lowndes,
(1835) 1 Bing NC 597; Bevan v Mahon-Hagan, (1893) 31 LR Ir 342, CA; and
Barlow v Bateman, (1730) 3 P Wms 65.
57. In re Berens, at 605.
58. In re Neeld, at 353-354; Re Howard's, at 523; In re Berens, at 604-605;
and Du Boulay, at 447.
59. Doe d Luscombe.
60. John Luscombe Manning was required to assume the name of
Luscombe once he had “attained the age of 21 years” and be entitled to the
estate. However, during his minority, he assumed the testator’s name of
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name and arms clause was a transfer of the name-property, the
name could not be used before the clause became effective, i.e.
before Luscombe inherited the estate. However, Luscombe, like
any disposee, did not need the clause to be able to bear the name:
he retained the possibility to assume the testator’s name, whether
or not the latter drafted the clause.
That English law puts the emphasis on the liberty to assume
another’s name rather than on the transfer of name-property by the
testator does not surprise when compared to what we know of the
origin of the name and arms clause in French law. The French
medieval concept of saisine is the prolonged use of a “thing” that
does not create a right of ownership, but that extinguishes the right
of others to complain about the use. 61 Like in English law, what
matters is that there is an assumption of a name for a period of time
long enough for the person to secure the use of his name, a bit like
an adoption, rather than a donation. 62 The emphasis is on the
liberty to change name rather than on the testator’s supposed right
to transfer the name. And because, like in English law, the French
saisine is neither property nor possession, the name is not property,
but rather the object of an exercise of liberty. But whereas English
law will retain this approach, French law will progressively drift
away from it by superposing the concept of property on the notion
of saisine and its related feature, the name and arms clause.
The association between name and property results from a
combination of factors which taken separately are not conclusive
and demonstrate how problematic the assimilation between name
and property can be. It all started when, at the end of the Middle
Ages, French lawyers ceased to understand the concept of the
saisine. Trained in Roman law, they turned towards the more
familiar concepts of possession and property to explain the features
of the saisine. In his commentaries of the Justinian Code, Balde (†
1400) affirmed that the name was bien hors du commerce (a thing
outside commerce), in order to highlight the fact that the right on
the name as known in the saisine does not incorporate the right to

Luscombe and was known thereafter by this surname instead of his own
surname.
61. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 44.
62. Id. at 46.
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sell the name. 63 The link he established between the name and
“goods” (biens) made it tempting later on to try to qualify the right
attached to the name, and what is better suited than the right to
property, which concerns goods? 64
Under that light, the clause mechanism seems to point towards
an act of disposition, indicative not of possession, but more of a
property right on the name. There is a donation of a name rather
than an adoption as it was understood in the Middle Ages. The
onus is thus on the transfer from testator to disposee rather than on
the disposee’s liberty to assume a new name. For French lawyers,
this correlation between name and property is comforted by the
fact that the surname has become hereditary in the sense that the
father gives his name to his children. Again, the emphasis on the
person who “transfers” the name rather on the one who “receives”
it.
This use of Roman law to reshape rationales underlying
existing practices is not surprising. France, like most continental
countries, had been deeply influenced by Roman law–much more
than England ever had been. 65 So although French and English
laws continue to recognise the name and arms clause and the
liberty to assume a new name, by the late 18th century, the
rationale provided changed dramatically, introducing confusion
about what the name is and is not.
The artificial character of the link made between name and
property can be seen in the wording used to describe the French
law of surnames, just before the 1789 Revolution. In 1780, one of
the most important encyclopaedias of French law, the Repertoire
Guyot, stated that “the name is an inalienable property of each
family and household. It suffices to enjoy this property/ownership
to be a male descendant of who bears the name.” 66 One can
immediately see that the features of the original saisine remain:
the name cannot be sold, and the name and arms clause, used
mainly by the nobility because the name is a symbol of the
63. Id.
64. Id. at 83.
65. Even the seisin, which we do not know so far whether it is related to the
saisine, is described as feudal possession, implying a different kind of
possession than that of Roman law. OSBORN’S, supra note 51, at v. “seisin.”
66. Desessarts, in GUYOT, supra note 32, at 168 (author’s translation and
emphasis added), also cited in LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 84, n.
149.
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household, depends on the existence, or rather absence, of a male
line to which the name can be transferred. Thus, the declaration
that the name is property is more a standard clause than the result
of a careful analysis of both the name and the concept of property.
The forgotten saisine which remains in its features has been
dressed up with the ill-suited concept of property.
This evolution of French law would not have had such an
impact if it were not for the success the new explanation enjoyed in
the 19th century. Far from being dispelled, the confusion found a
new life, except that it was not perceived as such, but rather as the
correct view of what the name is. The case of Du Boulay is a
testament to this understanding of the law. The plaintiffs whose
arguments were based on French law cited the Dictionnaire du
Notariat (Dictionary of the Notary), affirming that the name is
property. 67 One would then think that when the presentation was
criticised in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the confusion
would disappear. Certainly, scholars demonstrated that the name
could not be disposed of by the father and thus be hereditary like
property is. 68 So in that sense, one of the factors that led to the
conclusion the name was property has been rejected.
However, concerning the name and arms clause, the link
previously made between property right and liberty to dispose of
the name is never questioned, even by those maintaining that the
name is property, 69 nor by those considering that the name could
not be property. Indeed, the reason why the name cannot be
property anymore is because it cannot be disposed of . . . by a
name and arms clause, for the disposee of the clause cannot change
his name on his own accord but must ask at the very least the
Government’s authorisation! In other words, instead of
67. Du Boulay, at 440, 443.
68. M. PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE

DE DROIT CIVIL CONFORME AU
PROGRAMME OFFICIAL DES FACULTES DE DROIT § 398 at 152 (LGDJ, 4th ed.
1906); and 1 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 141 (1952).

For Planiol, it is the legislation (loi) that obliges the father’s name to be adopted
as a sign of the father-child relationship. The criticism is not without
weaknesses. If it is true that the Civil Code provides for the nomen to be a sign
of possessing the status of son or daughter, it is nonetheless notoriously silent
concerning the surname to be given at birth. Until the reforms of 2002 and
2003, custom dictated that the legitimate child should have his father’s name.
69. SALVETON, LE NOM EN DROIT ROMAIN ET EN DROIT FRANÇAIS 305 (thèse
1887), cited by PH. NERAC, LA PROTECTION DU NOM PATRONYMIQUE EN DROIT
CIVIL (ETUDE DE JURISPRUDENCE) 15 (PUF 1979).
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disappearing, the emphasis put on the testator disposing of the
name, is strengthened by the disappearance of the liberty to assume
one’s name.
The name and arms clause is not analysed anymore as the
conjunction of two liberties, that of making one’s will and that of
changing names, but as simply the act of writing a will that
opposes the principle of immutability of names and that cannot
therefore survive. Perreau, at the heart of the movement
combating the name presented as property in the 1900s, clearly
links the impossibility to dispose of the name with the prohibition
to change one’s name at will. “What instability, indeed, what
difficulties, what confusion and what frauds, in family and
business relationships, if anybody could modify his name as freely
as the composition of his estate (patrimoine)!” 70 Thus, Perreau
associates property with both liberty to dispose of the name and
liberty to assume another’s name: loss of the latter implies loss to
dispose of the name and thus loss of property rights. 71
Paradoxically, but easily understandable as the concept of the
saisine had not yet been rediscovered, 72 Perreau’s reasoning
perpetuates the original confusion introduced after the 15th century,
whereas the original intention of the author is to dispel the
confusion between name and property!
The argument definitely loses its apparent logic when
compared with English law. To follow Perreau’s line of reasoning
means that English law should affirm that the name is property as
it not only accepts the practice of the name and arms clause but
also recognises the liberty to change names. And yet, English law
refuses to consider the name to be property, clearly distinguishing
it from the title and arms. Hence, although English and modern
French laws appear to agree that the name is not property, their
understanding rests on an analysis of their respective practices
which are contradictory. However, as before, this contradiction
70. E. Perreau, De l’incessibilité du nom civil, REVUE CRITIQUE DE
548, 550 (1900).
71. “It appears to us that the Government’s authorisation would be
necessary nowadays, otherwise we would be confronted to a true cession of the
name”, i.e. to the name being a thing object of property, see Perreau, supra note
70, at 552.
72. The major work of A. Lefebvre-Teillard has not yet been written. In
addition, legal history has just been introduced as part of the curriculum in
French law schools.
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does not rest much on what is property in relation to the name.
Rather it builds on an historical misconstruction to which has been
added a new twist by the loss of the liberty to change names in
French law.
The introduction of the concept of extra-patrimonial right to
explain the particularities of the modern French law of surnames
only reinforces this evolution. Indeed, at the same time that
Perreau demonstrated the name cannot be property, he used a new
concept developed by German scholars as explained by Saleilles73
and which put the emphasis on what is a person in relation to
his/her name. The name is the object of an extra-patrimonial right
characterised by four elements: not at disposal, not to be seized,
not transmittable, and not prescribed by time. 74 Opposed to
property rights, the concept puts the emphasis on what is a person
intrinsically. The person’s identity that the name reveals is
confused with the immutability of the person 75 as a human being.
As a result, it made it difficult for French law to conceive that
the liberty to dispose one’s name is not a liberty to dispose of the
person’s identity and essence. It’s as if to recognise both liberties
would be allowing the person to sell him/herself like a vulgar
object of trade, of property. This particular conception of a person
marks the divergence between French and English laws. Thus,
what is at stake behind the liberty to dispose or not of one’s name
is not so much a reflection of what is property than a vision of
what is a person, since the 20th century introduction of the concept
of extra-patrimonial right in French law. Whether a similar
conclusion could apply to the protection of one’s name against the
use by another remains to be demonstrated.
73. R. Saleilles, Le droit au nom individuel dans le code civil pour l’empire
d’Allemagne: Note sous l’article 12 du Code civil allemand, REVUE CRITIQUE DE
LEGISLATION 94 (1900).
74. Among the many studies about extra-patrimonial rights from which is
derived the personality right, see NERSON, supra note 3; and P. Kayser, Les
droits de la personnalité. Aspects théoriques et pratiques, REV. TRIM. DR. CIV.
45, spec. 492 (1971).
75. Perreau, supra note 70, at 559; M. Gobert, “Le nom ou la redécouverte
d’un masque”, I 2966 JCP § 4, 20 (1980); M. Gobert, Rapport de synthèse, in
LA NOUVELLE LOI SUR LE NOM (ARTICLE 43 DE LA LOI DU 23 DECEMBRE 1985)
185, 197 (LGDJ 1985); Munday, supra note 9, at 94. Similarly, to the
philosopher Hume, identity coincides with immutability, Treatise of Human
Nature (1739), Book I, Part IV, section IV; also quoted in S. FERRET,
L’IDENTITÉ 20 (GF Flammarion 1998).

40

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 1

II. TO PROTECT ONE’S NAME:
THE EXERCISE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT?
Both English and French laws offer protection against the use
of a name by another. Indeed, like Roman law before, 76 they
recognise that a person cannot use another’s name for purposes of
fraud. 77 Beyond this specific situation however they diverge
significantly. Even if there is no intention to defraud, French law
offers to a person legal protection as long as he has not consented
to the use, whereas English law refuses to do so. This divergence
of practice would not have been of any significance for our debate
if French law had not affirmed for a long time that the name was
property, implying that the legal action available to protect the
name was the exercise of a property right on the name. It is this
understanding that the plaintiffs in Du Boulay put forward in
support of their claim that the Privy Council should prohibit the
defendant to bear the name of Du Boulay. Not contesting that
French law recognised a property right, 78 the Privy Council
affirmed the difference with English law: the “mere assumption of
a name by a stranger . . . whatever cause of annoyance it may be to
the family, is a grievance for which our Law affords no redress.” 79
Thus, the traditional interpretation of the case is that in English law
the name is not property. Could it be then that to protect one’s
name against the use by another is a sign of a property right? An
analysis of the argument in French law reveals confusion about the
name being property (A), a confusion the doctrine will try to dispel
in the early 20th century, offering a specific vision of the name in
contrast to the English law’s approach (B).

A. The Source of the Confusion
The possibility for a person to oppose the use of her name by
another arose in the Middle Ages with our already-encountered
76. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 43-46; and HOULLIER DE
VILLEDIEU, supra note 11, at 36-37.
77. Du Boulay, at 440-441; Cass. Civ., June 22nd, 1971, D. 1971, somm.
181.
78. French law was applicable at the time in St Lucia, id. at § 3.
79. Id. at 441.
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French law concept of the saisine. Indeed, the saisine has twotiers: the first, the name and arms clause, is to be exercised when
the name is about to be extinguished for lack of direct male heirs,
on the condition that if other male heirs exist they have to consent
to the transfer; the second, correlative of the first, is for the male
heirs to protect their “right” on the name by forbidding anybody,
including close relatives, to bear their names if they have not
consented that they do so.
Like for the name and arms clause, what matters is to ensure
that the noble name remains within the family or persons to be
trusted, in order to avoid confusion with commoners. This
protection of the name as the symbol of a household is particularly
important in a world where there is, in principle, liberty to use
another’s name as long as it is without fraud. If the protection
were not available, anybody could exercise his liberty to change
names and take a noble name. Thus the nobility needs specific
protection and the saisine provides it by opening a legal action to
all members of a family who do not need to prove damage or
fraud. Those features of the civil action will pass the test of time
untouched. However, the original context in which they were born
will be lost and, like the name and arms clause, by the end of the
18th century until the early 20th century, the legal action will be
presented as the exercise of a property right in respect to both the
holder of the action (1) and the requirement not to prove damage
(2). The confusion could not be greater.
1. The Holder of the Action
Because of the purpose served by the saisine, to protect one’s
name is to protect not simply the name one bears but also the name
of the family one belongs to but does not bear. Thus the legal
action is opened to a variety of persons who have in common their
interest in maintaining the household name intact. Because the
concept of the saisine was misunderstood, as we have seen with
the name and arms clause, French lawyers started to present in
1780 “the name [as] an inalienable property of each family and
household” 80 in order to explain the specific characteristic of the
legal action. The expression survived the turmoil of the French
80. Desessarts, in GUYOT, supra note 32, at 168, v. “Nom” (author’s
translation and emphasis added).
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Revolution, and during the 19th century the courts did not hesitate
to declare that “the family name is their exclusive property,” 81 that
“the name is part of the persons’ status and belongs exclusively to
the members of the family,” 82 or that “the family name is a
property . . . to which even the State cannot impair/infringe without
the consent of the family.” 83
Until the early 20th century, scholarly works maintained the
confusion and alongside the courts, they continued to affirm that
the legal action to protect one’s family name is the exercise of a
property right. Some, however, recognised that a true property
right only offers legal protection to the owner of the property, not
to the owner’s family. In order to provide a more adequate
explanation, they developed two lines of arguments. Either they
presented the name as a special type of property shared with
several people, 84 or they considered the name an example of coownership. 85 In any case, they did not question the affirmation of
the name being property. To the contrary, they perpetuated an
explanation which associated the name with the ill-suited concept
of property whereas the origins of the legal action they tried to
explain rested on the saisine, which resisted any assimilation to
property. Understanding that the unchecked affirmation did not
and could not rest on solid grounds shed light on English law’s
understanding in Du Boulay. Because analysis of French legal
history demonstrates that there is no link between protecting the
name and property, a contrario, there cannot be a link between
lack of protection of the name and lack of property rights in the
name. Thus when English law affirms the name is not property, it
81. Paris, March 20th, 1826, S.V. 1825-1827, 2, 214 ; S. 1826 II 214.
82. Paris, March 22nd, 1828 S.V. 1828-1830, 2, 60. Was at stake here the
action of a father agains the use of his name by his illegitimate son born out of
adultery.
83. Douai, December 26th, 1835 S. 1837 II 188; similarly, Riom, January
nd
2 , 1865, D. 1865, 2, 17 ; Agen, June 26th, 1860, D. 1860, 2, 141. Overall, see
E. Agostini, La protection du nom patronymique et la nature du droit au nom,
DALLOZ chr. 313 (1973).
84. For example, J. A. LALLIER, DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ DES NOMS ET DES TITRES
(Giard 1890); it echoes the Court of Appeal of Riom, January 2nd, 1865 D.P.
1865, 2, 17 “a right sui generis.”
85. 4 J. BONNECASE, SUPPL. TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL DE BAUDRYLACANTINIERE § 290, at 566 (1928); for a summary, see M. Herzog-Evans,
Autonomie de la volonté et nom. Un plaidoyer, RRJ 48-49 (1997); and NERAC,
supra note 69, at 15-17.
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cannot be because it does not protect the name against use by
another (except for fraud).
A similar conclusion applies to the other characteristic of the
legal action recognised in French law and related to the conditions
in which it operates.
2. The Conditions of the Legal Action
According to the traditional presentation, those entitled to bring
a civil law suit to protect their name against use by another are not
required to prove the existence of damage (prejudice).
Assumption of the name suffices to justify their legal action. In
the original context of the saisine, this condition is not a surprise.
The noble name is sufficiently known for its assumption by a third
party to create injury to the family members by the association it
brings between the stranger and the family. In practice, there is
damage, except that it is an implicit but obvious consequence of
the assumption. Proving the assumption equals proving the
damage, and there is no need to require additional evidence. 86
However, the original context of the civil action being lost,
scholars will be puzzled by the affirmation that there is no proof of
damages, especially when compared to the conditions surrounding
another legal action available to protect against the use of
surnames by another, for the latter apparently requires the
opposite, i.e. proof of damage. Indeed, when a person tries to
obtain confirmation of his new surname, he has to request a letter
patent to the Crown, a procedure which evolved to incorporate a
period of time during which people could oppose the change of
name.
Originally, this procedure developed as a consequence to the
name and arms clause and is thus closely related to the other legal
action the male heirs had. It is the nobility that has an interest in
opposing the grant of a letter patent, if it has not already engaged
in direct legal action before the courts. That interest, in its
86. See the example given by LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 48
where the Rochechouart-Mortemart sued their cousin Francois de PontvilleRochechouart for not bearing the name Rochechouart without their consent, but
as a result of a name and arms clause. Centuries later, the family of
Rochechouart-Mortemart will be embroiled in another law suit, Cass. Civ. 1ère,
January 31st, 1978 JCP 1979 II 19 035.
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substance, does not differ from the one at stake in the civil action.
Nonetheless, contrary to the civil courts, the Crown will expressly
require its proof, probably as a means to retain full discretion on
whether or not to grant the letter patent. 87 The administrative
procedure being incorporated into the law of 11 germinal an XI,
and now into article 61 of the French Civil Code, proof of damage
continues to be required, in contrast to the courts’ opposite
affirmation.
But like during the Ancien Régime, the difference does not
really exist and some modern scholars have demonstrated this. 88
Indeed, despite continuing to affirm that no proof of damage was
required, the civil courts never went on to accept any assumption
of name as justifying the plaintiff’s legal action. Paul Dupont (the
John Smith of England) will never succeed in protecting his
surname of Dupont if he restricts himself to prove that another
used it. The courts require more than that mere assumption and are
in that sense respectful of the original purpose of the legal action.
The protection given to the name was born out of the necessity
for the nobility to maintain the prestige of a name and its
associated arms and estate. It is this prestige of a name that
remains a constant preoccupation for the courts. Assumption of an
ordinary name requires proving a specific damage suffered; 89 by
contrast, assumption of a prestigious name or a name with
originality can be sufficient. In other words, the protection of the
name the courts offer still depends on the same rationale that
existed at the origin of the protection; the context may have
changed for the nobility has been abolished, but the foundational
principles remain because they can easily be transferred to non
noble names. 90

87. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 105, spec. n. 237.
88. CARBONNIER, supra note 4, at 192; P. Kayser, La défense du nom de
famille d’après la jurisprudence civile et d’après la jurisprudence
administrative, 10 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 21, 27-29 (1959); and NÉRAC, supra note
69, at 158-161.
89. Nérac demonstrated this caselaw element, id. at 158-159. He even
underlines that the civil and administrative courts hold the same line of
approach, id. at 160.
90. One could even argue that the new nobility of the 19th century are those
celebrities and stars a lot of people seem to aspire to be, like in the previous
centuries, people aspire to nobility.
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This debate would not matter much if it had not been at the
centre of a controversy about whether or not the name is property.
To explain the (unchecked) affirmation that there is no need to
prove damage before the civil courts, scholars consider that the
condition of the legal action is a sure sign of a property right being
exercised. Indeed, not to require proof of damages is, in French
law, a particularity of property law where assumption of the object
of property suffices to create the damage. Thus, the existence of
legal action born out of the saisine seems to confirm that the name
is property, and in the 19th century, the civil courts appeared to be
justified in affirming that the right to the name embodied by the
protection is a property right. Obviously, to declare that the name
is property completely ignores the reality of the case law. For if
the name was property, any name, whether common or rare, would
deserve protection, because any thing, object of property, deserves
protection, whether an old battered book or the priceless edition of
an author’s work. And yet, the courts adopt a different approach.
It raises the question of how the debate about whether or not
the name is property could have been so sidetracked and confused.
That the old concept of the saisine, from which was born the first
legal action, was lost, cannot be overstated as the cause of the
problem. Even lawyers who in the early 20th century challenged
the concept of the name being property took for granted the courts’
affirmation that there was no need to prove damage. Planiol, for
example, acknowledged that “if the name is a property, it is
possible for a person who bears it to ask others to respect it,
without the need to prove that the assumption causes damage.” 91
But having demonstrated that the name cannot be property, he
concluded that the civil courts erred in not requiring proof of
damage and that the opposite stand taken by the Council of State
should prevail in the other legal action available to protect one’s
name. 92 In other words, Planiol challenged what constitutes the
original feature of the legal claim born out of the saisine. The
irony is that historically, the saisine, and therefore the name, never
was property; thus, to affirm, like Planiol did, that the name is not
property, should not cause the very characteristic of the legal
action derived from the saisine to be disputed.

91. PLANIOL, supra note 68, at 152, § 400.
92. Id. at 153, § 400.
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Interestingly enough, Planiol sensed the original context of the
legal action, albeit he reached the wrong conclusions. For him, the
confusion between property and the name rests on the association
between the surname and the name of the land acquired by the
nobility. 93 He is not too far from the truth when noticing the link
between the French law of surnames and the nobility: the saisine
served the nobility’s interests which were often linked at the time
with interests in the land. However, the relationship between the
two never implied for the name to be property. It is the French
lawyers of the Ancien Régime who joined the two together in
imitation of Roman law, rather than by identification of the name
to the land or to a title (i.e. to property). The same lack of
historical knowledge and analysis about what the name really is led
them and others to infer that the supposed absence to prove
damages was a sure sign of property. To understand how this
interpretation spread dispels any doubt that comparison with
English law could create confusion as to the nature of the name.
The affirmation in English law that the name is not property should
not be associated with the quasi-absence, in English law, of a civil
action to protect one’s name. Analysis of French law shows that
there is no link between the two.
In the French civil action to protect the name, the absence of
proof of damage, said to be a sign of property, is more a rhetorical
affirmation than a conclusion having any sound substantial basis.
Certainly, that it remained unquestioned 94 and unchecked until the
middle of the 20th century 95 contributed to the confusion between
name and property in French law. 96 Nonetheless, and strangely
enough, it is not the analysis of the courts’ practice that will lead to
the affirmation that the name is not property.

93. Id. at 152; and PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 68, at 141.
94. Carbonnier wondered if the divergence between the civil and
administrative courts was not exaggerated, CARBONNIER, supra note 4, at 192.
95. Id. at n. 79.
96. Even after those studies, confusion reappears from time to time, see R.
LINDON, LES DROITS DE LA PERSONNALITÉ 177 (1983), who considers that the
protection of the name can be explained as much by the theory of property right
as by the concept of personality right.
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B. The Rejection of the Confusion
The doctrinal reaction against the property nature of the name
arose at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, in
two stages. The confusion between name and property proved to
be easy to dispel with regard to civil actions. If the name were
property, it would mean that several persons possess the name and
exercise the same rights on this thing. 97 However, in French law, a
property right implies an exclusive ownership on an object, on a
thing; there cannot be two owners of one thing with the same
rights. Thus, the name could not be property.
In relation to the conditions of the legal action, the doctrine did
not directly criticise the link made between a civil action in
property law and one related to the protection of names, because in
both cases, according to the courts, there is no need to prove
damage. 98 Rather, they tried to demonstrate that the alleged
practice reflected other concepts than property rights. They were
helped in that by recent developments in case law.
By the late 19th century, the courts extended the protection of
the name against personal use to use for literature purposes. They
did so on the basis of property rights in the name, 99 although they
required the plaintiff to prove damage and an interest to claim. As
scholars observed, such requirement was adverse to the concept of
property rights; more importantly, what was defended was not the
name as property/good, but the name as the embodiment of a
person and his/her personality or civil status. Linking this analysis
of the protection against artistic use to that of the protection against
personal use, the doctrine proposed a renewed interpretation of the
French law of surnames that radically breaks with the concept of
property rights.
At the turn of the 20th century, to protect one’s name against
use by another is no longer viewed as a sign of a property right, but

97. PLANIOL, supra note 68, at 151; PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 68, at
141; and 1 RIPERT & BOULANGER, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL D’APRES LE TRAITE DE
PLANIOL 377 (LGDJ 1956).
98. To the exception of Planiol, id.
99. Trib. Seine, February 15th, 1882, S. 1882, 2, 21; see LEFEBVRETEILLARD, supra note 10, at 183-184.
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the consequence of the name being an element of civil status 100
and the object of an extra-patrimonial right. 101 As we have seen
regarding the disposal of a person’s name, the emphasis is put on
the intrinsic values a person carries with him, without looking at
their monetary/economic worth. 102 It is the person who is at stake;
because the name embodies a person both in its individual and
family dimensions, it deserves protection whenever another person
uses it, even if there is no fraud. Thus to the name is attached an
extra-patrimonial right, not a property right.
The new rationale did not lead to challenge the traditional
presentation that the civil courts do not require proof of damage
when the personal use of another’s name is at stake. Nothing is
said about the contradiction of using the same rationale for the two
actions but differentiating on their conditions. And if the link with
the administrative procedure available to protect one’s name is not
made anymore, again the latter procedure is said to rest on proof of
damage and is still in contrast with the civil action for personal
use–even though nowadays, some scholars argue that there is no
difference.
Nonetheless, the concept of extra-patrimonial right definitely
excludes any reference to property right. In that sense, French law
finally reached the same conclusion as English law: the name is
not property. Yet, behind this common perception of what the
name is not, lies a different conception of the person. English law
does not know the concept of extra-patrimonial rights and presents
its own limited protection of the name as part of the law of torts, 103
notably the protection of the name against its use for artistic
purposes when that use falls within the remits of the tort of
defamation. Certainly, French law does not ignore this link with
torts as the legal actions are predicated on articles 1382 and 1383
of the Civil Code. 104 However, the related case law does not fall
under those articles but under article 57 of the Civil Code, which is
related to the registration of birth. And none of the torts textbooks
100. A. Colin, D. 1904 II 1, commentary under Paris January 21st, 1903. A.
COLIN & H. CAPITANT, COURS ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 360
(Dalloz 1923).
101. PERREAU, supra note 11.
102. There are other extra-patrimonial rights: right to life, right to honour,
right to one’s own image, right to privacy.
103. Du Boulay, at 446-447; and Cowley, at 460.
104. Influence of Planiol, PLANIOL, supra note 68, at 153, § 401.

2008]

IS THE NAME PROPERTY?

49

analyse the case law, leaving this aspect of the law to the books
dealing with Introduction to French Law or Law of Persons (droit
des personnes). It is as if French law’s vision of the person and
his/her name supersedes any other approach. It is not simply that
the name is not property; it is that the name cannot be property
because it incarnates the person. It is this vision that will
ultimately maintain the difference that arose, in the early 19th
century, between English and French laws in relation to another
feature of the law of surname: the liberty to change names. How
this liberty figured in the debate about the name being property
needs now to be investigated.
III. TO CHANGE ONE’S NAME:
AN INDICATION OF A PROPERTY RIGHT?
The liberty to change one’s name was never argued as the
exercise of a property right. In English law it still exists, and in
French law it existed despite the name being associated at the time
with property. Paradoxically, it is the loss of liberty to change
names in French law which reinforced the claim that the name was
property; a claim made, as we have seen, in relation to both the
name and arms clause and the protection against use by another.
The origin of the issue is indeed the establishment of the
immutability principle (A), the stringent effects of which the courts
set to counteract by maintaining the rhetorical but convenient
affirmation that the name was property (B) before the doctrine
moved away from such confusion.
A. The Origin of the Issue: Establishing Immutability of Names in
French Law
The liberty to change names was a basic feature of the French
law of surnames until the Revolution, as much as it was, and still
is, in English law. However, during the three centuries preceeding
the Revolution, the French monarchy conducted a policy to restrict
the liberty to change names in order to control the nobility, which
was seen as a threat to the Monarch’s power, as well as with a
view to strengthen the civil registry applicable to all subjects. The
Crown used two tools: the procedure of letters patent and the
ordinance of 1667 on civil procedure. With the first, which gave
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discretion to the Crown to refuse or accept the request, the Crown
tried to control the change of names and arms the nobility
undertook. However, despite the progressive increase of letters
patent since the 16th century, their numbers remained low. 105
With the ordinance of 1667, the Crown found a more efficient
way to restrict the liberty to change names. Indeed, the ordinance
of 1667, by requiring proof of age, marriage and death by the civil
register rather than by witnesses’ testimony, 106 progressively
obliged ordinary people to keep the name they had been registered
under at birth and later at marriage. Establishing an efficient civil
status registry enabled the monarchy to create more obstacles for
people to change their names.
Hence, compared with England, France took a rather different
path. Where France strengthened the monarch’s power, the
English monarchy abandoned the inclination to impose absolutism.
As a consequence, the relationship between the State and its
citizens or subjects was that of fierce non-interference. For matters
concerning only the individual, like the name–and as long it was
not linked with claiming a title–the English Crown could not
intervene without being perceived as an arbitrary power infringing
on civil liberties. 107 As a result, the civil status registry would not
be imposed before the middle of the 19th century, but it would
never be associated with control of the name. In addition, a
person’s actual and official names can be different from what has
been written on the birth certificate. 108

105. It is inferior to the number of letters patent to secure legitimacy,
LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 106, notably n. 241.
106. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 94-95; G. Sicard, L’identité
historique, in L’IDENTITE DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE. ETUDE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS
ET DE DROIT COMPARE 115, 133-137 (Pousson-Petit dir., Bruylant 2002).
107. J. Pousson-Petit, L’identité de la personne humaine au Royaume-Uni,
in L’IDENTITE DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE. ETUDE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS ET DE
DROIT COMPARE 343, 345-351 (Pousson-Petit dir., Bruylant 2002); and J.
Pousson-Petit, Conclusion, in L’IDENTITE DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE. ETUDE DE
DROIT FRANÇAIS ET DE DROIT COMPARE 979, 982 (Pousson-Petit dir., Bruylant
2002).
108. The Birth Registration Act 1953 does not allow for a change of
surname to be registered on the birth certificate. Thus a change of surname will
be recorded most of the time by deed poll, 35 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND §
1276, at 770 (4th ed. 1994) v. “Personal Property;” and J. F. JOSLING, CHANGE
OF NAME 23-46 (Oyez Pub. Ltd 1980).
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Nonetheless, the difference between England and France until
the Revolution should not be overstated. In France, the King’s
attempts to curb the liberty to change name never led to the
adoption of a general ordinance to prohibit changes of the name
without his authorisation. However absolute the power of the King
was, it was never so absolute as to override Roman law and
custom, on both of which the liberty to change names rests. 109 It is
thus not surprising that most lawyers up to the middle of the 18th
century agreed that people were at liberty to change name, 110 and
the practice reflected this liberty. In the rare cases where letters
patent were sought to secure a change of name, they would
sometimes be granted 50 years after the change occurred. 111
Therefore, the lack of liberty to change names is a “recent
invention” 112 in the French law of surnames. It is with the
Revolution in 1789 that the monarchy’s aspiration to control
mutability of names became a reality. The Revolution not only
confirmed the civil status registry, with its emphasis on the name
as a means of identification, but it also took the step in 1794 to
affirm the immutability of names; this was extended to all citizens
with the abolition of the nobility on August 4th, 1789. The breach
with the past was consumed, and the French law of surnames
ceased to be similar to its English counterpart. The various
governments following the Revolution never questioned the
revolutionary legislation, but rather reinforced it in 1803 by
creating a procedure to change names–inspired by the previous
system of letters patent–and in 1858, by criminalising the
assumption of names when it included an assumption of titles.
This importance of the principle of immutability of names
cannot be over emphasised, not only because it introduced a major
shift between the English and French laws of surnames, but
because it led to a misunderstanding about the origins of the
109. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 109.
110. Id. at 103-104
111. Id. at 109. In this example, the will was drafted in 1662, the name and
arms taken in 1692, but the change of name secured only in 1747 by letters
patent, the claimant wishing “to prevent any matter of trouble and to secure
better the right that the ascendant and father transmitted to him” (author’s
translation).
112. Herzog-Evans, supra note 85, at 56; F. Thibaut, Le nom patronymique
et l’attitude de l’Etat français à l’égard des changements de nom, RRJ 17, 21
(1989).
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French law of surnames, which fuelled in return a propensity in the
19th century to declare the name to be property, up to the point that
the created story found its way to the Privy Council in the 1869
case of Du Boulay.
At the end of the Revolution, doctrine and the courts asserted
that the former monarchy forbade all changes of names that it did
not authorise. Although a myth, this historical perspective resulted
from a series of works, notably that of La Roque, in his treatises on
nobility (1678) and on the name (1681). 113 He not only falsified
an ordinance of 1555, where the King indeed forbade the change of
names (though not in the terms the author mentioned), but he also
conveniently forgot to mention that the ordinance was actually
never registered, and thus never applied. 114 This presentation
echoed the monarchy’s need, and later the Revolution’s wishes, to
ascertain control on the name as an element of civil status. Such
an opportunity to find an “old” text ascertaining the principle of
immutability of names was too good to be discarded and the
fabricated historical justification of the principle found its way in
to one of the main legal dictionaries 115 just before the Revolution
broke. Given that the author of the 1785 text, Henrion de Pansey,
became President of the Court of Cassation after the Revolution, it
is hardly surprising that nobody questioned the source. Certainly
Merlin, 116 who was not necessarily on good terms with De Pansey,
tried to research the matter, but was only able to find that the
113. GILLES-ANDRE DE LA ROQUE, TRAITE DE LA NOBLESSE ET DE TOUTES
SES DIFFERENTES ESPECES (1678), availalbe at http://gallica.bnf.fr (last visited
November 6, 2008); and GILLES-ANDRE DE LA ROQUE, TRAITE DE L’ORIGINE
DES NOMS ET DES SURNOMS, DE LEUR DIVERSITE, DE LEURS PROPRIETES, DE
LEURS CHANGEMENS, TANT CHEZ LES ANCIENS PEUPLES QUE CHEZ LES FRANÇAIS,
LES ESPAGNOLS, LES ANGLAIS, LES ALLEMANS, LES POLONAIS, LES SUEDOIS, LES
ITALIENS AUTRES NATIONS (1681).
114. The deception was uncovered by A. Lefebvre-Teillard to which this
paragraph is indebted, see LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 96-101.
115. GUYOT, supra note 32.
116. Merlin (1754-1838), said Merlin de Douai (of Douai–a French town),
was a solicitor before one of the highest courts in France before the French
Revolution, le Parlement de Paris; and he edited the original edition of the
Repertoire Guyot in 1784-1785. During the Revolution, he proposed to abolish
feudality and to establish one single supreme court, the future Court of
Cassation. A very active supporter of the Revolution throughout the ten years it
lasted, he managed to escape the onslaught of the Terror and, with Napoleon in
power, became in 1801 the Procureur Imperial to the Court of Cassation.
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ordinance of 1555 was probably not registered; he was unable to
undo completely the Ariane’s thread that the story represented.
Hence, the ordinance of 1555 found its way into the nineteenthcentury French law of surnames as a text that supposed to support
the idea that the immutability of names had always been an
essential feature of the French law of surnames, long before the
Revolution chose to enact the law of 6 fructidor an II. Lawyers
forgot that the French law of surnames was actually different,
although the cases between 1800 and 1850 reveal that citizens
needed a bit more persuasion and time to become accustomed to
the new prohibition on the change of names without the prior
authorisation of the government. 117
The deception about what the actual French law of surnames
was prior to the Revolution could have remained of no
consequence for the purpose of this study, but it found its way in to
the very case where English law affirms its divergence with French
law, at least as understood at the time by French lawyers. Indeed,
in Du Boulay, the Privy Council had to examine what the French
law of surnames was prior to and after the French Revolution.
According to the treaty of 1815, French law applied to the
Caribbean island of Saint Lucia. Not surprisingly, the discussion
turned to whether the ordinance of 1555 had ever been applied. 118
The plaintiffs argued it had, and in support of their argument
referred to the 1823 case of Les Heritiers de Preaux de
Longchamps. 119 The French Court of Cassation concluded that the
ordinance of 1555 “although might not have been registered, was
however the manifestation of the royal prerogative” 120 according
to which “to the King only belongs the authorisation to change
names.” 121 Furthermore, the Court of Cassation considered that as
117. See for example CE May 24th, 1851 S. 1851 II 665. In a decision
about the validity of a change granted in accordance with the correct procedure
of the law of germinal an XI, the Council of State notes that “the investigation
reveals that, for a long time, Eugene and Jacques-Jules had been in possession of
the name Gaubert,” being known in their locality (i.e. the island of Martinique)
by that name.
118. With the added difficulty that Saint Lucia was a colony and as such
must have had its laws specially registered.
119. Cass. Req., November 16th 1824, S.V. 1822-1824, 1, 561; S. 1825, 1,
148.
120. Cass. Req., November 16th 1824, S.V. 1822-1824, 1, 561, 563.
121. Id.
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such, the ordinance of 1555 applied to the French Caribbean island
of Guadeloupe, an island which had the same legal status as Saint
Lucia while both were under French dominion. Clearly the
decision supports the plaintiffs’ arguments. However, Lord
Phillimore, for the Privy Council, never addressed the case; at least
not in his written opinion transcribed in the Law Reports. In
addition, he adopted the opposite conclusion to that of the Court of
Cassation: “at all events, it is not shown that this unregistered
ordinance ever formed part of the law of Saint Lucia.” 122 How one
can then explain such divergence of understanding?
Certainly, Lord Phillimore gave an accurate description of the
French law of surnames prior to the Revolution, noting that
“Merlin, in his Repertoire . . . says that the ordinance not having
been registered, never became law in France.” 123 Yet, he also
added that according to the Dalloz dictionary, “the courts hold a
contrary opinion,” 124 a quote which the 1823 French case
illustrated. So why was there such a departure from the Court of
Cassation’s own interpretation? Several explanations can be put
forward: the difficulty to know French law precisely (the 1823 case
does not seem to have been discussed before the courts, and one
wonders if it ever has been); or the social background of the
defendant (the illegitimate son of a former slave of the plaintiffs’
family–upholding French law as interpreted by the Court of
Cassation may have served to maintain the social division). It may
also be the Privy Council was reluctant to condone an
interpretation it probably sensed as being inaccurate. Indeed,
analysing the 1823 case cited by the plaintiffs reveals a hidden
agenda for the French Court: affirming at all costs the immutability
of names.
If the Court of Cassation relied so heavily on the ordinance of
1555 as enouncing a principle that has always been recognised, it
is because it needed a legal basis to refuse the change of name
undertook by one of the parties. The Court of Cassation could not
rely on the ordinance of 1803, which prohibits changes without
Governmental approval, as it had been registered in Guadeloupe
only in 1823, a few years after the facts took place. The Court of
Cassation also knew that the validity of the ordinance of 1555 was
122. Du Boulay, at 446.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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an issue, but to be faithful to historical truth would then have
forced the Court to validate the change of name done without
authorisation. At a time when the French Government was
painstakingly enforcing the opposite principle, such course of
action would have opened the door to much trouble and lawsuits.
The Court of Cassation was not ready to take the risk, and
preferred enforcing a supposedly ever-existing principle of
immutability embodied in the ordinance of 1555. One can see here
the driving force that modelled the French law of surnames during
the 19th century. Immutability of names had to be maintained at all
costs.
This emphasis on immutability of names in French law clearly
contrasts with the English law perception of allowing complete
freedom to choose and change names. Again, it may explain why
the Privy Council was reluctant to follow the Court of Cassation.
But for our debate about whether the name is or is not property,
this emphasis only matters because of what it created. To insist so
much on immutability meant that the French courts were
sometimes placed in a difficult position when plaintiffs asked for a
rectification of the civil status registry in situations where clearly at
stake was a change of name rather than a modification of a clerical
error on the registry books. The only way out was to resort to the
traditional view that the name was property, as the plaintiffs in Du
Boulay reminded the Privy Council.
B. Solving the Issue: Promoting Property Rights vs Promoting
Extra-Patrimonial Rights
Rectification of civil status registry could only be granted if
there had been a mistake in the transcription of the name in the
registry. But what constituted a mistake? Some people argued that
they used to bear a name with de for example, and that by mistake
the particle (particule) was dropped, or that they bore another
name in addition to the one on the registry or in substitution to the
one registered, and that by mistake the other name was dropped on
the birth certificate. Except that the so-called mistake was often a
deliberate move rather than the result of a civil officer’s
absentmindedness. During the Revolution, to register the de–often
but not always a sign of nobility–was a sure sign of trouble, if not a
death sentence in some circumstances in the middle of the Reign of
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Terror in France. Some people had to go as far as changing their
entire name such as “leroy” (literally “the king”) to survive those
difficult times. So to drop part of one’s name to avoid being
suspected of being a counter-revolutionary was a deliberate move
for survival. In that sense, there was no error and the principle of
immutability of names should have meant that the courts had to
refuse the request for rectification of the civil register. On the
other hand, the courts could not be insensitive to the plight of the
plaintiffs, who acted more by constraint than by choice; they were
tempted to accede to the request, but they could only do so if they
found a legal basis that would weight enough to counteract the
effect of the principle of immutability that they paradoxically
promoted. If they found it, they would then just need to ensure
that the claim was genuine and not an indirect way to gain a name
that the plaintiffs never had or abandoned long before the
Revolution.
The French law of surnames, at the time, offered them the
perfect reason: the name was property and thus the claimants just
had to prove they “owned” the name, “possessed” it, i.e. used it for
a long time before the crucial years of the Revolution. In other
words, in order to resolve the dilemma they felt they faced, the
courts used the old features of what was historically the saisine,
and used the theoretical background which superseded the
medieval concept, i.e. property rights. With the old features of the
saisine, they found a way to establish a criterion to assess whether
or not the claim was genuine. It sufficed to ask if there was a “use
of long tempo” as the old French law of surnames defined it (use
which is public, quiet, not contested, and for a long time–a notion
broad enough to give them flexibility in analysing the facts of a
particular case). With the theoretical background created by
lawyers at the end of the Middle Ages, they had a principle as
strong as the principle of immutability, so strong in fact, that the
courts could use it to downplay the stringent effects of the
principle of immutability without appearing to neglect the principle
of immutability. After all, property was a right engraved in the
French Declaration of Human Rights and with liberty, it was a key
foundation of the Civil Code. How could the Government oppose
a property right without being accused, at least implicitly, of
undermining the very foundational elements of France? Therefore,
the concept of property conveniently found a new life. Originally
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a way to integrate the medieval law of the saisine to the prestigious
Roman law, without questioning the freedom to change names as
recognised by custom and supported by Roman law, it became a
tool to instil more liberty into what became a very rigid system
governed by the principle of immutability of surnames and of civil
registry.
As a consequence, the more emphasis there was on
immutability, the more emphasis there was on property rights.
Yet, the association between name and property rights did not
result from a logical analysis of the concept of property in relation
to the features of the French law of surnames. Rather, it was based
on policy matters estranged to the concept of property. When the
concept of property was at last dropped–in the beginning of the
20th century, after scholars demonstrated it was inappropriate and
illogical–the issue remained: how to find a balance between
affirming immutability of names and allowing for some changes
that take place over time? To resolve it, the courts simply went on
applying the same criteria without referring anymore to the
original explanation put forward in the 19th century. Hence, this
last debate confirms how the interrogatory about whether or not the
name is property has been tainted in French law by factors
independent from the concept of property, factors like the
immutability of surnames. The contrast with English law could
not be greater.
Even now, that both English and French law agree that the
name is not property, they still differ in what this affirmation
reveals about their conception of the person in relation to his name.
English law sees the name as part of the one’s personal privacy,
free from interference from the State; French law, despite
recognising to the person an extra-patrimonial right to protect his
name, does not consider the person to be at liberty to choose and
change surnames. 125 Therefore, the real philosophical and legal

125. The evolution of French law is towards more autonomy granted to the
person in choosing names (see Acts 2002-2003), see Herzog-Evans, supra note
85, at 65; S. Shindler-Viguie, La liberté de choix du nom des personnes
physiques, art. 35942 DEFRESNOIS 1409, 1410, 1425 (1994); J.-J. Lemouland, Le
choix du prénom et du nom en droit français, in in L’IDENTITE DE LA PERSONNE
HUMAINE. ETUDE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS ET DE DROIT COMPARE 631, 669 (PoussonPetit dir., Bruylant 2002); and H. Lécuyer, L’identité de la personne (Pour
l’abrogation des lois des 4 mars 2002 et 18 juin 2003 sur le nom de famille),
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divergence between modern English and French law is thus not on
whether or not the name is property, but on what the relationship is
between a person and her/his name.
CONCLUSION
To our original question, “is the name property?”, the answer is
certainly “no” with regards to three elements of the law of
surnames: whether a person can or cannot dispose of one’s own
name, protect it, and change it. Although until the beginning of the
20th century French law used to affirm the name was inalienable
property, it did so more for lack of a better suited concept to
explain the features of its law of surnames, or to serve other
purposes, than out of a flawless analysis of the concept of property.
It is because the medieval concept of the saisine, which was
neither property nor possession, had been lost that French lawyers
integrated other notions, like property, to provide a theoretical
justification of the law of surnames.
Amid the confused history of the French law of surnames,
English law appears to act as a focal point, especially concerning
two of the features French law used to have before the 1789
Revolution, i.e. the liberty to dispose of one’s name by contract or
will and the liberty to change one’s name without prior
authorisation of the Government. Its affirmation that the name is
not property appears to match the historical sources of the French
law of surnames, although it remains to be proved whether the two
have identical origins. The latter, contrasted with the dramatic
changes French law underwent from the 1789 Revolution onwards,
highlights how its vision of the person and his/her name, which lies
behind the affirmation that the name is not property, is now very
different from that of French law. English law opted for freedom,
refusing to consider that a person’s identity depends on her name;
French law opted for control, partly because of the importance
attached to the name as part of the civil status, and partly because it
identifies the person with his name.
The debate about the nature of the name is not on whether the
name is property or not, but on what the relationship should be

131 LES PETITES AFFICHES 31 (July 1st, 2004). But the contrast with English
law remains striking.
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between a person and his name. And yet, albeit outside the scope
of this article, some issues remain which partly leave open the
debate about whether or not the name is property. The concept of
“privacy” as developed in U.S. law borrows both from the
concepts of property and personality; and in French law, some
argue for the name used for artistic purposes to be part of the
patrimoine, object of property rights, challenging the traditional
classification established in the beginning of the 20th century. 126
More sketches to answer our question need to be done . . .

126. M. Bui-Leturcq, Patrimonialité, droits de la personnalité et protection
de la personne, une association cohérente, DROIT PROSPECTIF–RRJ 767, 781
(2006).

ANALYZING PROPERTY ∗
IN DIFFERENT SOCIETIES
Jacques Vanderlinden†∗

INTRODUCTION
The distinction between persons and things is, for sure, one
which needs to be revisited; the diversity and quality of the
contributions to this workshop are ample evidence of it.
Furthermore, most of them, inspired by the reflections of their
authors and the eight questions so adequately proposed by the
initiators of this joint venture, are, quite naturally centered on law
systems which are familiar to teachers and students in European and
North American law schools. The ambit and purpose of this paper is
however quite different, as they leave the familiar shores of the
Roman-inspired legal traditions (I am exlusively referring here to the
distinction between persons and things) for those of the continent
celebrated by Joseph Conrad in Heart of Darkness. 1
The reference to Conrad’s work is particularly appropriate as the
following considerations deal with pre-colonial African laws, as
applied in societies which are indeed quite different from that in
which Gaius 2 established the summa division, which still rules a
good part of the formal apparent structure of many civil codes
throughout the world. But let us be quite clear: there is no such thing
as pre-colonial “African law.” The laws of Africa, even if one limits
oneself to so-called “ black” Africa–the one spreading from the
southern limit of the Sahara Desert to the Cape of Good Hope–reveal
∗

This written version differs substantially from my oral contribution to the
workshop; this is due to the fact–for which I apologize to the reader–that I am
unable to write a text before I speak on a specific topic. In a sense, to be true to the
title of the workshops, this is a “revisited” version of what I said.
†
Professor of Law Emeritus (Free University of Brussels, Belgium; and
University of Moncton, N.-B., Canada).
1. JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS, available at
http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/ConDark.html (last visited November
6, 2008).
2. Who taught law, by the way, in Africa, where the classical structure of the
digesta was less evident than in Rome.
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huge differences between the laws of people practicing agriculture,
commerce, fishing, gathering, hunting, and pasturing (if one looks
only at their mode of economic production) or having adopted
various types of socio-political systems (from the extended family to
one form or another of pre-state political regime) as their mode of
government. Such diversity precludes any serious generalization,
even on a regional or sub-regional basis. It is often said that most
lawyers (or legal anthropologists) who present the legal system of an
African ethnic group necessarily limit themselves to one group (or
possibly two) in the course of their academic career. There must
accordingly be no surprise if I shall essentially limit myself to one
African society, that of the Zande of North-Eastern Congo, even if
what I say or write could possibly apply to the members of the same
group who live in the the neighbouring Central African Republic or
the Sudan; this is a classical example of the splitting of African precolonial societies as a result of colonialism. What is essential is that
I do not pretend that my case study is valid for the whole of the
continent.
Nearly fifty years ago, when I arrived in the Zande country, I had
just completed my first year of teaching as a part-time “assistant”
(tutor) in the Faculty of Law at Brussels Free University from which
I had graduated in 1956 before serving for eighteen months as a
candidate reserve officer in the Belgian Air Force ground units that
specialized in the defense of airfields against possible paratroopers
from Eastern Europe! The people of whom I was instructed to study
the system of land tenure were as unknown to me as the heart of
Africa was to Joseph Conrad seventy years before, when he landed
on the shores of the Congo river. The only advantage I had on the
famous novelist was that there was some literature about Zande land
tenure. But I was clearly paid to go beyond it, as it appeared
unsatisfactory both quantitatively and qualitatively. I accordingly
spent six months in the field talking through an interpreter with
many Zande chiefs or simple peasants about what their legal
connection to land could be.
When doing this, I clearly was a foreigner approaching an
African society from the outside-in on the basis of what he had
learned, some years before, in a classical positivist law school about
“ things” or rather, more generally, about property (les biens) in the
Belgian (which is the French) Civil Code. At that stage of my
career, no need to say I had few (if any) qualms about what “law”
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was. I also knew that African laws were essentially “customary,” as
they were, mutatis mutandis, in the Northern part of France in the
Middle Ages, before the writing down of the customs as of the 15th
century onwards; this topic was precisely the one I was currently
discussing with my students during my tutorials. 3 Beyond that
sketchy and inapropriate background, I had read some contemporary
classics on structuralism by Claude Lévi-Strauss and bought a copy
of the Notes and Queries in Anthropology published by the Royal
Anthropological Institute in London. 4 All this does not plead very
much in favour of those who were sending me in the context of an
interdisciplinary mission entrusted with the task of advising the
Belgian governement about the economic and social development of
the Zande country.
In so far as I am concerned it nevertheless was a shattering
experience on two counts: at first, it deeply transformed me from a
legal point of view; second, it made me aware of the importance of
linguistics in the study of laws. Both had to deal with what I had
decided, many years before, my professional life would be: that of a
teacher. Until then, the law was to me an abstraction with a
universal value of which I had tried to master the intricacies in order
to pass examinations and get a piece of paper which would open
doors to a comfortable future. I had been exposed to some limited
aspects of its relativity through an introductory three credits course
devoted to the common law, but that was all. Furthermore that
course was taught in French with an occasional mention of English
terminology whenever it was indispensable to distinguish concepts.
But that was all. No fundamentals as to what a legal system or the
limits of translation were ever challenged. My first contact with a
single African legal system on a very narrow point–the law of
immovable property– irremediably changed all that.
I. IS THERE A NAME FOR PROPERTY?
My contribution to a better knowledge of the Zande world was to
present a clear view of the local land tenure system. These last three
3. See Jacques Vanderlinden, The Recording of Customary Law in France
during the XVth and XVIth Centuries and the Recording of African Customary
Law, JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW 165-175 (1959).
4. NOTES AND QUERIES ON ANTHROPOLOGY (Royal Anthropological Institute
of Great Britain and Ireland, 6th ed. 1951).
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words obviously sound more anthropological than legal, the latter
adjective referring normally to something quite familiar to lawyers in
systems where the law has a well-defined meaning. As the Zande
apparently had no distinct word in their vocabulary to identify law,
there was no use to ask them what their law about immovable
property was.
Yet they had courts and, interestingly enough, I met a case where
a distinction was made between two ways of solving conflicts
between individuals. The problem involved a husband and his wife.
She was the plaintiff and she was denied any remedy. The problem
she brought in front of the court was not considered because, the
judges said, it was not one of those within their jurisdiction. 5 It
rather fell within the jurisdiction of the parents of both parties who
had to sort it out between themselves. Would that provide us with a
distinction between what is legal and what is anthropological? Or
would it be only be an aspect of the legal pluralism existing within
Zande society? According to a positivist lawyer’s view, perhaps,
but certainly not for the Zande people involved. In fact, the
American or European lawyer is irresistibly tempted to project onto
African society his own conception of law. By doing so, he looks at
local society from the outside-in and the validity of such approach is
quite debatable.
Whatever the result of a possible debate may be, I chose to adopt
that approach and to have a good look at local cases as reported in
the native courts archives. I perused 2,000 of them in the course on
long evenings next to an oil-lamp roaring beside me, found out that
some 500 had to deal with private law and, finally, that there was not
a single case dealing with land tenure (not to speak of anything like
immovable property). At that stage, I could either give up and go
back to Europe or decide to take the anthropological path and inquire
through field work and interviews with inhabitants of the Zande
country. I chose the second possibility. Thus while carrying on with
the analysis of my 2,000 cases which allowed me to publish my
book, the Coutumier, jurisprudence et doctrine du droit zande, 6 I
turned myself into a legal anthropologist during daytime, visiting
5. A lawyer trained in Roman law–but many others too–would immediately
think of the maxim de minimis non curat prator. But beware of such too easy
comparison!
6. JACQUES VANDERLINDEN, COUTUMIER, JURISPRUDENCE ET DOCTRINE DU
DROIT ZANDE 350 (Editions de l'Institut de Sociologie 1969).
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farmers day after day, walking with them through their fields, sitting
in their habitat and trying to find what their answer was when
questioned on the basis of the Notes and Queries in Anthropology,
and also of some supplementary questions of my own.
Some conclusions resulted from that fieldwork. Here they are:
1. Each Zande socio-political unit–let us give it the name the
Belgian colonial authorities gave it, that is, chiefdom–occupied a
specific area of land. This area had a specific name in paZande (the
language of the Zande): sende. Anyone could settle on a sende,
provided he got the authorization to do so from the local authority–
let us again give him the name the Belgian colonial authorities gave
it, that is, chief. Normally, no chief would ever refuse a candidate,
as the more people that lived within his jurisdiction the more
powerful he was and was considered a “big” chief. Once he had
admitted someone on the sende, the chief would help him to find a
suitable place where he could settle down and establish his kporo;
there was no question of the chief imposing a place on his new
subject.
2. Land in the Zande country was plentiful, of an average-poor
quality, agricultural techniques were rudimentary, and manuring
practically non-existant as cattle could not resist the tse-tse fly.
Everyone could find a plot on which to establish his kporo. This was
the place where he would build his house, open up a garden of
various plants, organize his kitchen area, rest during daytime
between his activities, meet whith his family and visitors, etc. Not
too far from the kporo, he would clear, within the limits of his
physical strength, the öti or cleared land on which he would start
further work in order to open a bino on which he would grow the
main crop providing him with the basis of his subsistence and that of
his family. The products of that subsistence agricultural economy
were supplemented by the produce of the family garden and hunting
(often practised with some neighbours in order to facilitate it). Part
of these products went to the chief who would redistribute it on
specific occasions, such as holding a court to solve litigation
between his subjects. Finally, as this subsistence economy may be
considered to be a fairly rudimentary one, land had to be left resting
regularly between crops and, accordingly, the bino regularly lied
fallow for some time.
3. Such a factual description leads to one conclusion: as
everyone lives in that way, including the chief, who has his own
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kporo as a center of his personal life, land, as far as one could judge,
never was an object of any special interest, and accordingly an object
for any litigation, being altogether admitted that there could always
be exceptions justifying the rule, but also that I did not meet any
sample of it, either during my fieldwork or in the existing literature.
A second conclusion is that the social intercourse between persons
about land appears, until now, practically (but for the necessity for
anyone wishing to settle on the sende to be authorized to do so by
the chief) void of any element a lawyer would call property law, or
an anthropologist, land tenure. In order to bring legal notions into
the picture, one needs to look at what are the powers (or privileges)
related to the different categories of land and exercised by the people
described in the previous paragraphs. Hence, the interviews brought
me into the system as perceived by those living in it and not anymore
by the outsider.
4. In that perspective, let’s consider first the sende. Its limits are
determined by the chief and the chief alone. He is also the only one
able to decide that the sende will be abandoned by the group
(thereby relinquishing all powers on it) if there is a need for the
group to migrate. As long as the group is established on the sende,
the chief has, besides his exclusive power to admit newcomers on it
(see par. 1), full control over its parts where his subjects have not
established their kporo, öti or bino. But they, in turn, have on that
part of the sende the complete power to freely circulate on it, to
modify the place of their kporo, their öti or their bino, to collect the
wood they need to build their houses or to make fire, to hunt; in
short, take advantage of the sende as they please for their own use
and that of their family as long as it does not infringe on another
person’s situation. In a sense, the parties involved try constantly to
achieve equilibrium between whatever the chief wishes to do with
some parts of the sende and the limits of whatever his subjects want
to use it for. This is the reflection of a wish for consensus between
rulers and the people they rule. Being a “good” chief requires the
preservation of such reciprocal harmonious behaviour. The powers
of the chief vis-à-vis the sende is expressed in a word, ira, which
qualifies the chief. And the same word applies to his powers over
the people living on the sende. He is accordingly ira sende and ira
Azande.
5. If the chief has theoretically extensive powers on the sende,
the same is true of the individual established on it for any part he
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considers to be his. He alone begins with the determination of the
limits of his kporo, his öti or his bino, decides who is allowed to
circulate on them, what he is going to build or plant on his öti, and
ultimaltely, possibly, will make up his mind to abandon them and let
them turn back to the sende from which they had been taken through
his actions. Powers as to land in the Zande country are indeed
acquired by the individual through the incoporation of his work on a
part of the sende. The latter could be considered, when looked at
from the outside, as “virgin” land; that is, land which has not yet
been transformed by man’s actions; the three elements (kporo, bino
and öti) 7 we have been referring to could be called “transformed”
land, and, apparently, in order to qualify collectively these various
species of transformation of the sende, there is no generic word in
the local language which could be opposed to the latter.
Furthermore–and this is where the real rub appears, as in Hamlet’s
perception of sleep–we quickly realize that the individual is also
called ira kporo, ira bino or ira öti, the same word used for the chief
vis-à-vis the sende and the Zande. But this is a problem for part two
of this paper. Finally, the fruits which any Zande may hope to
extract from the land through the incorporation of his work on it will
definitely be his, to share with a possible family.
6. Looking at what has just been described in the
anthropologist’s way with a lawyer’s eye, one immediately enters
slippery ground. One indeed quickly tends to recognize, even if a
more detailed approach could lead to distinctions, two of the
classical components of the classical Roman concept of ownership:
the usage (usus) and the fruits (fructus), being absolutely clear that
the Zande language has no special general term regrouping the
components of the two notions. So far, so good. But then
immediately arises one of the most debatable, if not challengeable,
assumptions about pre-colonial African land tenure: the absence in
African systems of land tenure of an individual power of disposing
of land, the latter being necessarily common to the group and not
within reach of the individual. Let us try to have a look at the
various aspects of what the Roman concept of abusus may
encompass, and distinguish between different ways of disposing
from one’s land.
Abusus involves three coupled distinctions:
7. These three are but examples of a wide variety of specific lands coming out
of the sende through work.
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a) Alienation inter vivos or mortis causa;
b) Gratuitous alienation or alienation against compensation;
c) Alienation for the benefit of a member of the social group or for a
stranger.
7. Let’s consider the three above-mentioned distinctions:
a) Alienation inter vivos is the only one which can be contemplated
as, in the case where a head of family dies, his death is generally
attributed to bad fortune, the latter being necessarily associated to the
place where he lived. There is thus no question that someone would
stay (this is the case for whoever we would be tempted to consider as
his heirs) or come and settle down in such place as he would be
likely to be the victim of the same malediction. This, of course, is
the matter as seen by the Zande, and it would be preposterous to try
and invoke the absence of a “rational” link between the fact of the
death and that of the place where the kporo is established. Exit
alienation mortis causa. When talking to Zande peasants of the idea
of disposing of their land inter vivos, it simply does not seem to ever
have come to their mind. Why? This question brings us to the two
ways through which alienation can take place.
b) Gratuitous alienation or alienation against compensation?
Alienation of land against compensation is unimaginable, as who
would have a piece of cultivated land available to dispose of when it
constitutes the very basis of its subsistence and that of his family?
And who would be in a position to dispose of extra land in a system
where basic conditions–as described previously–for an extra
investment are not met? There simply is no market for land in the
Zande country. As for gratuitous alienation, it is even less likely–
and for the same reasons–than onerous alienation. And there is no
reason to necessarily include a power of abusus other than the one–
which we have already met–of disposing of the land by abandoning
it and letting the kporo, the bino or th ötis return to the sende from
which they originated as distinctive sorts of land through the
incorporation of man’s labour. But is any man roaming through the
Zande country free to settle down and transform the sende into a
kporo, bino or öti? This last question opens up a last problem.
c) Alienation for the benefit of a member of the social group or for a
stranger? The matter of alienation of land is already settled through
the previous paragraphs; it only exists when the ira of a kporo, a
bino or an öti decides to abandon a piece of land and lets it return to
the sende. Could then any Zande (or non member of that ethnic
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group) incorporate his work into the sende? By doing so, would he
become an ira of whatever piece of it he has so transformed? This is
a last point which is fundamental in trying to understand African
land tenure. And the answer of the Zande system on that point is
without ambiguity: as the careful reader has certainly already
noticed, when going through paragraph 1, only members of the
social group, i.e. persons allowed to do so by the chief who accepts
them as members of the group–and consequently disvest them of
their quality of stranger–are legally able to incorporate their work
into the sende and become (as the chief is in relation to the sende and
the Zande) an ira of their kporo, bino or öti. The affiliation to the
group living on a specific sende is, in the Zande case, purely
“political,” if one adopts a foreign classification which distinguishes
between, for example, cultural, economic, political, or social
affiliations; such a classification, there is no need to say, does not
exist in the Zande way of thinking about such affiliation. In other
African societies, the required affiliation will be, quite often, of a socalled “social” nature when the link results from consanguinity, even
if one considers the quite extensive one uniting members of the same
clan; in such case, the possibility of acquiring rights to land is
limited to members of the clan, which includes even those who,
being originally strangers, enter it by a ceremony of adoption. From
this importance of a necessary existing link between people holding
rights to land results the idea that African land tenure is “collective”
or, better, “communal.”
8. On the basis of what has been shown in the Zande example–
of which I am willing to admit that it could be atypical, but not that it
does not lead to a reassessment of our thinking about African land
tenure–the outside non-African observer is often led to a double
conclusion. When he adds the fact that there rarely is a factual
interest in disposing of the land, even for the benefit of a member of
the group, his inescapable twofold conclusion is a) that there is
nothing like ownership in Africa because of the lack of abusus, and
b) African land tenure is necessarily communal (collective has been
abandoned because of the confusion arising easily with the collective
conception of land tenure existing in socialist legal systems).
9. My personal point of view–which, I insist, is highly
debatable–is that as long as abusus exists and people can
individually divest themselves of their powers in connecton to land
under some form–in the Zande case by abandoning the land on
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which they have all the powers recognized to an ira–there is no
justification not to speak of an ownership of land in the Roman way,
provided–but this is never challenged–usus and fructus also exist.
No one has ever said that alienation must be either inter vivos or
mortis causa or gratuitous or onerous, in fact for the benefit of a
third party, which is not the case when a Zande abandons the land in
which he undoubtedly has well defined interests.
10. As for the communal character, no one seems to have ever
expressed the opinion that individual ownership disappeared when
the transfer of ownership to strangers was either curtailed or
excluded. The example–for many years–of Finland and Switzerland
are very clear on that point. During a long period of my life, I spent
my summer vacations in a sauna on a peninsula at the end of an
island fifty or so miles from Helsinki. I owned the cabin in which
we found shelter during these memorable weeks, but, as a Belgian
citizen, I could not constitutionally own the land around it. Would I
or anyone, including local lawyers, have said that the friend–a Finn
of course–who owned it, was not the owner of that land or that the
cluster of rights and duties he had in relation to it were not
ownership in the full sense of the word? Certainly not from the
Finnish point of view. And when, in winter, I once contemplated–
but, unfortunately never got the means to do so–buying a small
chalet in the Swiss Alps and was told that, as a foreigner, I could not
own that piece of immovable property, could I conclude that the
Swiss owner of the chalet was not an owner according to the relevant
provisions of the Swiss Civil Code? Of course not. Like his Finn
counterpart (but in a more specific way as such limitation in
Switzerland was essentially local and not general as in Finland), he
was an owner. Perhaps a slightly different one than his counterpart
in Belgium or Louisana, but still an owner. This being admitted,
would one dare to say that the Zande ira is an “owner”?
II. IS TRANSLATION POSSIBLE?
The last word of the previous section brings me to my second
section. But before considering some problems involved in the
linguistic transfer of African legal concepts in Western European
languages and the amount of doubts and dissatisfaction the exercise
leaves in the mind, there seems to be one point on which most
people interested in the matter seem to agree. What is more, it is
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directly relevant to the thread which unites the contributions to this
workshop, even if it is quite different from the ones usually
considered. It is, of course, a creation of American or European
minds observing African reality and creating abstract categories
which do not necessarily exist in African minds or languages. It is
the concept of the person-thing entity or unit.
Many anthropologists observing African land tenure have come
to the conclusion that land tenure does not deal so much with
relations between persons about land, but concerns rather the
analysis of the single entity that man has with earth or–why not?–the
latter has with the former. The one does not exist without the other
and, in that respect, one might say that African legal geography
(etymologically writing about the earth) is necessarily physio-human
geography and not purely physical geography. Or, as some are
inclined to say, “man does not own the land, the latter owns him.” 8
If we now look at the components of that entity or unit, the
person is not considered as an abstraction but as a diversity of human
beings occupying in society a specific position because of their age,
their sex or their cultural, economic, political or social function. The
same is true–as it was underscored in the previous paragraphs–for
what we call “land,” which is never considered in such abstract way,
but always linked to a specific function. 9 Thus a correct analysis of
land tenure necessarily goes through a previous careful analysis of
both components of it. And ends up with a presentation of a cluster
of person-thing unit which is not necessarily systematically
organized in societies where the need for abastract systematization is
not as felt as in ours. Quite obviously, my own analysis of Zande
land tenure was, from that point of view, totally unsatisfactory.
The immediate temptation, as the sudent of African law I was
nearly fifty years ago in the Zande country and the teacher I also was
(by the way, both I still believe I am) as soon as I came back from
Africa to my class in Brussels, was to communicate. Studying in
order to teach was already the fundamental activity of my craft. I
had not too many problems with the factual realities represented by
8. Quoted, without reference, in Daniel Biebuyck, Introduction, in AFRICAN
AGRARIAN SYSTEMS 2 (Daniel Biebuyck ed., International African Institute 1963).
9. One of the most interesting analysis from that point of view is that of G.
WAGNER, THE BANTU OF NORTH KAVIRONDO (Oxford University Press for the
International African Institute 1956) where he distinguishes 24 sorts of land with
reference to its use, 5 with reference to the rights of control upon them and 7 with
reference to its quality in Logoli vocabulary, but no term for “land” in the abstract.
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the paZande words öti, kporo, bino or sende. I rather easily decided
that the first one would be “cleared land,” i.e., the part of land of
which all obstacles had been removed in order to possibly sow and
cultivate some vegetation on it; the second one, “habitat,” i.e. the
part of land upon which a house and his separated and aerated
kitchen would be built, plus whatever land was freed and prepared
for circulation around the house and the kitchen to receive guests, or
for any other use; the third one, “field” as it had to be sown and
tended on the bino in order to produce some crop; and, last but not
least, sende. With the latter, things appeared more difficult indeed. I
did not favour territory, as the latter has, in French legal language, a
specific technical meaning “linked with public law” (a non-existent
notion in Zande thought), which, if used to sum up the Zande reality,
was conducive to serious potential confusions.
In that respect, it was true that “territoire” had a less specific and
technical meaning in French when speaking of the territory of
animals. But, for obscure reasons, that reference when speaking of
people discouraged me from using the word. Re-reading my text of
1960 (the year of its publication), it appears that I did not venture in
a translation and satisfied myself with a description of approximately
twenty lines of what the sende was. Would I dare to propose today
the “physical support of social life,” which is far from short and
elegant? And also quite abstract, when compared to the formulation
of Wagner, “bush land that has never been cultivated” 10 for ovulimu
in the Logoli language, which seems to be the nearest to the Zande
sende.
But this was not the end of my qualms. The real test came with
the three letters of ira, either when we apply it to the individual or
when it concerns the chief. In fact, at a first stage, the problem was
not so much with the ira kporo, bino or öti. In accordance with the
conclusions I came to in paragraph 10 above, “owner” could seem
provisionally acceptable to me, provided one admitted (this still does
not fully satisfy me, as we shall see later) that ownership never is as
absolute as one likes it to be and that the Finns or the Swiss may–
with some approximation–be called owners as much as the Belgians
or the Louisianians. We would then have no problem in calling the
Zande commoner an owner, something of which Allott would totally
disapprove when he writes that “the words ‘own’ and ‘ownership’
are . . . misleading, for the description of African property
10. Id. at 76.
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systems.” 11 And he is indeed quite right. But then–in order to carry
his logic on a wider geographical space–I would consider that
ownership is as much misleading when comparing Finnish or Swiss
law with either English or French law, as both of the latter have no
restriction whatsoever linked to the nationality of the buyer of a
piece of land in England or France. Good enough. But, then, how do
I translate ira when referring to the individual? May I beg the reader
to be patient and keep the question unanswered for a while?
Turning now to the chief, the matter seems–prima facie–simpler
than in the previous case. Certainly he is not, in any sense, the
owner of either the sende or the Zande as the local language
indicates. This was clear to my mind. But then, which French word
to use? I finally decided in favour of “master” (maître).
Such choice was motivated by a fundamental wish, i.e. to find a
single word in French (as in paZande where one finds ira) which
could apply to both the chief and his subject. If I had accepted not to
take that wish of linguistic homogeneity into consideration, the
problem would have been easily solved, by using “lord” for the chief
and “owner” for the commoner. But I had the feeling that by doing
so I was introducing in my description the distinction between public
and private law, so familar to me through my legal education, but
totally absent from the Zande mind. The thing would perhaps have
been easier if I had been trained in the common law where that
fundamental distinction has long been absent from the doctrinal
sphere. But I was communicating with continental lawyers educated
differently and for which the split between public and private was
fundamental in the legal discourse. “Maître” had the advantage that
it was still used (yet only once) in the French or Belgian Civil Code
when speaking of the liability of masters for the wrongful acts of
their servants (art. 1384, al. 5) and (this time, twice) when referring
to property which is vacant or “without master” (art. 539 and 713).
Maître could thus apply to both persons and things, as did ira when
concerning either the sende–a thing–or the Zande–a person. This for
the public law side. As for the private law one, didn’t popular
wisdom say that “charbonnier est maître chez soi” (literally “a
coalman is the master in his own house,” or, in accordance with the
English idiom “a man’s house is his castle”)?
11. A.N. Allott, Language and Property: A Universal Vocabulary for the
Analysis and Description of Proprietary Relationships, 11 AFRICAN LANGUAGE
STUDIES 12, 20 (1970).
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Fifty years later, I admit that all this seems (or should I write is?)
amateurish. Had I been better informed of the existing
anthropological literature about what I had to study, I would also
have realized that in many African societies–as in the case of the
Zande with ira–a single word is used to characterize the most
extensive powers of a person on land. 12 But, the reader knows, from
the introduction to this paper, in which circumstances and with
which kind of training (or should I write non-training?) I marched
into the heart of darkness; my total ignorance of methodology,
substance and form insofar as what I had to study is obvious. What
is perhaps funnier is that the publication of the results of my research
led to an invitation to the Second International African Seminar
organized by the International African Institute in Kinshasa (then
Léopoldville), where I spoke about the problems resulting from the
introduction of new ways of using land among the Zande and that
two years later, on the basis of these two papers, I was asked to open
and occupy the chair of African customary law at the Lovanium
University also in Kinshasa. From then on, an incredible number of
persons strongly believed (and still do) that I was a legal
anthropologist. How strange!
All along that long road into the kingdom of academe which is
still mine nearly half a century later, I have met many brethren–
sometimes close friends–who were treading along the
same
path. But, be
it K. Bentsi-Enchill in 1965, 13
A. Allott in 1970, 14 H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo in 1974, 15

12. Daniel Biebuyck, supra note 8, at 3-5. He provides examples borrowed
from the Barotse in Zambia, the Lo Wiili, the Nsaw in Cameroon, and the Nyanga
in the Congo. Be it the word mung’a, so, KEr, or mine–and one cannot but be
struck by the likeness with the ira of the Zande–one single word indicates the most
extensive powers a person with a specific status may have on a specific sort of
land.
13. K. Bentsi-Enchill, Do African Systems of Land Tenure Require a Special
Terminology?, in AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 265-290 (Gordon R.
Woodman & A. O. Obilade eds., Dartmouth 1995).
14. Allott, supra note 11.
15. H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Property Theory and Land Use Analysis, in
AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 291-305 (Gordon R. Woodman & A. O.
Obilade eds., Dartmouth 1995).
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G. McCormack in 1983 16 and T.W. Bennett in 1985 17 –only to
mention a fewnone of them were of much help insofar as I was and
still am concerned about the extraordinary (from an American or
European point of view) concept of a man-earth or person-thing
entity. But the most influential and seminal for me was P.
Bohannan, whom I met at length in the International African
Institute Seminar on land tenure that I was invited to in Kinshasa, as
I mentioned earlier in this paper. In his presentation, Bohannan
wrote:
It is . . . probable that no single topic concerning Africa has
produced so large a poor literature . . . The ignorance derives
less from want of ‘facts’ than what we do not know what to
do with these ‘facts’ or how to interpret them. 18
His words were echoed after a week of discussions at the
International African Institute Seminar when its organizer, Daniel
Biebuyck wrote, under the title Problems of Analysis and
Terminology:
The comparative study of the innumerable works devoted to
these problems [those of land tenure] reveals, as it was
underscored in the Seminar, the big disparity of approaches
and the inadequacy of the corresponding terminology, the
existence of a serie of untrue statements and the absence of a
true theory in that field. 19
Twenty-five years later, Bennett considered–a judgment to which
I still subscribe today–that it was “disheartening to find that little
progress seems to have been made” 20 on that topic.

16. G. McCormack, Problems in the Description of African Systems of
Landholding, in AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 321-334 (Gordon R.
Woodman & A. O. Obilade eds., Dartmouth 1995).
17. T.W. Bennett, Terminology and Land Tenure in Customary Law: An
Exercicse in Linguistic Theory, in AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 335-349
(Gordon R. Woodman & A. O. Obilade eds., Dartmouth 1995).
18. P. Bohannan, ‘Land’, ‘Tenure’ and Land-Tenure, in AFRICAN AGRARIAN
SYSTEMS 101 (Daniel Biebuyck ed., International African Institute 1963).
19. Author’s translation from the French. Daniel Biebuyck, Problems of
Analysis and Terminology, in AFRICAN AGRARIAN SYSTEMS 1-19, n. 2 (Daniel
Biebuyck ed., International African Institute 1963).
20. Bennett, supra note 17, at 335.
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CONCLUSION
(IF I AM STILL ABLE TO ESCAPE SELF-DERISION)
In the course of the fifty years which followed my escapade in
the Zande country, the deeper and wider I went into comparing laws,
the more I was inclined to realize how true Karl Llewellyn was when
he wrote:
Legal usage of technical words has sinned, and does still, in
two respects; it is involved in ambiguity of two kinds:
multiple senses of the same term, and terms too broad to be
precise in application to the details of single disputes. First,
it does not use terms in single senses, but uses the same term
in several senses; and in everal senses, indiscriminately,
without awareness. This invites confusion, it makes bad
logic almost inevitable, it makes clear statement of
clear thought difficult, it makes clear thought itself
improbable. No logician worth his salt would stand for it; no
scientist would stand for it. 21
I do not claim, in any way, to be considered as a logician or a
scientist, but being forced into communication by my craft, I cannot
but be struck by the fundamental truth emanating from these words
first uttered when I had still two years to go before being conceived.
In this instance, when the Zande speak of ira or we speak of
ownership, we all use abstract terms reflecting concepts built in our
minds, and probably more clearly formulated in the Zande country
where people live the law as a constant communal process than in
our countries where they are the product of self-proclaimed
sophisticated minds arguing, as in Byzantium, about the sex of
angels in a language that even ordinary lawyers are at pains to
understand. Lawyers and perhaps more evidently legal scholars–a
group to which I belong so that everything I write about it can
obviously refer to me–have not yet had the capacity or the courage to
develop a language which would at least try to be understandable by
all lawyers of good will. Also, no one has decided to take the time
and courage needed for a possible systematic and rigorous
application of the fundamental concepts defined by W.N. Hohfeld to
African land tenure, in spite of the eloquent plea made in favour of it

21. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 84 (Oceana 1978).
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by E.A. Hoebel in his Law of Primitive Man, 22 which he concludes
by another quotation of his accomplice in the study of the Cheyenne,
Karl Llewellyn: “And thinking thus, in nicer terms, with nicer tools
of thought, you pull the issue in clarity . . . unambiguously, because
your terms are not ambiguous.” 23 But these voices of scholars of
first magnitude in legal anthropology were clamantes in deserto.
Everything went on as if there was a definite advantage to keep the
law ambiguous and the comparison between laws foggy.
And yet on the rich material we currently have, from the factual
point of view through more numerous and elaborate legal
anthropological fieldwork, through fundmental theoretical legal
research and also, in some instances, through a combination of both,
it should have been possible to go beyond–and even, if one looks at
my limited and shaky contribution on Zande law, far beyond–what
has been common knowledge among africanists for more than a
quarter of a century.
I have had some occasions to plead in favour of such joint efforts
involving scholars in the field of law and linguistics. To no avail,
the most reluctant being the lawyers. For sure, their theoretical
contribution seems more advanced than the development of research
in African concepts about what “order” may mean in society. Social
anthropology has made tremendous progresses in the analysis of
African ways of thinking; but they seem to have focused on the
background, both factual and intellectual, which subsumes what we
could possibly call “order” or “law.” The task is complicated by the
fact that many among us–including myself–have serious doubts as to
the existence in pre-colonial African minds of a distinct mental
category isolating what we consider as “legal” from the rest of the
seamless web which holds those societies together. But, at least, the
challenge ought to be met. And do not ask me why I did not take it
up. The accused can’t be forced into admitting his own guilt.
Being currently, in the twilight of my life, I am still in the Heart
of Darkness about what I consider to be a possible science of laws at
large. 24
22. E.A. HOEBEL, LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 46-53 (Harvard University Press
1954).
23. LLEWELLYN, supra note 21, at 88.
24. I come back to this issue of a general formulation of legal concepts in Les
nouvelles ambitions de la science du juriste: Une langue générale de
spécialisation en droit est-elle une utopie ?, forthcoming, in a volume edited by R.
Sacco, to be published by the Accademia nazionale dei Lincei in Rome.

HUMAN EMBRYO, ANIMAL EMBRYO,
CHIMERICAL EMBRYO:
WHAT LEGAL STATUS IN FRENCH LAW?
Laurence Brunet ∗ & Sonia Desmoulin†∗
INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the scientific review Science published an experiment
studying the development of human cell nuclei introduced into
bovine enucleated cells. In an article entitled The Minotaur in
Gestation in a Laboratory of Massachusetts, the French newspaper
Le Monde questioned the legality of such research in France, as
well as the status of the life which may arise from this
experimentation. 1 Surprisingly, the article provoked little reaction.
Less than ten years later, in 2007, Le Figaro–another French
newspaper–caused a stir with an article announcing, Soon Embryos
Half-Man Half-Animal. 2 Between these two dates, some important
changes had taken place in France and in other countries.
In France, the law pertaining to the use of human embryos for
scientific research has been modified. Indeed, the law of August
6th, 2004 authorized by exception, and for a limited period of five
years, experimentation on human embryos. 3
At the same time, outside France, the issue concerning the
creation of chimeras or hybrid embryos (composed of human and
animal elements) raised some public concerns. In Canada, the
Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHRA) of 2004 defined a
∗

Centre de Recherche “Droit, Sciences et Techniques,” Université Paris I
Panthéon-Sorbonne (UMR 8103). Ms. Brunet wrote section 1.
†
Centre de Recherche “Droit, Sciences et Techniques,” Université Paris I
Panthéon-Sorbonne (UMR 8103). Ms. Desmoulin wrote sections 2 and 3.
1. LE MONDE, November 14th, 1998.
2. Martine Perez, Bientôt des embryons mi-homme mi-animal, LE FIGARO,
September 9th, 2007. See also, Jean-Yves Nau, Chimères humaines et
démocratie, LE MONDE, February 23rd, 2007.
3. Act n° 2004-800, August 6th, 2004, JORF August 7th, 2004. See also, H.
Gaumont-Prat, La révision des lois de bioéthique et la recherche sur les cellules
souches embryonnaires, 12 REVUE LAMY DROIT CIVIL 27(2005) ; and also, Ph.
Pédrot & B. Pauvert, La législation applicable aux cellules souches
embryonnaires, 35 PETITES AFFICHES 77 (2005).
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“hybrid,” as “an ovum of a non-human life form into which the
nucleus of a human cell has been introduced,” 4 and stated that “no
person shall knowingly . . . create a hybrid for the purpose of
reproduction, or transplant a hybrid into either a human being or a
non-human life form.” 5 Furthermore, three of the main Canadian
federal granting agencies in Human Health and research6 adopted
guidelines which set down, first, that “it is not ethically acceptable
to create, or intend to create, hybrid individuals by such means as
mixing human and animal gametes, or transferring somatic or germ
cell nuclei between cells of humans and other species;” and
second, that “it is not ethically acceptable to undertake research
that involves ectogenesis, cloning human beings by any means
including somatic cell nuclear transfer, formation of animal/human
hybrids, or the transfer of embryos between humans and other
species.” 7
The United Kingdom also had to face this issue: the Human
Fertility and Embryology Authority (HFEA) received two
applications from scientific teams to carry out research using
human cells and animal eggs to produce stem cells. The
explanation for such applications can be found in the lack of
available human oocytes for scientific research on embryo
development. The regulatory body decided that, under current
British law, it was not in a position to authorize such an
experiment, and considered it necessary for British citizens to pass
on the social acceptability of such experiments. Therefore, a
public consultation was launched in 2007 8 and the Science and
Technology Select Committee released, in April 2007, a report on
“Government Proposals for the Regulation of Hybrid and Chimera

4. Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHRA), 2004, Section 3
(d).
5. AHRA, Section 5 (1) (j).
6. Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and
Engineering Research Council of Canada, Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada.
7. Article 9.5 Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research
Involving Humans 1998 ("TCPS" with 2000, 2002, and 2005 amendments),
http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/english/policystatement/policy
available
at
statement.cfm (last visited November 6, 2008).
8. See, Public Dialogue, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/en/1517.html#dialogue
(last visited November 6, 2008).
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Embryos.” 9 The Committee opined “that the creation of humananimal chimera or hybrid embryos, and specifically cytoplasmic
hybrid embryos, is necessary for research” but “that development
of human-animal chimera or hybrid embryos past the 14-day stage
should be prohibited and that a prohibition should be put in place
on the implantation of human-animal chimera or hybrid embryos
in a woman.” Since then, the HFEA decided to give limited
approval, on a case-by-case basis, for certain scientific research
projects involving the creation of hybrids or chimerical embryos in
vitro. In November 2007, a proposal to update the Human
Fertilization and Embryology Act of 1990, concerning assisted
conception and the use of embryos in research and therapy, was
introduced before Parliament. The new Bill became an Act of the
Parliament on November 13th, 2008. It supports a pragmatic legal
framework by prohibiting placing “in a woman an embryo other
than a human embryo, an inter-species embryo, or any gametes
other than human gametes.” Mixing human gametes with animal
gametes, bringing about the creation of an inter-species embryo, or
keeping or using an inter-species embryo is prohibited without a
license issued by the HEFA. This inter-species embryo cannot be
kept after either “the appearance of the primitive streak,” or “the
end of the period of 14 days beginning with the day on which the
process of creating the inter-species embryo.” 10
Such a legal framework still does not exist in France.
Nevertheless, as with their foreign colleagues, French scientists
specializing in cloning, genetics engineering and embryology
begin to express interest in this field. Therefore, French lawyers,
already facing the tricky issue of defining the legal status of human
embryos, now have to determine the legal status of chimerical or
hybrid embryos, resulting from the mixing of human and animal
cells.
9. House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Government
Proposals for the Regulation of Hybrid and Chimera Embryos, Fifth
report
of
Session
2006-07,
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmsctech/272/27
2i.pdf (last visited November 6, 2008).
10. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [HL], Amending the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act
1990,
Section 4A, available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldbills/006/08006.17.html#j254 (last visited November 6, 2008).
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The question of the legal status of the chimerical embryo
reveals other disturbing issues in French law, which appears
clearly to anyone familiar with the French legal system.
First, it is structured around a summa divisio, distinguishing
two fundamental categories and regimes: persons and things,
subjects and objects. Traditionally, these fundamental categories
defined themselves in reference–and in opposition–to each other.
Without precise legal definitions, French authors tried to define
these concepts and suggested that the French word chose,
translated roughly as thing, should apply to anything existing in the
human world, whether or not it is likely to be appropriated. As
regards les personnes–persons–as said by a renowned French
Professor of Law, “we are accustomed to institutions; we don’t
need to define them.” 11 In fact, the category of persons is closed,
while the category of things is residual. The latter absorbs what
the former rejects.
Consequently, because of their
interdependence, neither of these categories can be simply
understood. Nevertheless, the need for such a distinction has
always been clear for lawyers.
Several distinguishing criteria have thus been brought out: a
person is characterized by the ability to act in the judicial system
(by judicial deeds and trials), by the capacity to be the subject of
rights and duties, by the capacity to exercise such rights, and also
by what is known as “patrimony” in traditional civilian doctrine. 12
In this way, the legal concept of person is a tool to identify actors
(subjects) of the legal system by their opposition to objects over
which rights are exercised. But the distinction also brings with it a
symbolic dimension: the actors are invested with a supreme
importance. Here the ancient influence of Christianity and its
insistence on the importance of individuality is to be stressed.
Catholicism is the first religion to emphasize the importance of
terrestrial experience as opposed to a purely extra-terrestrial
attitude. The consideration for the autonomy of the individual, and
for its self-sufficiency, was further enhanced with the spread of the
Protestantism. To be complete, the humanist philosophy has also
emphasized the self-sufficiency of the individual as a rational
11. J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL, INTRODUCTION n. 23 (PUF, Thémis
1999).
12. Patrimony: the economic unit consisting of the total sum of a person’s
assets and liabilities.
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entity, with or without any connection with God. In short, one can
grasp the legal concept of person (and judicial personality), on the
one hand, as a functional and instrumental tool, and on the other
hand, as a symbolic institution with religious and humanist roots.
Second, despite–or perhaps because of–this symbolic
dimension, the legal concept of person could not perfectly
correspond to flesh and blood people. We remember, of course,
the slavery statute, not abolished until 1848 in France. Slaves in
French colonies were governed by the regime of goods and things
(Le Code noir, 1685). 13 French law also had what was called mort
civile–civil death–which was not abolished until 1854. It was a
sentence passed on persons convicted to hard labor or life
imprisonment. The “civilly dead” person lost all his possessions.
His legacy was passed on, as if he had died, and his marriage was
dissolved. Since then, the progression of the idea of inherent rights
and that of equality narrowed the gap between a person in the legal
sense of words and an actual human being. The adherence of these
two concepts was sought. It could be the reason why the concept
of natural person appeared in the Louisiana Civil Code, 14 while the
concept of physical persons was acknowledged in the French civil
doctrine. At the same time, the legal concept of a person was
divided to accommodate the concept of a juridical person, which
seems to be more open in the Louisiana Civil Code than in the
French law (in which this category covers almost only corporations
and associations). With this evolution arose the idea that all
individuals must be understood as persons in the legal sense. This
movement deepened in Europe after the Second World War with
the promotion of human rights and the stigmatization of crimes
against humanity. The adoption of the European Convention for
Human Rights (ECHR), 15 in the framework of the European
Council and the creation of a special court–the European Court for
Human Rights–in charge of judging violations of the convention
by member states and individuals, were important events. The fact
that any individual who claims to be a victim of a violation of
13. CODES NOIRS: DE L'ESCLAVAGE AUX ABOLITIONS, LE CODE NOIR DE
1685, EDIT DU ROI SUR LES ESCLAVES DES ILES DE L'AMERIQUE (Dalloz
2006).
14. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 24 (West 2008).
15. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(Rome, November 4th, 1950).
MARS
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rights protected by the ECHR can complain to the Court (under the
condition that all legal recourses within national Law must have
been exhausted) plays a central role in the strengthening of human
rights. Furthermore, the Court has significant influence to the
effect that most national laws have been modified towards a
greater respect for human rights.
There is undoubtedly in Europe, since the middle of the 20th
century, a movement of convergence between the different
conceptual tools described: human rights, amplified and
consolidated by the ECHR, reinforce the idea that the judicial
personality, in his dual dimension–instrumental and symbolic–is
the person’s primary source of protection. But recent advances in
biotechnology and the scientific interest in manipulating human
genome, cells and embryos, disrupt this progression. In general,
the substantial unity and the identity of the person are strikingly
challenged in medical investigations and genetic explorations that
try to reengineer human components. Scientific applications to
experiment on human embryos and mix human and animal
components shed a harsh light on the blurred frontiers of humanity.
Indeed, the very concept of humanity was philosophically
constructed in opposition to that of animalism, and animals belong
to the residual category of things in the civil tradition. 16 At the
same time, the legal notion of humanity is challenged by a new
concept of “human species,” as in article 16-4 of the French Civil
Code. 17 This concept of “human species” is closer to biology and
zoology than to law. In this context, the relations between human
beings (and humanity), the legal category of persons (individuals
with judicial personality) and legal protection have to be
reconsidered. In this paper, we propose to reexamine these
problematic relations through the emerging question of the legal
status of the chimerical or hybrid embryo resulting from mixing
human and animal cells.
As there is no specific French jurisprudence, nor legal text,
regarding chimerical embryos mixing human and animal cells, a
practical way to anticipate may be to combine solutions dealing
with human and animal embryos. Therefore, in order to illuminate
the legal status of chimerical embryos, we will proceed in three
16. See F. BURGAT, ANIMAL: MON PROCHAIN (Odile Jacob ed., 1997).
17. French Civil Code, art. 16-4: “nobody can interfere with the integrity of
the human species.”

2008]

HUMAN, ANIMAL, & CHIMERICAL EMBRYO

85

steps. First, we will expose the current status of human embryos in
French law. We will then clarify the legal status of animal
embryos in France. Finally, we will discuss chimerical embryos
and will propose some primary hypotheses.
I. HUMAN EMBRYOS
Given the strong protective dimension that has historically
been associated with the legal notion of the person (e.g., with
general legal capacity), the protections given to the human fetus
and embryo are co-extensive with their legal characterization. The
question is whether they can be viewed as belonging to the
category of the person. To clarify this issue, we first must address
the in utero embryo and fetus, and second, the in vitro embryo.
Traditionally the question is connected to the ancient Roman
fiction of the anticipated personality of the unborn child for the
preservation of its interests. This idea is not formally mentioned in
any provision of the French Civil Code. This is a primary
difference with the Louisiana Civil Code, in which article 26 states
that “an unborn child shall be considered as a natural person for
whatever relates to its interests for the moment of conception.”
Besides in French law this rule has a strictly patrimonial
understanding and therefore is does not offer a considerate status to
the unborn child, namely, a protection adjusted to the humanity of
the fetus.
The question of the fetus’s nature, or status, first arose in a
socially controversial context, at the time of the vote on the French
Law n° 75-17 of January 17th, 1975, authorizing the voluntary
interruption of pregnancy. 18 This law operated a compromise. It
made it clear in article 1 that “The law secures the primacy of the
person, prohibits any assault on human dignity and guarantees the
respect of every human being from the beginning of life. The
principle may only be derogated from in the event of necessity and
in accordance with the conditions set out by this law.” It was a
matter of finding a delicate equilibrium between the principal of
respect for all human beings from the moment of conception, and
the exception or justification admitted in the case of distress of a
pregnant woman. The law therefore did not recognize in 1975 the
18. Until then, intentional abortion had been sanctioned by French law,
except in cases where it was necessary in order to save the life of the mother.
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right to abortion. It recognized simply that under certain
circumstances the criminal sanction could be removed. The law,
manipulating the concepts of principle and exception, in this way
avoided taking a position on the characterization of the fetus as
either person or thing.
The recent reform of the abortion law has slightly modified the
former equilibrium. 19 The period in which abortion was permitted
was extended to twelve weeks instead of the ten weeks previously
provided. In addition, the physician’s duty to assess the mother
distress was diminished. More importantly, the provisions relating
to criminal offence in case of abortion have disappeared in the
Criminal Code. All of the law’s provisions regulating voluntary
abortion have now been enacted in the Public Health Code. This
modification reinforces the woman’s freedom to abort.
The Constitutional Council acted similarly when it held that the
law conforms with the French Constitution. 20 This amounted to a
ratification by the Council of this equilibrium and to a refusal to
give constitutional value to the idea of respect for all human beings
from the moment of conception.
Some time afterward, the National Consultative Ethics
Committee (NCEE) issued an opinion on the sampling of dead
human embryonic and fetal tissue for therapeutic, diagnostic, and
scientific purposes (opinion n° 1, May 22nd, 1984). The NCEE is
an independent authority with the mission to give opinions on
ethical problems and questions concerning society, revealed by the
progress of knowledge in the fields of biology, medicine and
health. The Committee opined that the embryo is “a potential
human person.” This expression is ambivalent: the embryo is not
yet a person, but it has the elements of a person, and must be
protected as one.

19. Law n° 2001-588, July 4th, 2001, revising the Public Health Code, arts.
L. 2212-1 to 2212-11.
20. Decision n° 74-54, January 15th, 1975, available at http://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/depuis1958/decisions-par-date/1975/74-54-dc/decision-n-74-54-dc-du-15janvier1975.7423.html (last visited November 6, 2008).
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Authors 21 have steadily proposed the creation of a new
subclass within the category of person to find an adequate
protection for embryos. Most of them have suggested splitting the
concept of person between, on the one hand, the functional and
abstract notion of person and, on the other hand, a more flexible
notion of human being. According to the authors, this reasoning
was justified by the 1994 bioethics laws. 22 It is thus provided
under article 16-1 of the French Civil Code that “the law secures
the primacy of the person, prohibits any assault on human dignity
and guarantees the respect of every human being from the
beginning of its life.” 23 It has been noted that this law was
intended to add a new feature to the concept of person, its human
dimension, and more particularly to add this new feature to the
embryo.
An additional justification for this idea of a new sub-class was
also found in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of
Biology and Medicine, also known as the Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine, which was opened for signature on April
4th, 1997 in Oviedo and came into force on December 1st, 1999.
Article 1 provides that the “Parties to this Convention shall protect
the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee
everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and
other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the
application of biology and medicine.” This passage is explained in
the Convention’s accompanying explanatory report on the
Convention, which states that “the Convention also uses the
expression ‘human being’ to state the necessity to protect the
dignity and identity of all human beings. It was acknowledged that
it was a generally accepted principle that human dignity and the
identity of the human being had to be respected as soon as life

21. S. Joly, Le passage de la personne, sujet de droit à la personne, être
humain, 22 DROIT DE LA FAMILLE (see the recording of references in n. 51)
(1997); and P. Murat, Réflexions sur la distinction être humain/personne, 9
DROIT DE LA FAMILLE (1997).
22. Laws n° 94-653 and n° 94-654, July 29th, 1994. New provisions were
added in both the French Civil Code and Public Health Code.
23. One can notice that it is nearly the same wording as in the 1975 law
(authorizing voluntary abortion), art. 1.
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began.” 24 However, in 2008, France had not yet ratified the
Convention.
Moreover this attempt to give a juridical protection to in utero
fetus was ruined by criminal court cases applying article 221-6 of
the French Criminal Code. Indeed, on three occasions, the Cour de
cassation (hereafter, Court of Cassation)–the French highest court
for private law cases–stated that: “the rule that offences and
punishment must be defined by law, which requires that criminal
statutes be construed strictly, pleads against a charge of
unintentional homicide lying in the case of a child that is not born
alive.” 25
In one of the Court of Cassation decisions dated June 30th,
1999, an application against the French Republic was lodged with
the European Court of Human Rights. It was a case of mistaken
24. The Convention does not define the term ‘everyone’ (in French ‘toute
personne’). These two terms are equivalent and found in the English and French
versions of the European Convention on Human Rights, which however does
not define them. In the absence of a unanimous agreement on the definition of
these terms among member States of the Council of Europe, it was decided to
allow domestic law to define them for the purposes of the application of the
present Convention.
25. D. Vignaud, Note, Cour de cassation, Chambre criminelle, 30 juin
1999, RECUEIL DALLOZ 710 (1999); Y. Mayaud, Entre vie et mort, la protection
pénale du foetus, 4 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE 813 (1999); and M.-L
Rassat, La victime des infractions contre les personnes après l'arrêt de la
Chambre criminelle du 30 juin 1999, 12 DROIT PENAL 4 (2000).
Y. Mayaud, Note on Cour de cassation, Assemblée plénière, 29 juin 2001,
RECUEIL DALLOZ 2917 (2001); P. Sargos, Rapport, J. Sainte-Rose, Conclusions,
and M.-L. Rassat, Note, all at 10569 SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (2001); J. Hauser,
Note, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 560 (2001); and J. Pradel, La
seconde mort de l'enfant conçu, RECUEIL DALLOZ 2907 (2001). In July 1995, a
vehicle being driven by Mr. Z, who was intoxicated, collided with a vehicle
being driven by Mrs. X, who was six months pregnant. She was injured and as a
result of the impact lost the foetus she was carrying.
J. Pradel, Note, Cour de cassation, Chambre criminelle, 25 juin 2002,
RECUEIL DALLOZ 3099 (2002); M.-L. Rassat, Note, 10155 SEMAINE JURIDIQUE
(2002); and Y. Mayaud, Note, REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE 95 (2003). The
child’s death was a result of the negligence of both the doctor, in failing to place
the patient, who was beyond term, under closer observation, and of the midwife
in failing to notify an unequivocal anomaly noted when the child’s cardiac
rhythm was recorded.
For a comprehensive analysis see A. Lepage & P. Maistre du Chambon, Les
paradoxes de la protection de la vie humaine, in LES DROITS ET LE DROIT,
MELANGES DEDIES A B. BOULOC 613-650 (Dalloz 2007).
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identity: two Vietnamese women had nearly similar names. One
of them came to the doctor to have her contraceptive coil removed.
The other was six months pregnant and came for a regular check
up. The doctor caused the death of the child the second woman
was carrying by operating on her without performing a prior
clinical examination. The woman who lost her child alleged a
violation of the Convention on the ground that the doctor’s conduct
was not classified as unintentional homicide.
The Court concluded, on July 4th, 2004, that there had been no
violation of article 2 of the Convention 26 because, “the issue of
when the right to life begins comes within the margin of
appreciation which the Court generally considers that States should
enjoy in this sphere, notwithstanding an evolutive interpretation of
the Convention, a living instrument which must be interpreted in
the light of present-day conditions.” 27
An author 28 has pointed out the incoherence of this position
saying that a person causing unintentional injury is liable to
criminal prosecution while a person who unintentionally causes the
death of the fetus goes unpunished. He criticized the fact that a
26. Article 2 of the Convention provides: “1. Everyone’s right to life shall
be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in
the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for
which this penalty is provided by law.”
27. ECHR,
Grand
Chamber
§82,
Vo v.
France
case,
July
8th,
2004,
available
at
http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Press/2004/July/GrandChamberjudgmentVovFranc
e080704.htm (last visited November 6, 2008).
M. Levinet, Note, 9 LES GRANDS ARRETS DE LA COUR EUROPEENNE DES
DROITS DE L'HOMME 97 (F. Sudre et al., PUF, Thémis 2007); J. Sainte-Rose ,
L'enfant à naître: un objet destructible sans destinée humaine, SEMAINE
JURIDIQUE 194 (2004); J.-P. Marguénaud, Les tergiversations de la Cour
européenne des droits de l'Homme face au droit à la vie de l'enfant à naître,
REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 799 (2004); and P. Murat, Les frontières
du droit à la vie: l'indécision de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme,
DROIT DE LA FAMILLE 194 (2004).
28. J. Pradel, Note sous Cour de cassation, Chambre criminelle, 2 décembre
2003, RECUEIL DALLOZ 449 (2004). The Criminal Division of the Court of
Cassation has held that a Court of Appeal gave valid reasons for a defendant
guilty of the unintentional homicide of a child who died an hour after her birth
on the day of a road traffic accident in which her mother, who was eight months’
pregnant, was seriously injured, when it held that, by failing to control his
vehicle, the driver had caused the child’s death an hour after birth as a result of
irreversible lesions to vital organs sustained at the moment of impact.
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child who has lived for a few minutes is recognized as having
standing as a victim, whereas a child that dies in utero is ignored
by the law; and the fact that freedom to procreate is less well
protected than freedom to have an abortion. This can be
considered as a surprising result because criminal law is normally
dedicated to the protection of the human being who is vulnerable
and whose life deserves to be protected.
What all these decisions reveal is that criminal law refuses to
acknowledge any distinction between a human being and a person
having a judicial personality. As a result, no protection is given
until a child is born, alive and viable. Louisiana law appears to be
very different since the child to be is considered a person for the
purposes of a wrongful death action against the person which
causes the loss of the fetus. 29
If we now consider the topic of in vitro embryo, we reach the
same impasse. The idea of making a distinction between a person
having legal capacity and a human being is also defeated. It is
therefore difficult to find a relevant protection for embryos in a
state of cryopreservation. We are going to see how the status of in
vitro embryo obliges to set aside all ontological definitions of the
embryo to restrict its to a teleological definition: 30 what is
important is the use intended for the in vitro embryo.
Just before the 1994 bioethics law was enacted, the Conseil
constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) sharply depreciated the
embryo, denying that it can be construed as a sample of humanity.
The issue of the abandoned frozen embryos that cannot be
transferred into a womb was referred to the Council. The law
obliges them to be destroyed after a certain limit of time. The
Constitutional Council stated on July 27th, 1994 that “the legislator
has taken the view that the principle of respect of every human
being from the beginning of life was not applicable to them.” The
relevant provisions were therefore constitutional.31
As a

29. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 26 (West 2008).
30. F. BELLIVIER, Réflexions au sujet de la nature et de l'artifice dans les
lois de bioéthique, 35 PETITES AFFICHES: SPECIAL REVISION DES LOIS
BIOETHIQUE 10 (2005).
31. Decision n° 94-343/344 DC, July 27th, 1994, available at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/lesdecisions/depuis-1958/decisions-par-date/1994/94-343/344-dc/decision-n-94343-344-dc-du-27-juillet-1994.10566.html (last visited November 6, 2008); and
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consequence, the Council acknowledges the existence of a subclass of human beings, expelled from humankind, who does not
deserve the respect due to every human being from the beginning
of life.
Thus, the characterization of the embryo no longer depends
upon its inherent nature. Rather, it relies on the willingness of
another to give it the status and protections of a person. This is
clear from the 1994 bioethics French law, as amended in 2004: 32
“Assisted conception is aimed at responding to parental request of
a couple” (in the French law “couple” refers to married or
unmarried couple made up by the in vitro fertilization patients). 33
The destiny of frozen embryos is closely linked with the existence
and pursuit of the “parental project.” If, for example, parents are
separated or do not want other children, or if one of them dies, then
there is no longer a parental project and the status of embryo is
rendered uncertain. The embryo is either given to another couple
(in accordance with adoption procedures) or used for scientific
research or destroyed after five years in a state of cryopreservation,
if the couple expresses no other possible choice. 34
In vitro embryos have a very ambiguous legal status: on the
one hand, they benefit from full legal protection when they are part
of a parental project. On the other hand, as soon as there is no
such project (e.g. no married couple is willing and able to receive
the in vitro embryo available for adoptive implantation), they count
for nothing. This ambiguous legal status has been confirmed by
the Court of Appeals of Douai in a judgment dated December 6th,
2005. 35 In this case, several embryos belonging to the same couple
had deteriorated because of poor storage conditions (they had been
kept by the hospital in containers with fissures). The Court of
Appeals acknowledged that the hospital was liable for failing to
provide appropriate storage, but reversed the award of damages
that had been granted to the couple (10,000 Euros based on “varied

B. Edelman, Le Conseil constitutionnel et l'embryon, RECUEIL DALLOZ 205
(1995).
32. Law n° 2004-800, August 6th, 2004.
33. Public Health Code, art. L. 2141-2.
34. Id. at art. L. 2141-4.
35. Cour administrative d'appel de Douai, December 6th, 2005, Juris-Data n°
2005-291858 ; and J.-R Binet, L'enfant conçu et le projet parental devant le juge
administratif, DROIT DE LA FAMILLE 14 (2006).
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troubles in their living conditions”) in first instance by the
Administrative Tribunal. The Court of Appeals considered that, in
view of the specific circumstances of the case, the couple’s
parental project had ceased when their embryos had been
destroyed by accident: after the birth of their two daughters born
as a consequence of in vitro fertilization, they had not maintained
any contact with the medical facility where the nine leftover in
vitro embryos were stored.
The European Court of Human Rights emphasized the
dependence of the embryo destiny to the parental project in the
case Evans v. United Kingdom, (first judgment on March 7th, 2006,
and, after the referral of the case to the Grand Chamber, second
judgment on April 10th, 2007 confirming the previous one). 36 The
decision can be transposed to French law, which is close, in some
respects, to the Human Fertilization and Embryology British Act of
1990.
The applicant, Mrs. Evans, had serious pre-cancerous tumors in
both ovaries, requiring their removal. She and her partner were
told that because the tumors were growing slowly, it would be
possible first to extract some eggs for in vitro fertilization (“IVF”).
Mrs. Evans and her partner commenced treatment at the Bath
Assisted Conception Clinic. In May 2002, the relationship broke
down. The future of the embryos was discussed between the
parties. On July 4th, 2002 the partner wrote to the clinic to notify it
of the separation and to demand that the embryos should be
destroyed. The applicant contested some provisions of the Act of
1990, whereby the consent of either party might be withdrawn at
any stage up to the point of implantation of an embryo. She argued
that this rule, which denies her any chance to have geneticallyrelated offspring in view of her medical history, violated her rights
to respect for private and family life under article 8 of the
Convention. 37
36.
ECHR,
March
7th,
1986,
available
at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2006/March/ChamberjudgmentEvansvUnited
Kingdom070306.htm (last visited November 6, 2008).
ECHR,
Grand
chamber, April 10th,
2007,
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=Evans&sessionid=16566852&skin=hudoc-en
(last
visited
November 6, 2008); and B. Mathieu, Note, 10097 SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (2007).
37. “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life.”
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 15, at art. 8.
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On April 10th, 2007, approving the previous judgment, the
Court, sitting as a Grand Chamber, stated that:
Respect for human dignity and free will, as well as a desire
to ensure a fair balance between the parties to IVF
treatment, underlay the legislature's decision to enact
provisions permitting of no exception to ensure that every
person donating gametes for the purpose of IVF treatment
would know in advance that no use could be made of his or
her genetic material without his or her continuing consent.
In addition to the principle at stake, the absolute nature of
the rule served to promote legal certainty and to avoid the
problems of arbitrariness and inconsistency inherent in
weighing, on a case by case basis, entirely
incommensurable interests. 38
Therefore the Grand Chamber stated that, “given the lack of
European consensus on this point, the fact that the domestic rules
were clear and brought to the attention of the applicant and that
they struck a fair balance between the competing interests, there
has been no violation of article 8 of the Convention.” 39
A review of the French provisions and the European case law
on this topic shows that the requirements for recognizing a current
and justifiable parental project limit the possibility of protecting
the embryo’s potential to be born. Indeed, if the in vitro embryo
ceases to be part of a genuine parental project, it becomes a group
of cells that may be used for scientific experiments or disposed by
destruction. Without parental desire, the embryo lacks humanity.
Once more, the gap between Louisiana and European law is
striking. The characterization of the in vitro embryo as “a juridical
person” in the Louisiana Revised Statutes, 40 as surprising as it
38. ECHR, Grand chamber, supra note 36, at § 89.
Even if the Court holds that the conflicting interests of the parties are
“incommensurable” and could not be “weighed, on a case by case basis,” it
nevertheless compares them when considering that “the applicant's right to
respect for the decision to become a parent in the genetic sense should be
accorded greater weight than J.'s right to respect for his decision not to have a
genetically-related child with her” Id. at § 90. See J.-P. Marguénaud, La triste
fin des embryons in vitro du couple séparé: la Cour de Strasbourg, Cour
européenne des droits du Mâle, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 295
(2007).
39. ECHR, Grand chamber, supra note 36, at § 92.
40. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:121 (2008).
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could seem from a European perspective, offers effective
protection to this embryo, which is entitled to be represented in a
law suit. To resolve disputes between the potential parents, the
Louisiana law states that “the best interest” of the in vitro embryo
must be the judicial standard. Moreover it is impossible to destroy
it intentionally, without any time limit, even if no parental project
sustains it any more. 41 It seems therefore that under Louisiana
law, frozen embryos are potentially immortal persons. One can
infer from these provisions that in vitro embryos could not be
destroyed in circumstances close to the situation judged by the
European Court of Human Rights in the Evans case.
The French teleological definition of embryo has allowed
scientific research to take place with both public and private funds.
The August 6th, 2004 law enables some research on in vitro
embryos when they are no longer part of a parental project, if the
parents give express consent. As it becomes a scientific material,
the embryo is then to be regarded as a thing. These experiments
are subject to authorization on a case-by-case basis by the
Biomedicine Agency, which controls the interest and the necessity
of such experiments. Around 45 research teams have been allowed
to work on human embryonic stem cells since 2004. 42 In this legal
framework, a testing program on embryo cells aiming at
establishing a chimerical model man/mouse to enable the study of
HIV infection was authorized in 2006. As adult mice were used in
this experiment, the “chimerical model” was not a chimerical
embryo. In this context, law concerning animal experimentation
could be more useful to provide guardrails.
As regards chimerical embryos, the result of mixing cells from
human and animal embryos, the question of their legal statusbe
solved by considering either the legal status of a human embryo or
the legal status of animals, especially animal embryos. Having
discussed the law pertaining to the human embryo, the legal
provisions concerning animal embryos should now be explored.

41. Id. at §9:122 - 133 (2008).
42. Rapport annuel-Bilan des activités, AGENCE DE LA BIOMEDECINE 56-60
(2006), available at www.agence-biomedecine.fr (last visited November 6,
2008).
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II. ANIMAL EMBRYOS
To clarify the legal status of animal embryos, it is first
necessary to summarize the legal status of animals under French
law. That will help us to clarify, in a second step, the peculiar
situation of animal embryos, particularly in texts dealing with
scientific experiments.
A. Legal Status of Animals
In France, animals traditionally belong to the legal category of
things, which includes everything that is not legally a person, a sort
of “default category.” They are mentioned in the French Civil
Code in articles dealing with property, and their legal status
apparently remains unchanged since 1804. 43 This remains the
leading position among French scholars. The utilitarian theories of
Jeremy Bentham 44 or Peter Singer, 45 as well as the theory of
animal rights developed by Tom Regan, 46 have few echoes in
France.
Nevertheless, some contemporary French scholars hold that
animals have rights and should be treated as legal persons.47 Some
of them are lawyers and base this view on a mere technical
conception of legal personality. They consider that an animal has
such rights because it possesses its “own legally protected
interest,” which is the criterion of a “subject of rights”–the
theoretical analogon of the legal person–according to Ihering. 48
These authors stress the fact that the right to freely use a good–a
43. French Civil Code, art. 522, 524 & 528.
44. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (Adamant Media Corporation 2005) (1789).
45. P. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR TREATMENT
OF ANIMALS (Random House 1975); P. SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (Cambridge
University Press 1979); and THE GREAT APE PROJECT: EQUALITY BEYOND
HUMANITY (P. Cavalieri & P. Singer eds., Saint-Martin’s Press 1994).
46. T. REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS, (University of California
Press 1983).
47. G. CHAPOUTIER, LES DROITS DE L’ANIMAL, (PUF, collection “Que saisje?”, 1992); J.-P. MARGUENAUD, L’ANIMAL EN DROIT PRIVE (Preface Cl.
Lombois, Presses Universitaires de France 1992); and S. ANTOINE, LE DROIT DE
L’ANIMAL, (Préface J.-M. Coulon, Légis-France 2007).
48. R. VON IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END, (I. Husik trans., The
Boston Book Company 1913) (1877).
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concept that flows from the strong protection of property
developed since the 1789 revolution–cannot be applied as such to
animals. Indeed, the right to use is nowadays limited by criminal
law: ill-treatments and cruelty towards animals are banned. 49
Similarly, the right to decide freely is limited and affected by the
incrimination of abandoning or provoking voluntary death of
animals without any necessity. 50 According to this opinion, as
animals are protected (through criminal law) even against their
owner, they should no longer be characterized as things or as
goods. 51
Some choices made by the French Parliament may support this
view. For instance, legally registered associations promoting
animal protection have been authorized, since 1976, 52 to sue as
victims in certain criminal proceedings concerning animals illtreatments or cruelty toward animals. 53 Furthermore, in 1999, a
technical, but symbolic and legally far-reaching choice was made:
the French Parliament decided to move criminal offences against
animals from a part of the Penal Code entitled “Infringements on
possessions” to another part entitled “Other crimes and offences.”
At the same time, articles defining goods in the Civil Code have
been rewritten to make explicit reference to animals, and no more
only to “objects” or “things.” From then on, one can read that
“animals and things that the owner of a tenement placed thereon
for the use and working of the tenement are immovable by
destination,” 54 and that “animals and things which can move from
one place to another, whether they move by themselves, or whether
they can move only as the result of an extraneous power, are
movables by their nature.” 55 Beyond the vocabulary, this appeared
as an important shift for some scholars that were tempted interpret
as a clear distinction between animals and “objects” or “things.”
49. French Penal Code, art. R. 654-1 and art. 521-1.
50. Id. at art. 521-1 and art. R. 655-1.
51. See C. Daigueperse, L’animal, sujet de droit: réalité de demain, 1er
Sem. GAZ. PAL. 160 (1981); J.-P. Marguénaud, L’animal dans le nouveau Code
pénal, RECUEIL DALLOZ 187 (1995); and J.-P. Marguénaud, La personnalité
juridique des animaux, RECUEIL DALLOZ 205 (1998).
52. Act n° 76-629, July 10th, 1976, JORF July 13th, 1976.
53. The French system allows victims to bring their civil claim in damages
before criminal courts, where they are referred as the partie civile (civil party).
54. French Civil Code, art. 524 (redaction Act n° 99-5, January 6th, 1999).
55. Id. at art 528.
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Nevertheless, one must observe that the new version of the text
leaves animals in the legal category of goods, movable or
immovable when by destination.
Recently, the Act of March 5th, 2007 concerning the prevention
of delinquency also modified several articles of the Penal Code
dealing with additional penalties in order to include express
references to animals. To be precise, the articles concerning the
confiscation of things used or intended to be used for the
commission of an offence (or the confiscation of things which are
the product of an offence) were rewritten to make explicit
reference to animals. In doing so, the Parliament gives the
impression that the expression “things which were used or
intended for the commission of an offence” does not cover
animals, for instance dangerous dogs used to fear a victim. But,
before this modification, courts applied these texts without any
problems. Obviously, such modifications create more doubts than
clarifications about the legal status of animals.
However, the opinion that animals should be considered as
legal persons cannot prevail. Indeed, under current French law,
animals can still be appropriated and general solutions applicable
to goods and things are applied to animals, except when a specific
provision rules them out. The existence of specific texts regarding
animal protection or animal welfare 56 are not incompatible with
the traditional legal status of animals, as long as animals are still
legally treated as objects, things or goods. Besides, unlike Swiss
or German law which textually states that animals are not things, 57
no French law explicitly extracted animals from the category of
goods. On this point, French legislation may appear more
coherent, as Swiss and German law on property are still applicable
to animals in the absence of a specific legal solution. French
jurisprudence is even clearer than the legislation. If a few courts in
the 1980s were tempted to adopt some new opinion, for example
by applying family law concerning children to animals, the Court
of Cassation censured these minority decisions. 58
56. Specific texts most of the time collected in the French Penal Code, in
the French Rural Code, and in the French Environmental Code.
57. See BGB, art. 90, and Swiss Civil Code, art. 641a. See also S.
ANTOINE, RAPPORT SUR LE REGIME JURIDIQUE DE L’ANIMAL (Ministère de la
Justice, May 10th, 2005).
58. See A. Couret, Observation, Cour de cassation, Civ. 1ère, 8 oct. 1980,
RECUEIL DALLOZ 261 (1981).
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Therefore, the confusing elements described below, as regards
the Penal and the Civil codes, do not really change the situation.
Despite the academics debate, and beyond the lexical sliding,
animals remain goods, and therefore things, in French law. This
must be taken into account to better understand the status of animal
embryos.
B. Legal Status of Animal Embryos
The legal status of animal embryos raises less debate. For
those who consider that animals are goods, and therefore things,
animal embryos shall all the more be defined as things (or objects).
For the others, the “own interest” of an animal embryo appears
difficult to outline. Law concerning the property of fruits or the
“right of accession” reinforces the conclusion that animal embryos
are things. Indeed, under the civil law tradition–in French law as
in the Louisiana Civil Code–, in the absence of rights of other
persons, the owner of a thing acquires the ownership of its natural
fruits, and this solution is applicable to animals. The young of
animals belong to the owner of the mother. 59 In this legal
framework, the animal embryo is legally a fruit, produced by a
thing, and therefore belonging to the legal category of things.
However, defining animals as things does not imply absolute
freedom of action with animals. Numerous specific texts were
adopted to protect animals by prohibiting bad behavior or by
requiring the assent of administrative procedures. And it is
important to notice that some of these texts are applicable to
animal embryos. For instance, in its articles dealing with animals
used for scientific purposes, the French Rural Code covers all
vertebrates, including at the embryonic stage, except embryonic
forms of vertebrates oviparous (egg laying). 60 Such an exception
shows that French law does not apply the same solution for all the
animal embryos: some of them are things and objects of free
disposal, which is the case for invertebrate embryos and oviparous
59. French Civil Code, arts. 547 and 548 (Natural fruit: increase in stock
belong to the owner by right of accession; Fruit produced by a thing belong to
the owner only on condition that he repays the costs of ploughing, works and
seeds incurred by third parties and whose value must be assessed at the date of
repayment); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 483 & 484 (West 2008).
60. French Rural Code, art. R. 214-87.
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embryos; others are also things but are protected by special texts
limiting the freedom of the owner or the holder in an experimental
context, which is the case for vertebrate viviparous embryos.
Beyond the question of the legal status of the animal embryos,
this difference influences the conditions in which experiments can
take place. When scientists want to use viviparous embryos, they
must comply with administrative constraints. The French Rural
Code requires a license for institutions where experiments take
place and for persons who realize them. Except for the case of
simple observations requiring no intervention or suffering,
scientists are required to obtain a personal authorization. Licenses
and authorizations are delivered by civil servants working for local
veterinarian services.
Since 2001, controls cover research
protocols.
If the experimental protocols are not in fact
systematically checked one by one, scientists who ask for a
personal authorization to experiment with protected animals for
five years must explain the aim of their research. They also have
to justify the reasons why they need to use a certain sort of animals
and to assure that there is no alternative solution. Lastly, they must
set measures to limit animal suffering.
Though technical, such data are of great importance for a study
on mixing human and animal elements in order to create
chimerical embryos. They show that controls exist for scientists
and establishments where experiments take place on viviparous
embryos. They also show that it is easier to work on oviparous
embryos, because in this case scientists do not have to work in a
licensed institution or to obtain a personal authorization to
experiment, and so avoid controls.
All these information is important to anticipate questions about
the legal status of chimerical embryos. What can be the legal
status of this puzzling inter-species creature? In view of the
relative and uncertain status of human embryos in French law, and
taking into account the legal framework regarding animal
experimentation, answering this question is likely to be a real
challenge.
III. CHIMERICAL EMBRYOS
French law is mute about “chimeras” or “chimerical embryos.”
No definitions or specific solutions have been adopted. The
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question of the legal status of a chimerical embryo, mixing human
and animal cells, has no clear answer. Therefore, French lawyers
must use basic legal solutions and make conjectures.
Despite this first observation, a close examination of French
law reveals a clue. This lies in article L. 611-17 of the French
Intellectual Property Code, which holds that “Inventions shall be
considered unpatentable where their commercial exploitation
would be inconsistent to human dignity, order public or morality;
however, such inconsistency may not emanate from a prohibition
by law or regulation.” This text is the transposition into French
law of article 6 of the European Directive of July 6th, 1998 on the
legal protection of biotechnological inventions. 61 Article 6 states
that:
1) inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their
commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public
or morality; however, exploitation shall not be deemed to
be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or
regulation; 2) On the basis of this, the following, in
particular, shall be considered unpatentable: (a) processes
for cloning human beings; (b) processes for modifying the
germ line genetic identity of human beings; (c) uses of
human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; (d)
processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals
which are likely to cause them suffering without any
substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also
animals resulting from such processes. 62
How to relate this solution to our quest? The answer is in the
preamble of the Directive. Indeed, the “whereas” (or
“considering”) number thirty eight of the preamble of the Directive
brings some information about the correct interpretation of article
6. It specifies that “the operative part of this Directive should also
include an illustrative list of inventions excluded from patentability
so as to provide national courts and patent offices with a general

61. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
July 6th, 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, OJ L 213,
http://eur30.7.1998,
at
13-21,
available
at
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:213:0013:0021:EN:P
DF (last visited November 6, 2008).
62. Directive 98/44/EC, article 6.
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guide to interpreting the reference to ordre public and morality,” 63
that “this list obviously cannot presume to be exhaustive,” 64 and
that “processes, the use of which offend against human dignity,
such as processes to produce chimeras from germ cells or
totipotent cells of humans and animals, are obviously also
excluded from patentability.” 65
This late precision provides a precious, but perhaps flimsy,
clue. The legal force of a preamble of a European directive is
subject to discussion. Nevertheless, this text has been written to
help interpreters of the Directive. As article L. 611-17 of the
French Intellectual Property Code transposes article 6 of the
Directive, it is acceptable to read the French text in the light of the
preamble of the Directive. In doing so, one can hold that a process
to produce a chimerical embryo created from germ cells or
totipotent cells of human and animals would not be patentable.
Going one step further in our interpretation, one could consider
that a chimerical embryo from germ cells or totipotent cells of
human and animals would not be patentable. This supported
opinion should convince. But it is a debatable conclusion. French
Courts, French and European Patent Offices could find in the
Stuart Newman’s decision of the United States Patent Trade Office
another reason to choose this interpretation.
In 1987, cell biologist Stuart Newman, in collaboration with
biotech-activist Jeremy Rifkin, filed a patent application for a
“chimera,” described as a “mammalian embryo developed from a
mixture of embryo cells, embryo cells and embryonic stem cells, or
embryonic stem cells exclusively, in which at least one of the cells
is derived from a human embryo, a human embryonic stem cell
line, or any other type of human cell, and any cell line, developed
embryo, or animal derived from such an embryo.” 66 Newman and
Rifkin hoped through the application either to obtain a patent, and
thus to be able to block anyone else from developing a human63. Id. at preamble (considering 38).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Dec. Stuart Newman,
Application n° 10/308, 135, Art unit n° 1632. See about this decision, M.-A.
Hermitte, Bioéthique et brevets dans le droit du commerce international: la
construction d’un nouveau contrat social, in LA COMMUNAUTE
INTERNATIONALE ET LES ENJEUX BIOETHIQUES 111 (S. Maljean-Dubois dir.,
Pédone 2005).
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animal chimera for twenty years, or to provoke the denial of the
patent, and thus to get the Patent Office to take a clear stand
against the patenting of chimeras. The 2003 final decision in the
Newman applications is largely based on traditional patent
requirements. The decision, for example, notes that the Newman
application fails to describe adequately how the applicant intends
to produce a chimera; that to the extent that it does describe how to
accomplish its ends it merely duplicates already published
processes.
But, in a more interesting way, the Patent Office
asserted its position that human beings are not patentable subject
matter. The Patent Office said that “a proportion of non human
cells do not negate the human’s status as a human, nor does
alteration by human intervention. Thus, it is clear from a reading
of the claims in view of the specification and in view of the art that
the breadth of the claimed invention includes ‘humans’.” 67 In his
report, the examiner also developed that, under United States
patent law, only “useful process, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter” 68 may obtain a patent, and that “the term
useful has been construed to include the connotation that an
asserted invention should not be frivolous, or injurious to the wellbeing, good policy, or good morals of society.” 69 In charge of
applying a textual exclusion from patentability for inventions
inconsistent to human dignity, public order or morality, French and
European Patent Offices could adopt a similar position.
Though useful, this information does not answer clearly the
question of the status of such an embryo. It is thus necessary to
question other existing rules to discover possible answers to this
forward-looking issue. For the purpose of our thought, three basic
working hypotheses have to be envisaged, depending on the legal
status of the elements mixed to create the chimera.
In a first hypothesis, one could consider that a human embryo
even in vitro is a person (or a subject of rights in French legal
terminology), unlike an animal embryo. Concerning human
embryos, this hypothesis is less relevant according to French law
than to other civil legal systems such as Louisiana law. In this
context, several options are conceivable. In order to provide a
maximal protection to human embryos, a solution consists in
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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considering that a chimerical embryo is legally a human embryo,
and consequently a legal person, though it is only partially
biologically human. On the contrary, one could suggest that the
mixture of DNA disqualifies the embryo as a human embryo, and
that the new creature is just a new type of genetically modified
animal. But others pathways are imaginable. One could, for
instance, make reference to the civilian rules concerning “principal
and accessories” or composite things. In the civil legal tradition, to
characterize a thing as accessory means that the accessory may
follow the principal thing. In this view, the embryo essentially
constituted by genetically human material (more than 50 percent)
would be characterized as human embryo, and thus as “subject of
rights.” It would be the case, for instance, of the human embryo in
the brain of which animal neuronal cells would have been injected.
On the contrary, embryos not presenting this characteristic would
belong to the category of animal embryos and would be mere
things. Another possibility lies in paying attention to the DNA of
sex cells. With this solution, for instance, a duck embryo of which
brain would have been partially colonized by human neurons
would not be protected at all. Last but not least, one could propose
to create or recognize a new specific category, but no information
is available about what rules would be applicable.
In a second hypothesis, one could consider both human and
animal embryos as legal persons. This hypothesis is not relevant to
current French or Louisiana law. Nevertheless, it is still interesting
to notice that the characterization of human embryos and animal
embryos as persons does not imply that the same rules would be
necessarily applicable to them. In the legal category of persons,
different regimes may coexist. For instance, juristic persons and
natural persons have a name, a domicile, a nationality and a
patrimony, but juristic persons do not need physical protection or
matrimony rules. So, it is still necessary to decide if the chimerical
embryo would be treated as a human embryo, as an animal
embryo, or as a new kind of person subject to new rules.
In a third hypothesis, one could consider human embryos in
vitro and animal embryos as legal things. In such a view, which is
more convincing under current French law than the Louisiana Civil
Code, the mixture of human and animal embryos would inevitably
fall into the category of things. At this point, two reasons would
oblige a lawyer or a judge to determine the applicable rules: first,
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as already explained, different solutions apply to human embryos
and to animal embryos; second, different rules apply to oviparous
or viviparous embryos. Undoubtedly, juridical imagination would
be tested, and maybe hounded into a corner.
To go further, it would also be necessary to address the
problem of a possible development of such a chimerical embryo
into the womb of a woman or a female, and the problem of its
birth. As a matter of fact, most of the time, the status of children
or offspring depends on the status of the mother or the female
which gave birth. The final paragraph of article L. 2151-5 of the
French Public Health Code states that human “embryos on which
research has been carried out may not be transferred for the
purpose of gestation.” Using the traditional techniques of
interpretation, it is easy to conclude that a fortiori, a chimerical
embryo may not be implanted. However, the fact that this is the
only reasonable interpretation cannot prevent that the legal
prohibition might be trespassed one day.
Moreover, the possibility of using human somatic cells to
create a chimerical embryo complicates the task. Would a
chimerical embryo produced from human somatic cells and animal
embryonic cells be characterized as a human embryo (which is
related to the concept of “potential human person” as seen before)?
It seems very problematic. Would it be legally treated as a
chimerical embryo created with human embryonic stem cells?
Probably not: as it has been previously explained, the use of human
embryos for experimental purposes is strictly limited by specific
rules only applicable to human embryos. Yet, supervising
scientific research under serious regulations appears to be an
important matter, even when human embryonic stem cells are not
used.
To complete this rapid overview, let us add that a human
embryo cannot be characterized as a genetically modified organism
under current French law, whereas an animal to which some
human genes were added can be a genetically modified organism.
Since 1990, France (as other member states of the European
Community) submits experiments on genetically modified
organisms to special authorizations. It is a whole field of new
questions that thus has to be investigated.
The range of genomic mixtures leads to infinite questions.
Science moves forward and scientific curiosity is boundless.
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Several scientists consider experiments mixing human and animal
elements as tools to make advance knowledge on early human
development. According to them, this could lead to a better
understanding of genetic diseases and to new medical treatments.
Consequently, experiments creating chimeras will probably be
attempted all around the world. Unaware of the situation or
underestimating the consequences, lawyers often ignore these
questions. Yet, very few answers are available in our legal system.
It is time to become conscious and to face these new questions.
The answers to come will be all the more relevant as the questions
will have been anticipated and the possible solutions submitted to
discussion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last 20 years, law reviews in the United States have
addressed in more than 6,500 articles, notes, and comments on the
debate on human embryos, trying to determine if they should be
understood as persons or things. In 2006, approximately 470
contributions were published, reflecting that almost every
American law review has addressed the topic. 1 The LSU Law
Center was no exception to this phenomenon. 2
This paper will help the readers examine the debate on human
embryos through an interdisciplinary perspective, by focusing on a
debate regarding Native Americans that took place in the Spanish
city of Valladolid during the 16th century. 3 Readers will be
provided with a historical viewpoint, which will not provide a
perfect and suitable solution or forecast for the current debate on
human embryos (that would be the work of oracles or fortune
tellers), but which will help them understand and learn from past
1. Information extracted in May 2007 from the electronic databases of
Westlaw.
2. The Louisiana Law Review dedicated several pages to the topic. See the
following recent papers that addressed some aspects of the debate: Katherine
Shaw Spaht, Who's Your Momma, Who Are Your Daddies - Louisiana's New
Law of Filiation, 67 LA. L. REV. 307 (2006); and J.-R. Trahan, Glossae on the
New Law of Filliation, 67 LA. L. REV. 387 (2006).
The George W. & Jean H. Pugh Institute for Justice organized a conference
by Jane Maienschein and Jason Scott Robert which was entitled Where Biology
Meets Society? (LSU Law Center, February 2nd, 2007).
The Fourth Session of the Civil Law Workshop Robert A. Pascal Series
broke the ground when speaking of human, animal, and chimerical embryos
[Human Embryo, Animal Embryo, Chimerical Embryo: What Legal Status? by
Laurence Brunet and Sonia Desmoulin (Fourth Session, Civil Law Workshop
Robert A. Pascal Series, LSU Law Center, March 20th, 2007). See their paper in
1 JCLS 69].
3. Information (in Spanish) of the history of the city of Valladolid is
available
at,
Historia
de
Valladolid,
http://www.ava.es/modules.php?name=Historia&file=Historia (last
visited
November 6, 2008).
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experiences. The main point of the paper is to demonstrate that
society has faced many moral and social debates before facing the
current debate on human embryos, and society always has been
able to find a solution. Among some of those previous debates,
and moving backwards in time, are to be found: abortion, 4 “civil
death,” 5 and finally, the human “monsters” in Rome at the
Tarpeian Rock. 6 At some point in the 16th century, it is possible to

4. The following recent works on abortion may be mentioned from the
abundant literature: ALBIN ESER, ABORTION AND THE LAW: FROM
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON TO LEGAL POLICY (Emily Silverman trans.,
2005); and BELINDA BENNETT, ABORTION (2004).
5. Civil death may be defined as “the state of a person who though
possessing natural life, has lost all his civil rights, and as to them is considered
as dead.” Proceso Gonzales Sánchez, The Nature and Consequences of Civil
Death 1 (1909) (unpublished LL. M. thesis, Yale Law School). In addition, see,
William Walton Liles, Challenges to Felony Disenfranchisement Laws: Past,
Present, and Future, 58 ALA. L. REV. 615, 616 (2007); George Brooks, Felon
Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy, and Politics, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
851, 852 (2005); and Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of
Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045,
1059 (2002).
For further readings in Spanish about civil death (muerte civil), see 1.3
ALBERTO G. SPOTA, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL 57-75(1961).
For further readings in French about civil death (mort civil), see, 1 MARCEL
PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 152-153 (12th ed. 1939).
6. During the Roman period, the babies born with extreme physical
malformations (referred to as “monsters”) were killed by throwing them from
the top of the Tarpeian Rock in Rome, a few hundred feet from the Capitolium.
These executions were also done in Sparta, from the Taygetus mountain range,
in the Peloponnesus. MIGUEL ANGEL RIZZI, TRATADO DE DERECHO PRIVADO
ROMANO (1936).
Digest 1.5.14 reads in Latin:
Paulus libro quarto sententiarum
Non sunt liberi, qui contra formam humani generis converso more
procreantur: veluti si mulier monstrosum aliquid aut prodigiosum
enixa sit.
Y. Lassard & A. Koptev, The Roman Law Library, http://web.upmfgrenoble.fr/Haiti/Cours/Ak/ (last visited May 10, 2008).
Digest 1.5.14 reads in an English translation:
Paulus, Sentences, Book IV.
Those beings are not children who are born formed in some way which
is contrary to the likeness of the human race; as, for instance, where a
woman brings forth something monstrous or unnatural.
THE CIVIL LAW (translated by S. P. Scott), available at
http://www.constitution.org/sps/sps02_j2-01.htm (last visited May 10, 2008).
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stop in the city of Valladolid, and analyze the events that occurred
during the so-called controversy 7 between Bartolomé de las Casas
and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda.
To provide a historical perspective, this paper will first explain
what a human embryo is, what a stem cell is, and the applicable
legislation and case law in the United States. Secondly, it will
explain the legal status of the Native Americans in the Spanish
Colonies during the 15th to 17th centuries, focusing on the
legislation and the work of Francisco de Vitoria. Thirdly, it will
describe the Valladolid Controversy, its main players (i.e.
Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda), their
arguments, and the outcome. Finally, some conclusions will be
provided to the readers.
II. THE CURRENT DEBATE ON HUMAN EMBRYOS AND STEM CELLS 8
An embryo starts its existence after the spermatozoid fertilizes
the ovum. 9 The first embryonic stage is that of zygote, 10 and if
the embryo continues with its regular development for a period of

Eric H. Reiter also addressed “monsters” in his presentation entitled
Rethinking Civil-Law Taxonomy: Persons, Things, and the Problem of Domat’s
Monster (Seventh Session, Civil Law Workshop Robert A. Pascal Series, LSU
Law Center, November 1st, 2007). See his paper in this same volume of the
JCLS, at 189.
7. The following terms have also been used to define the events that took
place in Valladolid during the 16th century: Debate, Tournament, Meeting,
Sessions, Junta, Disputation, and Trial.
8. The section on human embryos, developed during the Fifth Session of the
Civil Law Workshop, resulted in publications in Argentina [Agustín Parise, El
status legal de los embriones humanos en la jurisprudencia de los Estados
Unidos de América, (2007-F) LA LEY 1088] and Canada [Olivier Moréteau,
Agustín Parise & Aïssatou Sylla, La vie humaine, de la conception à la mort:
Les hésitations de la jurisprudence américaine, 9 REVUE DE LA COMMON LAW
EN FRANÇAIS 287 (2007)]. Thanks are due to the medical doctor Miguel Luis
Podestá III.
9. Laura S. Langley & Joseph W. Blackston, Sperm, Egg, and a Petri Dish
Unveiling the Underlying Property Issues Surrounding Cryopreserved Embryos,
27 J. LEGAL MED. 167, 171 (2006).
10. Patrick Lee, Embryonic Human Beings, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 424, 426 (2006).
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eight weeks, it will evolve into the fetal stage.11 Science knows of
two different kinds of embryos: animal and human. 12 The first
kind is used in important scientific research, which will have
impact in human medicine. 13 The second is the result of the
fertilization of the ovum of the human female by the spermatozoid
of the human male. 14
Human fertilization may occur in two ways: in vivo or coital,
and by means of in vitro fertilization (IVF). 15 It is by means of
human fertilization that the cells that make up the human embryo
start to multiply and to create the characteristics of a human
being. 16 Since 1978 more than one million humans were born with
IVF takes place in laboratories,
the assistance of IVF. 17
18
specifically in Petri dishes.
Approximately 15 to 20 ova are
fertilized, and kept for the future, in the event that the implantation
11. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 453 (Neil J. Salkind &
Lewis Margolis eds., 2006).
12. Finally, other kinds of embryos exist as a result of chimerism, i.e. a
combination or mutation between human and animal embryos. See D. Scott
Bennett, Chimera and the Continuum of Humanity: Erasing the Line of
Constitutional Personhood, 55 EMORY L.J. 347, 351 (2006).
There is great expectation in this field of study and early limits are sought to
avoid excess by scientists. See Catherine Arcabascio, Chimeras: Double the
DNA-Double the Fun for Crime Scene Investigators, Prosecutors, and Defense
Attorneys?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 435, 447 (2007); and Stephen R. Munzer,
Human-Nonhuman Chimeras in Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 21 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 123 (2007).
See also the work by Laurence Brunet and Sonia Desmoulin in this same
volume of the JCLS, at 79.
In May 2008, the UK took an important step towards allowing research with
chimerical embryos, see Mark Henderson & Francis Elliott, MPs
back
creation
of
human-animal
embryos,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article3964693.ece (last visited
November 6, 2008).
13. Chad West, Economics and Ethics in the Genetic Engineering of
Animals, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 413, 414 (2006).
14. Langley & Blackston, supra note 9, at 171.
15. Langley & Blackston, supra note 9, at 171.
16. Patrick Walsh, Stemming the Tide of Stem Cell Research: The Bush
Compromise, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1061, 1063 (2005).
17. Amber N. Dina, Wrongful Death and the Legal Status of the Previable
Embryo: Why Illinois is on the Cutting Edge of Determining a Definitive
Standard for Embryonic Legal Rights, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 251, 252 (2007).
18. Paul Berg, Brilliant Science, Dark Politics, Uncertain Law, 46
JURIMETRICS J. 379, 382 (2006).
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is not successful and does not result in a birth. Human embryos
are therefore cryopreserved in liquid nitrogen and reach a stage
known as suspended biological state. 19 It is said that embryos
could be kept in optimum conditions for an indefinite period of
time, although, after five years they are generally discarded by the
donors. Currently, in the United States there are at least 400,000
human embryos that are cryopreserved in liquid nitrogen and
waiting to be used. 20
One of the stages that the embryo reaches while evolving in
that eight week period is that of blastocyst. 21 Within the blastocyst
is the stem cell. These cells are of great importance for medical
science, 22 for they can be totipotent or pluripotent, and have the
potential to generate a great variety of cells within the human
body. 23 These stem cells are called embryonic stem cells
(hereinafter, ESC).
Research has shown that the ESC may help replace defective
tissue and develop cells that could defeat diseases by means of
regenerative research. 24 Such studies have shown that ESC are
effective in treating—among others—cardiovascular diseases,
diabetes, osteoporosis, Parkinson’s disease, and Alzheimer’s
disease, which affect 128 million people in the United States
alone. 25 In addition, research with ESC would be of great value
for testing drugs and lessening research on animals. Finally,

19. Langley & Blackston, supra note 9, at 174.
20. Lauren Thuy Nguyen, The Fate of Stem Cell Research and a Proposal
for Future Legislative Regulation, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 419, 422 (2006).
21. MOSBY'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 225 (Tamara Myers ed., 7th ed., 2006).
22. The Nobel Prize for Medicine 2007 was given to Mario Capecchi,
Martin Evans, and Oliver Smithies due to their research with stem cells. See The
Nobel
Prize
in
Physiology
or
Medicine
2007,
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/2007/
(last
visited
November 6, 2007).
23. Charles I. Lugosi, Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and
Human Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in Fourteenth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 119,123 (2007).
24. Walsh, supra note 16, at 1065.
25. Michael S. Mireles, Jr., States as Innovation System Laboratories:
California, Patents, and Stem Cell Technology, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133,
1134 (2006).
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research with ESC would assist medical doctors in understanding
birth defects. 26
In order to extract the ESC from the blastocyst, it is necessary
to destroy it, and it is at that point that the debate on the rights of
the human embryo takes a significant role.
The United States does not have a federal law that regulates
entirely the specific activities with ESC. 27 On August 9th, 2001
President George W. Bush made an announcement regarding the
subsidies of the federal government for the research with ESC. He
said that at that time, 60 lines of ESC had been extracted from
blastocysts and that the decision had already been made in those
cases. He rejected the idea of deciding to destroy or not to destroy
the blastocysts in the remaining cases of human embryos kept in
suspended biological state. 28 Currently, there are even fewer ESC
in the hands of specific laboratories holding them in a monopolistic
way. 29 In absence of Federal legislation, since the early 1980s at
least 35 states have enacted legislation in favor of or against
The states of Connecticut, Illinois,
research with ESC. 30
Maryland, and New Jersey, among others, strongly support this
kind of research. For example, in November 2004, the state of
California adopted Proposition 71, by which almost three billion
dollars will be allocated to research with ESC over a ten-year
period. 31 On the other hand, states such as Indiana, South Dakota,
and Louisiana oppose investigation with ESC. 32
The US Supreme Court has not yet faced the opportunity to
decide whether human embryos should be considered persons or

26. James M. Wood et al., Product Liability Protection for Stem Cell
Research and Therapies–A Proposal, 18 No. 1 HEALTH LAW 1, 3 (2005).
27. Joanna K. Sax, The States “Race” with the Federal Government for
Stem Cell Research, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 2 (2006).
28. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/200108092.html (last visited November 6, 2007).
29. Ryan Fujikawa, Federal Funding of Human Embryonic Stem Cell
Research: An Institutional Examination, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1089 (2005).
30. Ann A. Kiessling, What is an Embryo?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1067
(2004).
31. Mireles, supra note 25, at 1134.
32. Roger G. Noll, Designing an Effective Program of State-Sponsored
Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1143, 1145
(2006).
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things. 33 In 1973, in the case Roe v. Wade, 34 and following the
opinion of Justice Blackmun, the Court did not resolve the
question of when human life begins. 35 Justice Blackmun noticed
that the question would stay unanswered for a future occasion, for
it is not the duty of judges to decide such a matter, but the duty of
experts in medical sciences. 36 Notwithstanding the silence, and
while waiting for a decision of the US Supreme Court, several
State courts have been filling that gap. Some courts claim that
human embryos are persons; 37 other courts believe they are
things; 38 and finally, an eclectic group of courts believes they are
something in between, which should be subject to special
treatment. 39 In late November 2007, the information came out that
two teams of scientists had turned human skin cells into stem cells,
without having to produce and to destroy embryos. This research
development could terminate the debate about the morality of
destroying the blastocyte, because no embryo would be
jeopardized. 40 This creates no incentive for legislatures to
abandon their wait and see attitude. However, courts of justice may
still have to decide on the matter.
33. Ann Marie Noonan, The Uncertainty of Embryo Disposition Law: How
Alterations to Roe Could Change Everything, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 485, 491
(2007).
34. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35. Leslie Leazer, “Brother Can You Spare a Cell?” The Ethical and Moral
Minefield Surrounding Stem Cell Research on US and International Law, 13SUM CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 38, 41 (2004).
36. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
37. See Davis v. Davis, Not Reported in S.W.2d, 1989 WL 140495
(Tenn.Cir.Ct.); and Miller v. Am. Infertility Group, No. 02-L-7394, slip op. at 6
(Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. Feb. 4, 2005) (order denying motion to dismiss
claims brought under Illinois' Wrongful Death Act).
38. See Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital, No. 74-3588 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14,
1978); York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 422 (E.D. Va. 1989); Davis v. Davis,
Not Reported in S.W.2d, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn.Ct.App.), 59 USLW 2205;
and Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
39. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 911 (1993); and AZ v. BZ, Mass. Law. Wkly. No. 15-008-96, slip op. at 28
(Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct., Mar. 25, 1996) (order granting preliminary
injunction).
40. See Gina Kolata, Scientists Bypass Need for Embryo to Get Stem Cells,
TIMES,
November
21st,
2007,
available
at
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/science/21stem.html?_r=1&pagewanted=a
ll&oref=slogin (last visited November 6, 2008).
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III. BRIDGING THE PRESENT WITH THE PAST
The debate on human embryos currently faced by legal
scholars is not the first of its kind in history. Legal scholars have
for a long time been encountering the following questions: Should
we first seek to settle the moral aspects of potential developments
and then face the developments? Or should we first seek to settle
developments and then face their moral aspects?
Similar questions were faced by scholars of the 16th century.
The European legal community then was facing a strong debate
regarding the rights and capacities of the Native Americans in the
Spanish possessions in America. Should they first analyze the
moral aspects of conquering the Native Americans, and then move
forward with the conquering process (e.g. treat them as members
of the local society or as extra-societal laborers)? Or should they
first conquer the Native Americans, and then face the moral
consequences that would derive from such a conquest?
Paolo Grossi, from his chair at the University of Florence
(Italy), 41 encouraged scholars to change their spectacles before
looking back in time, and to try to answer those questions through
a historical perspective. 42 If they do not do so, the outcome of
their view could be deformed or out of focus, with the current
perspective. In the present case, scholars should remove the
spectacles they use for the 21st century, and do their best to put on
the ones that would help them see the 16th century. Grossi
describes this activity as consigning the archetype to the history
books (historificar el arquetipo). 43 The best way for a legal
historian to change spectacles is to work with primary sources (i.e.
letters, correspondence, manuscripts, and first editions of books in
their original language or good translations). In this process many
41. See Grossi, Paolo,
http://www.giuris.unifi.it/index.php?module=PostWrap&page=docenti
(last
visited November 6, 2007).
42. PAOLO GROSSI, LA PROPIEDAD Y LAS PROPIEDADES: UN ANÁLISIS
HISTÓRICO 34 (Ángel López y López trans., 1992) (Original Title: LA PROPRIETÀ
E LE PROPRIETÀ NELL'OFFICINA DELLO STORICO).
43. GROSSI, supra note 42, at 34. See also, Agustín Parise, Mercedes de
Tierras y Solares: Aspectos de la Institución en la América Hispana Meridional
Durante los Siglos XVI y XVII, 43 REV. DER P.R. 181, 181 (2004); and Agustín
Parise, El Asilo Eclesiástico. Consideraciones sobre su Recepción en la América
Hispana Colonial, 15 IURIS TANTUM 125, 126 (2004).
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ghosts may appear, but those ghosts will help legal historians in
their process of discovery. 44
IV. NATIVE AMERICANS IN THE SPANISH TERRITORIES
In 1492, when Spaniards arrived in America, an estimated 13
million Native Americans lived there. 45 With their arrival,
Spaniards started to interact with clans of Native Americans that
lived in the Antilles. 46 One year later, on May 4th, due to the papal
bull Inter caetera, 47 Pope Alexander VI granted exclusive powers
to Portugal and Spain to pursue their missionary activities in the
new continent. 48 Accordingly to the papal bull, an imaginary
north-south line was drawn 100 leagues west of the Azores islands,
dividing the possessions between Spain and Portugal. On June 7th,
1494, and according to the provisions of the Treaty of Tordesillas,
the imaginary line was relocated 370 leagues west from the Cape
Verde islands. 49
As early as 1493, it was not clear if Native Americans in the
Spanish colonies were human beings or beasts. The different
Spanish expeditions had been encountering different tribes and
44. The term ghosts was borrowed from Paul R. Baier, who while
communicating with his students at LSU, several times reaches into his archives
and brings to life some ghosts by means of pictures, video and audio recordings,
or even theatrical representations.
45. 1 ALFONSO GARCÍA-GALLO, MANUAL DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO
ESPAÑOL 719 (1984).
46. Among the Native Americans of the Arawakan and Caribe clans, that
inhabited the Antilles, it is possible to mention the social groups of naborias,
taínos, and nitaínos which were under the control of a cacique. Id. at 730.
47. For an English translation of the text of the papal bull visit, Pope
Alexander
VI—The
Bull
Inter
Caetera—4
May
1493,
http://www.catholic-forum.com/saints/pope0214a.htm (last visited November 6,
2007).
48. RICARDO LEVENE, MANUAL DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ARGENTINO 55
(4th ed. 1969).
49. Id. at 55.
The Spanish crown also tried to document its rights. On November 4th,
1605, a notarial act drafted in Valladolid stated that the King of Spain had
bought from the descendents of Moctezuma, represented by Don Juan de
Toledo, all the pretentions they had and could have over the Empire of current
Mexico. The King granted a pension in consideration, and that amount was paid
until the year 1820. SILVIO ZAVALA, LAS INSTITUCIONES JURÍDICAS EN LA
CONQUISTA DE AMÉRICA 20 (1935).
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settlements, and their reports were sent to the authorities back in
Spain. 50 Hence, some scholars affirmed Native Americans were
rustic persons with limited knowledge of their rights (vulnerable
like widows, the sick, or the miserable); 51 while others argued that
Native Americans were beasts or lesser creatures, with humanoid
external form but lacking mental and moral capacity. 52
Even though Spaniards had not decided if Native Americans
were persons or things, they had to provide legislation that would
regulate the activities concerning Native Americans. Therefore, a
legislative framework came together with the conquering
expeditions. While the debate waited to be settled, the Spanish
Crown created, in 1503, the encomienda system, by which the
activities of the Native Americans would be regulated. 53
The encomienda was a very important element of the Spanish
conquest. 54 The system consisted in the division (repartimiento)
of the Native Americans into groups, and by assigning each group
to a Spanish landlord (encomendero) for work in his or her land. 55
The Native Americans were kept in “deposit” by the encomendero,
and by 1513, it was determined that that deposit would last for two
lives (i.e. the life of the Native American and that of his son or
daughter). 56 The encomenderos were obligated to pay the Native
Americans a wage for their day of work and for their maintenance,
and starting in 1509, they were obligated to instruct them in the
Holy Catholic faith, and to teach them how to read and write.
Finally, the encomenderos had to pay as taxation one peso in gold
for every Native American that belonged to the encomienda. 57
The encomienda also had a negative impact in society, because
of the abuses of the encomenderos. On December 14th, 1511, the
Dominican Antonio de Montesinos, in a speech at Santo Domingo,
50. James Muldoon, Spiritual Freedom--Physical Slavery: The Medieval
Church and Slavery, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 69, 88 (2005).
51. 2 ABELARDO LEVAGGI, MANUAL DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO
ARGENTINO 104 (1986).
52. Muldoon, supra note 50, at 89.
53. 1 GARCÍA-GALLO, supra note 45, at 723.
54. See generally, SILVIO A. ZAVALA, LA ENCOMIENDA INDIANA (1935).
55. 1 GARCÍA-GALLO, supra note 45, at 723. See also, Guillermo Floris
Margadant, Offical Mexican Attitudes Toward the Indians: An Historical Essay,
54 TUL. L. REV. 964, 967 (1980).
56. 1 GARCÍA-GALLO, supra note 45, at 724.
57. Id. at 724.
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in the island of Hispaniola, 58 raised the following questions: “are
these [Native Americans] not men?” “have they not a rational
soul?” “are you not bound to love them as you love yourselves?” 59
The result of Montesinos’s speech was the annoyance of the
encomenderos, who were afraid of losing their cheap labor. 60
Even though the speech of Montesinos had a negative impact
among the encomenderos, the Spanish Crown was not able to
ignore his comments. In 1512, the Laws of Burgos (Leyes de
Burgos) 61 were enacted, and ordered that some limits should be
imposed on the encomienda system. 62 The opposition of the
encomenderos was not long in coming, and the Leyes de Burgos
were not obeyed. 63
One year later, and until 1556, 64 the reading of the
“requirement” (requerimiento) was mandatory whenever new
groups of Native Americans were discovered and encountered. 65
The requerimiento was a document to be read before the Native
Americans, trying to explain the reasons for the presence of the
Spaniards and their acts. The initial address read:
On behalf of the very powerful and very catholic defender
of the Church, always winner and never defeated, the great
King Ferdinand V of Spain, of the Two Sicilies, of
Jerusalem, and of the Islands and Lands of the Ocean Sea,
etcetera, tamer of the barbarians, and of the very high and
powerful lady the Queen Juana, his very loved and cared
daughter, our Masters, Me, Pedrarias Dávila, his servant,

58. 1 ABELARDO LEVAGGI, MANUAL DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO
ARGENTINO 149 (1986); and 2 ALFONSO GARCÍA-GALLO, MANUAL DE HISTORIA
DEL DERECHO ESPAÑOL 654 (1984).
59. LAURENTINO DÍAZ LÓPEZ, EL DERECHO EN AMÉRICA EN EL PERÍODO
HISPÁNICO 214 (1989).
60. DÍAZ LÓPEZ, supra note 59, at 215.
61. For an English translation of the text of the Laws of Burgos visit, 15121513:
The
Laws
of
Burgos,
http://faculty.smu.edu/bakewell/BAKEWELL/texts/burgoslaws.html
(last
visited November 6, 2007).
62. DÍAZ LÓPEZ, supra note 59, at 108.
63. Id. at 109.
64. Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the
Status of the American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
93 (1983).
65. Muldoon, supra note 50, at 88.
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messenger and captain, notify you, and let you know, to
the best of my abilities . . . 66
The debate on persons or things apparently was finished by a
papal bull of Paul III. In 1537, the pontific made public the papal
bull Sublimis deus sic dilexit. 67 According to the papal bull, the
Native Americans were rational beings capable of understanding
and receiving Christian faith and sacraments. 68 In addition,
supreme rights were given to the church and legality to the Spanish
presence and religious duty in America. 69 The papal bull read in
part:
We, who, though unworthy, exercise on earth the power of
our Lord and seek with all our might to bring those sheep
of His flock who are outside, into the fold committed to our
charge, consider, however, that the Indians are truly men
and that they are not only capable of understanding the
Catholic faith but, according to our information, they desire
exceedingly to receive it. 70
After the papal bull, a new attempt to finish with the
encomienda system was made by the Spanish Crown. In 1542, the

66. The Spanish text read:
De parte del muy alto e muy poderoso y muy católico defensor de la
Iglesia, siempre vencedor y nunca vencido, el gran rey Hernando el
Quinto de las Españas, de las dos Cicilias, de Iherusalem y de las Islas
e Tierra Firme del Mar Océano, etcétera, domador de las gentes
bárbaras, y de la muy alta y muy poderosa señora la reina Doña Juana,
su muy cara e muy amada hija, nuestros señores, Yo, Pedrarias Dávila,
su criado, mensajero y capitán, vos notifico y hago saber como mejor
puedo . . . (Bold added)
2 GARCÍA-GALLO, supra note 58, at 655.
67. For an English translation of the text of the Bull visit, Sublimus Dei,
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Paul03/p3subli.htm (last visited November 6,
2007).
68. 2 LEVAGGI, supra note 51, at 104.
69. Bonar Ludwig Hernandez, The Las Casas-Sepúlveda Controversy 15501551,
http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~epf/2001/hernandez.html
(last
visited
November 6, 2007).
70. MCNUTT, BARTHOLOMEW DE LAS CASAS, HIS LIFE, HIS APOSTOLATE,
AND HIS WRITINGS 429 (1909) cited by Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of
Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 GEO. L. J. 1, 12 (1943).
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New Laws (Leyes Nuevas) were enacted. 71 The Leyes Nuevas
were unsuccessful. 72 Opposition by the encomenderos was
stronger than the church’s assertion that Native Americans were
people. 73
In 1680, the Compilation of Indian Laws (Recopilación de
Leyes de Indias) was enacted, and intended to regulate completely
the issues related to Native Americans. 74 The Recopilación de las
Leyes de Indias was divided into nine books, and Book Six was
devoted completely to the treatment of Native Americans within
the Spanish colonies. 75 In addition, Book IV, Title I, Law VI read:
“That in the capitulaciones 76 the word conquer is avoided, and that
instead the words pacification or settlement are used.” 77 Finally,
Book III, Title IV, Law 9 read: “We order that no war is to be
made against Native Americans to teach them the Holy Catholic
faith, nor to make them obey us, nor for any other purpose.” 78
V. SPANISH SCHOLASTICS
The change to a more benign treatment of Native Americans
by the Spanish crown, which was generated in the period of 150
years (between the enactment of the Leyes Nuevas and the
enactment of the Recopilación de Leyes de Indias), was
attributable mainly to the Spanish Scholastic movement. The
Spanish Scholasticism of the 16th century, also called Neo71. Michel J. Godreau & Juan A. Giusti, Las Concesiones de la Corona y
Propiedad de la Tierra en Puerto Rico, Siglos XVI-XX: Un Estudio Jurídico, 62
REV. JUR. U.P.R. 351, 451 (1993); and Hernandez, supra note 69.
72. Ruth Kerns Barber, Indian Labor in the Spanish Colonies, 6
PUBLICATIONS IN HISTORY 112 (1932).
73. DÍAZ LÓPEZ, supra note 59, at 110.
74. 1 RECOPILACIÓN DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS 62 (Cultura
Hispánica ed. 1973) (1681).
75. 2 RECOPILACIÓN DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS DE LAS INDIAS fs.188-275
(Cultura Hispánica ed. 1973) (1681).
76. Contract between crown and adelantado setting out the grant of wealth,
powers, and honors to be given upon successful discovery or settlement of new
territories. M.C. Mirow, Latin American Legal History: Some Essential Spanish
Terms, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 43, 51 (2001).
77. “Que en las capitulaciones se escuse la palabra conquista, y usen las de
pacificacion, y población.” See supra note 75, at fs. 81.
78. “Mandamos que no se pueda hacer, ni haga Guerra á los Indios de
ninguna Provincia para que recivan la Santa Fé Catolica, ó nos dén la
obediencia, ni para otro ningún efecto.” Id. at fs. 25.
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Scholasticism, was a unique production of minds, something not
seen before in legal history. 79 The impact of the production of the
Spanish Scholastics may be compared to the impact of the
production of the Roman period of Justinian (e.g. Gaius, Paulus,
Ulpian); and more recently, to the impact of the Germanic School
of the 19thcentury (e.g. Georg Friedrich Puchta, Friedrich Carl von
Savigny, Anton Friedrich Thibaut).
The Neo-Scholastics
advocated a close connection between law and theology. Acts
were judged exclusively by their moral significance. Issues were
appraised not solely from a social or political perspective, but as
cases of conscience. 80 Among the main exponents of the Spanish
school of thought were: Alfonso de Castro, Bartolomé de las
Casas, Juan de Mariana, Luis de Molina, Domingo de Soto,
Francisco de Vitoria, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, Francisco Suarez,
Gabriel Vázquez, and Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca. 81
Francisco de Vitoria (1485-1546), 82 called by many the
founder of international law, 83 was one of the main exponents of
Spanish
Scholasticism.84
He
was
an authority
in
legal affairs in his time, 85 and very popular throughout
79. They were studied, among others, by Ángel Losada, James Brown Scott
(who translated Las Partidas into English), and Lewis Hanke. See G. C. Marks,
Indigenous Peoples in International Law: The Significance of Francisco de
Vitoria and Bartolome de las Casas, 13 AUST. YBIL 14 (1990); and Lewis
Hanke, Mi vida con Bartolomé de las Casas 1930-1985, in EN EL QUINTO
CENTENARIO DE BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS 11-19 (Instituto de Cooperación
Iberoamericana ed. 1986).
80. 1 FEDERICO DE CASTRO Y BRAVO, DERECHO CIVIL DE ESPAÑA 174 (3ed.
1955).
81. 1 ABELARDO LEVAGGI, MANUAL DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO
ARGENTINO 104 (1986).
82. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS xxix-xxx (Anthony
Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991). For further reading on de Vitoria, see
Coleman Phillipson, Franciscus a Victoria (1480-1546), 15 J. SOC. COMP.
LEGIS. N.S. 175, 176 (1915).
83. See Phillipson, supra note 82, at 197; James Brown Scott, Note, 22 AM.
J. INT’L L. 139 (1928); and William Renwick Riddell, Book Review, 23 GEO. L.
J. 904, 904 (1935).
84. For a biography (in Spanish) of de Vitoria, see Bárbara Díaz & Idoya
Zorroza,
Francisco
de
Vitoria,
http://www.unav.es/pensamientoclasico/autoresyobras/Vitoria.html (last visited
November 6, 2007).
85. The influence of the theories of de Vitoria extended even to decisions of
the US Supreme Court during the 19th century. The Marshall Trilogy regarding
rights of Native Americans to the land in the US used the theories of de Vitoria,
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Europe. 86 De Vitoria was a Dominican priest who occupied,
starting in 1526, 87 a chair of Theology88 in the University
of Salamanca 89 (Spain), and who had never been in

even when they did not cite him directly. See Kenton Keller Pettit, The Waiver
of Tribal Sovereign Immunity in the Contractual Context: Conflict between the
Ninth Circuit and the Alaska Supreme Court?, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 363, 366
(1993).
In 1823, in the case Johnson v. M’Intosh (21 U.S. 543), it was decided that
through the discovery theory, the US could extinguish by conquest or just war;
and therefore, Native Americans could transfer valid land title only to the US.
In 1831, in the case Cherokee nation v. Georgia (30 U.S. 1), it was decided that
Native Americans were sovereign peoples, but not to the same extent as foreign
states. Native Americans were domestic, dependent sovereigns to whom the US
owed a special duty of care. Finally, in 1832, in the case Worcester v. Georgia
(31 U.S. 515), the court used the history of Britain's relations with Native
Americans to further develop the duty of care. See Angela R. Hoeft, Coming
Full Circle: American Indian Treaty Litigation from an International Human
Rights Perspective, 14 LAW & INEQ. 203, 210 (1995).
For further readings on the Marshall Trilogy, see Rachel San Kronowitz et
al., Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering the Political Status of
Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507 (1987); Stephanie Dean,
Getting a Piece of the Action: Should the Federal Government Be Able to Tax
Native American Gambling Revenue?, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 157, 161
(1999); Jason Kalish, Do the States Have an Ace in the Hole or Should the
Indians Call their Bluff? Tribes Caught in the Power Struggle between the
Federal Government and the States, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1345, 1348 (1996);
Rosemary Sweeney, Federal Acknowledgement of Indian Tribes: Current Bia
Interpretations of the Federal Criteria for Acknowledgment with Respect to
Several Northwest Tribes, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 203, 204 (2002); Sarah H.
Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1 (2002); David Wilkins, Quit-Claiming the Doctrine of Discovery: A
Treaty-Based Reappraisal, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 277(1998); and Blake A.
Watson, John Marshall and Indian Land Rights: A Historical Rejoinder to the
Claim of “Universal Recognition” of the Doctrine of Discovery, 36 SETON
HALL L. REV. 481(2006).
86. Even Henry VIII of England referred to de Vitoria about his divorce.
Phillipson, supra note 82, at 177.
87. Ramon Hernandez, The Internationalization of Francisco de Vitoria and
Domingo de Soto, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1031, 1031 (1992).
88. De Vitoria occupied the chair of theology at Salamanca from 1526 to
1546. Phillipson, supra note 82, at 176.
89. The University of Salamanca had been created in 1212 by Alfonso IX
(grandfather of Alfonso X the Wise). By the mid 16th century, 5,000 students
attended courses there, and 70 professors occupied chairs. Id. at 176.
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America. 90 While delivering his lectures (lecciones) in Salamanca,
his students and disciples 91 drafted class notes that turned out to be
valuable documents called relecciones. 92 The first and the last
relecciones are missing, but thirteen have survived. 93 The best
known relecciones are entitled On the American Indians (De indis)
and On the Law of War (De indis relectio posterior, sive de iure
belli), dictated in January and June 1539. 94
As a result of these two relecciones, de Vitoria stated that
Native Americans were the true owners of the lands, and that they
had rights to own property. 95 He provided two main arguments for
his position: (i) Native Americans possessed natural legal rights as
free and rational men; 96 and (ii) the Pope’s grant to Spain of title to
American possessions was baseless, and could not affect the
inherent rights of the Native Americans. 97 To sustain his first
argument he used Roman Law, Thomistic philosophy, Canon Law,
and Holy Scriptures. 98 For the second argument he cited Aquinas,
and said that according to Natural Law, the Pope lacked temporal
authority over the Native Americans, and thus, the Pope could not
give something he had no control, possession, or dominium over. 99
Finally, he argued that the law could not bind Native Americans,
who were not previously subject to it. 100
Notwithstanding these two arguments, de Vitoria spoke of a
reciprocal jus inter gentes 101 or law of nations: a law of nations
90. Blake A. Watson, John Marshall and Indian Land Rights: A Historical
Rejoinder to the Claim of “Universal Recognition” of the Doctrine of
Discovery, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 481, 504 (2006).
91. By the year of his death at least 24 renowned professors had been his
disciples. Hernandez, supra note 87, at 1041.
92. Phillipson, supra note 82, at 177.
93. Hernandez, supra note 87, at 1039.
94. DE VITORIA, supra note 82, at 231, 293.
95. Williams, supra note 64, at 68-92.
96. Id. at 70.
97. De Vitoria said that it was not possible for the Pope to have temporal
dominium over the newly discovered lands. He said that if Jesus had not had it,
then the Pope, who was his vicar, also would not have it. LEVENE, supra note
48, at 56.
98. Williams, supra note 64, at 71.
99. Id. at 75.
100. Id. at 75.
101. It is said that de Vitoria was the first to use the technical term jus inter
gentes. James Brown Scott, Asociación Francisco de Vitoria, 22 THE
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 139 (Jan., 1928).
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that not only forced a pact or agreement among men, but also
created the force of law for the world as a whole. 102 De Vitoria
claimed that transgressions to that law of nations by the Native
Americans could serve to justify the Spanish conquest and
hegemony in the Americas. 103
According to the jus inter gentes, some basic duties were
imposed (universally binding) on the Native American societies. 104
Among them were: (i) that to respect natural society and
fellowship, 105 by which Spaniards should be allowed to travel, if
they did no harm, within the American territories; 106 (ii) that to
permit a free and open commerce within the Americas and the
European immigrants (i.e. if a Native American could dig for gold,
the Spanish also should be allowed, as long as they did no
harm); 107 and (iii) that to propagate Christianity, by allowing the
preaching of the gospel. 108 After an analysis of the situation, de
Vitoria concluded that if Native Americans did not obey the basic
duties, Spaniards had the right to declare a just war on them. 109
VI. THE EVENTS AT VALLADOLID
Two other important Spanish Scholastics were Bartolomé de
las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. They both defended their
positions towards Native Americans during the events that took
place at the Controversy, in the Spanish city of Valladolid, starting
in the year 1550.
102. Williams, supra note 64, at 77.
103. Id. at 70.
104. Id. at 79.
105. Note benne, one of the articles of the Digest of the Civil Laws Now in
Force in the Territory of Orleans of 1808 (antecessor of the current Louisiana
Civil Code) also read in relation to the law of nations:
Wild beasts, birds and all the animals which are bred in the sea, the air,
or upon the earth, do, as soon as they are taken, become instantly by the
law of nations, the property of the captor; for it is agreeable to natural
reason, that those things which have no owner, should become the
property of the first occupant.
Digest of 1808 Online, Book 3, Title 20, Article 4, in Digest Online,
www.law.lsu.edu/digest (last visited November 6, 2007).
106. Williams, supra note 64, at 79.
107. Id. at 80.
108. Id. at 82.
109. Id. at 83.
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A. De las Casas & Ginés de Sepúlveda
Fray Bartolomé de las Casas (1474-1566), 110 Bishop of
Chiapas and Defender of the Indians by official decree of the
emperor, 111 was well known for his activities in favor of Native
Americans. 112 He had crossed the Atlantic Ocean on twelve
occasions, 113 and was therefore a firsthand connoisseur of the life
of Natives in America. During his early years in America, he had
been an encomendero, 114 and by the time of the speech of
Montesinos in 1511, he decided to dedicate his life to the just
treatment of the Natives. Although de las Casas was not a
philosopher, theologian, jurist, politician, or a man of
government, 115 he was a very prolific author. 116 He wrote many
books, monographs, and papers; among them: Brief Account of the
Devastation of the Indies (Brevísima Relación de la Destrucción
de las Indias), 117 History of the Indies, and Apologetic History. 118
110. G. C. Marks, Indigenous Peoples in International Law: The
Significance of Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolome de las Casas, 13 AUST.
YBIL 18 (1990).
111. Ángel Lozada, The Controversy between Sepúlveda and Las Casas in
the Junta of Valladolid, in BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS IN HISTORY: TOWARD AN
UNDERSTANDING OF THE MAN AND HIS WORK 279 (Juan Friede & Benjamin
Keen eds., 1971).
112. He was also known as the Champion of the Indians. LEWIS HANKE,
BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS 1474-1566: BIBLIOGRAFÍA CRÍTICA Y CUERPO DE
MATERIALES xiii (1954).
113. Lewis Hanke, Las Teorías Políticas de Bartolomé de las Casas, 67
PUBLICACIONES DEL INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES HISTÓRICAS, FACULTAD
DE FILOSOFÍA Y LETRAS UBA 8 (1935).
114. Susan Scafidi, Old Law in the New World: Solórzano and the
Analogical Construction of Legal Identity, 55 FLA. L. REV. 191, 198 (2003).
115. LORENZO GALMÉS, BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS: DEFENSOR DE LOS
DERECHOS HUMANOS 178 (1982).
116. DANIEL CASTRO, ANOTHER FACE OF EMPIRE: BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS
CASAS, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, AND ECCLESIASTICAL IMPERIALISM 14 (2007).
117. De las Casas has been criticized because of exaggerating the facts and
the cruelty of Spaniards. For example, he said that in a twenty-year period, 24
million Native Americans were killed. An author analyzed that information and
said that 3,500 killings per day were impossible at that time, because of the
weapons that were used and the number of Spaniards that lived in America.
VICENTE GAY, LEYES DEL IMPERIO ESPAÑOL: LAS LEYES DE INDIAS Y SU
INFLUJO EN LA LEGISLACIÓN COLONIAL EXTRANJERA 24 (1924).
118. EN EL QUINTO CENTENARIO DE BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS 186-192
(Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana ed. 1986).
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Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1490-1573), on the other hand, was
known as a defender of the encomenderos and of the Spanish
Empire. 119 Like de Vitoria, he had never been in America, 120 but
was well known because of his strong philosophical, theological,
and canonical formation. 121 His erudition seated him in meetings
with Pope Clement VII, King Charles V, King Philip II, Hernán
Cortés, Alejo Venegas, and Honorato Juan; and drove him to
debates with Martin Luther and Erasmus of Rotterdam. 122 His
writings in law, philosophy, and history were also very important
in his time. Among his works, it is worth mentioning his
translations of the main literature of Aristotle,123 and his books
entitled Chronicles of Charles V, Chronicles of Philip II,
Chronicles of the Spaniards in the New World, Of Glory, Of
Marriage and Dispensation of Marriage, and Of Testimony and
Witnesses. 124
In 1533, Ginés de Sepúlveda had finished writing his book
entitled Of the Conformity of the Militia with the Christian
Religion (Democrates primus), by which he justified the warfare
activities of Charles V, even if those were religious wars; 125 that is
to say, that war was consonant with the doctrines of
Christianity. 126 In 1544, 127 he applied the ideas expressed in
Democrates primus to the wars in the Hispanic American
territories, and wrote Of the Just Causes of War against Indians
(Democrates secundus), 128 which included a dialogue between the
two main characters (i.e. Democrates and Leopoldus). 129 The
second book, whose original manuscript comprised 68 folios
119. JUAN GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, DEMOCRATES SEGUNDO O DE LAS JUSTAS
CAUSAS DE LA GUERRA CONTRA LOS INDIOS ix (Ángel Losada ed., 2d ed. 1984).
120. Watson, supra note 90, at 508.
121. GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at ix.
122. Id. at xi ; and AUBREY F. G. BELL, JUAN GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA 30
(1925).
123. In 1522, he started to translate the Meteorum and the De Ortu et Intu,
and in 1548, the Politica. Hanke, supra note 113, at 44.
124. GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at xii.
125. Id. at xii.
126. FRANCIS AUGUSTUS MACNUTT, BARTHOLOMEW DE LAS CASAS: HIS
LIFE, HIS APOSTOLATE, AND HIS WRITINGS 286 (1909).
127. It is believed that it was written during the Fall semester of 1544 and
the Fall semester of 1545. GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at xiv.
128. Id. at xiii.
129. Id. in general.

2008]

THE VALLADOLID CONTROVERSY REVISITED

127

without enumeration, 130 did not receive royal approval for
publication in Spain. De las Casas had been one of the main
opponents to the publication of the book and contributed to its
banning. 131 Ginés de Sepúlveda then sent the Democrates
secundus to Rome (where the censorship was less severe) together
with an Apología. The Apología was printed in 1550, while the
Democrates secundus had to wait for approval. 132
B. The Controversy
On April 16th, 1550, King Charles V of Spain suspended all
conquering activities in America, until he decided whether or not
Spaniards were entitled to wage war on Native Americans. 133 He
then called for the two main actors of each side to debate before a
group (Junta) of jurists. 134 By 1550, Ginés de Sepúlveda was
identified as supporting the way in which the Spaniards ran their
activities in America; whereas de las Casas was identified as
opposing the activities of Spaniards and the publication of the
Democrates secundus. 135
In August or September 1550, the Junta of jurists met 136 in the
city of Valladolid. 137 Ginés de Sepúlveda took the stand first, for
130. Id. at xxvii.
131. Id. at xvi.
132. MACNUTT, supra note 126, at 287; and GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra
note 119, at xviii.
133. GALMÉS, supra note 115, at 173.
134. A strong controversy had existed between moralists and theologians on
the one side, and the encomenderos and conquerors on the other hand. CASTRO,
supra note 116, at 128.
135. De las Casas was not alone in his opposition to the doctrine of Ginés
de Sepúlveda. In 1547, the Dominican theologian and bishop, Melchor Cano
had written against that doctrine; and in 1549, the Spanish lawyer and member
of the Second Audiencia of Mexico, Alonso de Maldonado, supported de las
Casas in a petition to the king. LEWIS HANKE, ARISTOTLE AND THE AMERICAN
INDIANS: A STUDY IN RACE PREJUDICE IN THE MODERN WORLD 31 (1959).
136. Soto, Carranza, Cano, Rodrigo, Pedro Ponce de León, Anaya,
Mercado, Pedraza, Gasca. GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at xxi.
Another author mentions that the Junta comprised 15 jurists. GALMÉS,
supra note 115, at 173.
Other authors say that the Junta consisted of 14 members: ARTHUR HELPS,
THE LIFE OF LAS CASAS THE APOSTLE OF THE INDIES 265 (1896); and AUBREY F.
G. BELL, JUAN GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA 46 (1925).
137. GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at xxi.
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three hours, 138 before the Junta. 139 He commented on and
summarized his treatise (i.e. Democrates secundus), 140 claiming
that Native Americans were inferior, and that therefore, Spaniards
were entitled to wage war on them. 141 Not having been in
America, when referring to the situation of natives in America, he
had to rely on the book General History (Historia General) by the
chronicler Fernandez de Oviedo. 142
He gave at least four main arguments for his position: 143
(i) Firstly, he said that Native Americans were barbarians and
should be ruled by their superiors.144 In this first argument he
cited, among others, the theory of Aristotle on natural slaves, 145
followed by Saint Augustine; 146 and the theory of Saint Thomas
Aquinas. 147
138. Lewis U. Hanke, The Great Debate at Valladolid, 1550-1551, in THE
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN COLONIAL AMERICA 48 (Richard E. Greenleaf
ed. 1977).
139. MARCEL BRION, BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS “FATHER OF THE
INDIANS” 165 (1929).
140. LEWIS HANKE, ALL MANKIND IS ONE: A STUDY OF THE DISPUTATION
BETWEEN BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS AND JUAN GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA IN 1550
ON THE INTELLECTUAL AND RELIGIOUS CAPACITY OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS 68
(1974).
141. Hernandez, supra note 69.
142. Lozada, supra note 111, at 280.
143. GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at 19-85; and Marks, supra note
110, at 25.
144. The Latin expression that summarized the first argument read: “Ij,
quorum ea condition naturalis est, ut aliis parere debeant, si eorum imperium
recusant. Hoc enim bellum iustum lege naturae Philosophorum maximi
testantur.” GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at 19; and also SILVIO
ZAVALA, LAS INSTITUCIONES JURÍDICAS EN LA CONQUISTA DE AMÉRICA 15
(1935).
145. He cited Aristotle who had said: “It is natural the seeking of wealth
through war, . . . to be applied not only to beasts, but also to those men who
were born to obey and refused to be subjected, and such a war is then by nature
just.” GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at 22; and Marks, supra note 110,
at 25.
146. He cited Saint Augustine who had said: “Act, even against his will,
because although suffering, the pain is necessary for his salvation.” GINÉS DE
SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at 23.
And: “God granted a very delicate and glorious Empire to the Romans for
them to prevent all the serious evils that existed in many groups that in seeking
glory, had desires for richness and many other vices.” Id. at 31.
147. He cited Saint Thomas Aquinas who had said: “You will tolerate the
sin of the prince if he cannot be punished without a scandal to the community,
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(ii) Secondly, he claimed that Native Americans had
committed crimes and sins against natural law, and therefore,
Spaniards were entitled to stop them and punish them. 148 He cited,
among others, Deuteronomy, 149 the readings of Saint Cyprian, 150
and Saint Augustine. 151
(iii) Thirdly, he claimed that Spaniards were obliged to prevent
Native Americans from oppressing and killing other innocent
Native Americans. 152 He cited, among others, Sirach, 153 the Book
of Proverbs, 154 and the writings of Cremes of Terence. 155 He also
used the examples provided by the exaggerated stories about
cannibalism that were very popular in Europe at that time. 156
(iv) Finally, he argued that Native Americans were infidels of
the Roman Catholic faith, and needed to be instructed in that faith

unless his sin is of a nature that would cause more spiritual or temporal damage
to the community than the scandal that would be generated.” Id. at 25; and
Hanke, supra note 113, at 46.
148. The Latin expression that summarized the second argument read:
“Alteram causam attulisti, vt tollantur humanarum epularum portentosa flagitia,
quibus plurimum rerum natura violator, neue quod iram Dei maxime lacessit,
daemonia pro deo colantur, idque prodigioso ritu humanas victimas
immolandi.” GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at 84 and 57; and also
Marks, supra note 110, at 25.
149. He cited Deuteronomy that read: “When offering to the gods their
children and throwing them to the fire, they did many different atrocities, which
God dislikes.” GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at 40.
150. He cited Saint Cyprian who had said: “If before the arrival of Christ
those precepts in favor of God and against idolatry were kept, then, after his
arrival, there is even more reason to keep them.” Id. at 42.
151. He cited Saint Augustine who had said: “If we delay the punishment or
the vengeance of those serious offenses against God, we will be exhausting his
patience, and he will get angry.” Id. at 43.
152. The Latin expression that summarized the third argument read: “Quod
me iudice permagnam uim et pondus habet ad huius belli iustitiam asserendam,
vt graues iniuriae a plurimis innocentibus mortalibus, quos barbari quotannis
immolabant arcerentur, quas iniurias a quibusuis hominibus repellere cunctos
homines si possint, lege diuina iuberi docuisti.” Id. at 84; and also Marks, supra
note 110, at 25.
153. He cited the Sirach which read: “God entrusted to each man the care
for his fellow man.” GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at 59.
154. He cited the Book of Proverbs which read: “Free those which are sent
to death [free of guilt and in an unfair way]” Id. at 61.
155. He cited Cremes of Terence who said: “I am human, and I believe
there is nothing human that is indifferent to me.” Id. at 59.
156. Hanke, supra note 113, at 47.
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by Spaniards (i.e. evangelization). 157 He cited, among others, the
teachings of Saint Gregory, 158 Saint Augustine, 159 Saint
Ambrose, 160 and Saint Paul. 161 He also mentioned that he felt
uneasy about the things that could happen to the priests sent
unarmed to evangelize in Florida. 162
The doctrine of de Vitoria regarding just wars was applied
against Native Americans by Ginés de Sepúlveda. He tried to
make clear that Native Americans could not, because of their sins,
under any circumstance, wage a just war against Spaniards. 163
After Ginés de Sepúlveda spoke, de las Casas began to speak,
and took five days 164 to read entirely his Apología
(In Defense of the Indians) 165 which comprised 90 quad demy
157. The Latin expression that summarized the forth argument read:
“Quarto loco posuisti, ut Christiana Religio, qua se aditus ostendit, longe et late
conuenientibus rationibus per euangelicam praedicationem dilatetur, aperta via
praedicatoribus morumque, et religionis magistris munita, atque ita munita, vt
non solum ipsi tuto valeant euangelicam doctrinam tradere, sed etiam a
popularibus barbaris omnis timor, suorum principum, et sacerdotum remouetur,
quo libere, et impune liceat persuasis Christianam religionem accipere.” GINÉS
DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at 84; and also Marks, supra note 110, at 26.
158. He cited Saint Gregory who had said: “The one that is not liberated
with the water of regeneration will stay chained to the first obligation of
atonement for sins committed.” GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at 55.
159. He cited Saint Augustine who had said: “There are still people that are
distant, even when they are few, to whom the Gospel has not been preached.” Id.
at 55.
160. He cited Saint Ambrose who had said: “In some remote areas of the
World, people have not been illuminated by the grace of God, but we have no
doubts that there is a secret intention of God to give them a time in which they
will listen and receive the Gospel.” Id. at 55.
161. He cited Saint Paul who had said: “He made some of us apostles,
others prophets, others evangelists, others shepherds and doctors, for the
purification of saints and for the endeavors of his ministry, for the building of
the body of Christ.” Id. at 67.
162. Id. at 72.
163. HANKE, supra note 135, at 69.
164. MANUEL M. MARTINEZ, FRAY BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS “PADRE DE
AMÉRICA:” ESTUDIO BIOGRÁFICO-CRÍTICO 316 (1958).
165. BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS, IN DEFENSE OF THE INDIANS: THE
DEFENSE OF THE MOST REVEREND LORD, DON FRAY BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS
CASAS, OF THE ORDER OF PREACHERS, LATE BISHOP OF CHIAPA, AGAINST THE
PERSECUTORS AND SLANDERERS OF THE PEOPLES OF THE NEW WORLD
DISCOVERED ACROSS THE SEAS (Stafford Poole trans., 1974). This book
includes the text of the Latin translation, and has been generally accepted as
dated some time after the debate took place. There are no surviving Spanish
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pages, 166 was allegedly drafted between 1548 and 1550, 167 and
was probably expanded before the Junta took place. 168 His
Apología represented a voluminous encyclopedia of all his ideas,
scattered throughout his previous books and monographs. 169
While doing so, de las Casas described the cruelty of conquerors
and highlighted his firsthand experience (something that Ginés de
Sepúlveda did not have). In addition, he claimed that the role of
Spain was spiritual and not political or economic. 170 Finally, he
strengthened his position by stating that Native Americans were
truly men, capable of becoming Christians. 171
De las Casas also gave his answers to the main arguments that
Ginés de Sepúlveda had stated during the previous session. His
principle sources were the Bible, the theologians (from the Spanish
Scholastics he cited only de Vitoria), the texts on canon law, the
corpus iuris civilis, and the writings of Aristotle: 172
(i) To the first argument he answered that, according to
Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas, the term barbarian could be
used in four different ways. 173 He claimed that from the fact that
Native Americans were barbarians, it did not follow that they were
incapable of government and had to be ruled by others, except for

copies of the original Apología; and the only surviving Latin manuscript of the
Apología, which is in the National Library of Paris (France), is comprised of 253
folios divided into 63 chapters without headings or summaries. Id. at xiv-xv.
166. ANTONIO MARÍA FABIÉ, VIDA Y ESCRITOS DE DON FRAY BARTOLOMÉ
DE LAS CASAS OBISPO DE CHIAPA 546 (1879). The English quad demy size is
similar to the Spanish pliego size, which is understood generally as 1000 mm x
800 mm.
167. DE LAS CASAS, supra note 165, at xiv.
168. Id.
169. Lozada supra note 111, at 280.
170. Hernandez, supra note 69.
171. DE LAS CASAS, supra note 165, at 42.
172. Id. at xvi.
173. He said Aristotle addressed the four types of barbarians in Books 1 and
3 of Politica, and Book 7 of Etica. Id. at 28.
The first type of barbarian included any cruel, inhuman, wild, and merciless
man acting against human reason. The second included those who did not have
a written language that corresponded to the spoken one, and did not know how
to express in it what they meant. The third included those who because of their
evil character or the barrenness of the region in which they lived, were cruel and
strangers to reason. The fourth included all those who did not acknowledge
Christ. See respectively id. at 28, 30, 32, and 49.
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their evangelization. 174 He believed that Native Americans had
more developed skills in the mechanical arts; 175 and were more
developed than ancient people (e.g. Egyptians, Romans, and
Greeks) in religion, maybe even more than the Spaniards. 176
(ii) To the second argument regarding crimes against Natural
Law, citing among others Saint Augustine, 177 he said it was
necessary to have jurisdiction to punish them. 178 He understood
that the King and the Pope had no jurisdiction over Native
Americans, because Natives were not Christians (just as the Moors
of Africa, the Turks, and the Persians were not), and hence, they
could not take cognizance of their acts or punish them. 179 Also, he
stated that Native Americans were different from heretics, who
were guilty because, having been baptized, they did not obey the
precepts of the Church. 180
(iii) To the third argument, he said that not all Native
Americans oppressed and killed other natives,181 and there was a
risk that, while trying to prevent the death of few innocents, an
immense multitude of persons (including other innocents) could be
killed
or never would want to hear the name of
182
Christ.

174. Id. at 42.
175. Id. at 44.
176. HANKE, supra note 135, at 55.
177. De las Casas said: “Augustine believes that the punishment of crimes
committed by pagans or idolaters is reserved to divine judgment.” DE LAS
CASAS, supra note 165, at 86.
178. De las Casas said: “We can punish the sins of unbelievers or that they
can punish ours, either when we are their subjects or when they are ours or come
under our authority. Now this can happen for four reasons. The first is dwelling
or habitation; for example if they should live among Christians . . . Second, by
reason of origin . . . Third, a person is considered our subject if he is a vassal and
has taken an oath of fidelity . . . The fourth reason is a crime committed in
someone’s jurisdiction, either against the ruler himself or against the property or
persons who are his subjects.” Id. at 54.
179. Id. at 55.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 186.
182. Id. at 190.
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He cited, among others, Aristotle, 183 Deuteronomy, 184 and a
commentary of Saint Augustine about Genesis.185
(iv) To the fourth argument, he said that Native Americans
should be evangelized, but not by means of a war. 186 He believed
that they would be called by Christ in the same way as other men
(e.g. Europeans) were led to him. 187 He cited, among others, the
writings of Saint Chrysostom, 188 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 189 and
Saint Augustine. 190
De las Casas also mentioned the legal doctrines of de Vitoria.
He claimed that de Vitoria had been misled, due to false
information and wicked lies, to believe that Native Americans had
committed the alleged crimes; therefore, there was no just title for
Spaniards to start a war against them. 191
One of the members of the Junta, Domingo de Soto, was
appointed to draft a summary of the contentions. 192 De las Casas
183. De las Casas said that Aristotle teaches that in his Etica: “According to
the rule of right reason when we are confronted by two choices that are evil both
as to moral guilt and we cannot avoid both of them, we ought to choose the
lesser evil. For in comparison with the greater evil, the choice of the lesser evil
has the quality of a good.” Id. at 191.
184. He cited Deuteronomy that read: “Fathers may not be put to death for
their sons, nor sons for fathers. Each is to be put to death for his own sin.” Id.
at 193.
185. He cited Genesis that read: “If you offer rightly, but do not rightly
distinguish, have you not sinned?” Id. at 188.
186. Id. at 267.
187. Id. at 271.
188. He cited Saint Chrysostom who had said: “Just as there is no natural
difference in the creation of men, so there is no difference in the call to salvation
of all of them, whether they are barbarous or wise, since God’s grace can correct
the minds of barbarians so that they have a reasonable understanding. He
changed the heart of Nebuchadnezzar to an animal mind and then brought his
animal mind to a human understanding. He can change all persons, I say,
whether they are good or bad: the good lest they perish, the bad so that they will
be without excuse.” Id.
189. He cited Saint Thomas Aquinas who had said when referring to the
wedding parable of Saint Luke: “That compulsion which Saint Luke mentions in
chapter 14 is not one of force but one of effective persuasion, as, for example,
through harsh or gentle words.” Id.
190. He cited Saint Augustine who had said: “O happy necessity which
compels one to what is better.” Id. at 273.
191. Id. at 341.
192. GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at xxii.
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and Ginés de Sepúlveda did not appear together before the Junta.
Notwithstanding, the members of the Junta seem to have discussed
the positions of each contender separately with them. In addition,
the members of the Junta held discussions among themselves. 193
A second debate took place on April or May 1551, 194 but few
records were kept of it. Ginés de Sepúlveda had asked for
permission to reply to the statements of de las Casas according to
the summary of de Soto. 195 As a result, Ginés de Sepúlveda found
twelve objections and gave his answers to those objections. 196
Subsequently, de las Casas answered to those twelve objections, 197
and Ginés de Spúlveda made no further rejoinder because he saw
no necessity. 198
C. The Outcome
The Controversy had neither immediate winners nor losers. No
official records were kept of the debates of the Junta, or they have
not yet come to light. 199 Historians currently work with what
Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepúlveda wrote after
the debate. On the one hand, de las Casas wrote Here is included
an Argument (Aqui se contiene una disputa), 200 in 1552, including
his main arguments, the summary of Domingo de Soto, the 12
193. HANKE, supra note 135, at 39.
194. GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at xxi.
195. Id. at xxii.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. HANKE, supra note 140, at 68.
199. Hanke, supra note 138, at 50.
200. The complete Spanish title was: Aqui se contiene una disputa, o
controversia: entre el Obispo don fray Bartholome de las Casas, o Casaus,
obispo que fue de la ciudad Real de Chiapa, que es en las Indias, parte de la
nueva España, y el doctor Gines de Sepulveda Coronista del Emperador nuestro
señor: sobre que el doctor contendia: que las conquistas de las Indias contra los
Indios eran licitas: y el obispo por el contrario defendio y affirmo aber sido y
ser impossible no serlo: tiranicas, injustas y iniquas. La qual question se
ventilo y disputo en presencia de muchos letrados theologos y juristas en una
congregacion que mando su magestad juntar el año de mil y quinientos y
cincuenta en la villa de Valladolid.
Text available in Spanish at, Aquí se contiene una disputa, o controversia
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/IbrAmerTxt/IbrAmerTxtidx?type=header&id=IbrAmerTxt.Spa0035&pview=hide (last visited November
6, 2007).
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objections of Ginés de Sepúlveda, and the 12 answers of de las
Casas. 201 On the other hand, and contemporarily, Gines de
Sepúlveda allegedly 202 wrote Rash, Scandalous, and Heretical
Propositions (Proposiciones temerarias, escandalosas y
heréticas), 203 that included his position regarding the outcome of
the debate.
Both Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepúlveda
claimed that they were winners. 204 They did so according to the
opinions of their friends and those who shared their opinions. 205
For example, Ginés de Sepúlveda sent a letter to Martín de Oliva,
dated October 1st, 1551, in which he stated:
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that I stood right on my two
feet after the first encounter . . . Hence, in a short period of
time, I was able to return the misled judges to the path of
truth, and make them approve my thesis, to which I had
dedicated many years of my life. Then, all without
exception were convinced that the war on Native
Americans was a way of bringing them to the fold of
Christ. 206

201. Id.
202. The expert Ángel Lozada mentions that the referred work is attributed
to Ginés de Sepúlveda. GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at xiii.
203. Id. at xx.
The complete Spanish title was: Propossiçiones Temerarias, Escandalosas
y hereticas que noto el Doctor Sepulveda en el libro de la Conquista de Indias
que Fray Bartholome de las Casas Obispo que fue de Chiapa hizo imprimir sin
liçencia en Sevilla año de 1552 cuyo título comienza Aquí se contiene una
disputa o controversia.
See,
an
interesting
reference
in
Spanish,
at:
http://www2.uah.es/cisneros/carpeta/images/pdfs/249.pdf (last visited November
6, 2007).
204. Hernandez, supra note 69.
205. MARTINEZ, supra note 164, at 316.
206. The letter in Spanish read:
No obstante, no puede decirse que salí muy bien parado del primer
encuentro . . . Así, en poco tiempo conseguí que aquellos jueces, antes
tan descarriados, volvieran al camino de la verdad y aprobaran mi tesis
cuya defensa tantos años de mi vida había yo gastado. Todos, pues, sin
excepción se convencieron de la licitud de la guerra contra los Indios
como medio de atraerlos al redil de Cristo.
EPISTOLARIO DE JUAN GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA 156 (Ángel Losada ed., 2d ed.
1979).
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In the long run, the results were different. On the one hand, the
book of Gines de Sepúlveda, that had generated the rivalry
between the two scholars (i.e. Democrates secundus), was not
published until 1892, 207 when Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo
published it in Madrid. 208 On the other hand, the encomienda
system, to which de las Casas had dedicated countless days and
nights to fight against, continued until the 18th century, at which
time it was formally abolished. 209
VII. SOME COMMON DENOMINATORS
BETWEEN EMBRYOS AND VALLADOLID
It has been shown that when society faces new developments
or discoveries, it always faces controversies, debates, or questions.
Different approaches to those controversies can be made, from
different angles and perspectives.
Among some of the
perspectives, it is possible to mention firstly religious beliefs or the
belief in a supernatural energy. Religious beliefs have been
present in almost all controversies, and are strongly linked to
morality. Religion tends to shape the conduct of men, and its
postulates constantly are challenged by the new discoveries. The
Roman Catholic faith was present at the Valladolid events; and it is
also present, together with other religious beliefs, in the current
debate on human embryos, by means of press releases or from the
preachers’ pulpits in many congregations.
Economic endeavors may also create another perspective when
looking at developments. Back in the Hispanic possessions in
America, and at the time of the Valladolid debate, the
encomenderos were able to succeed in economic endeavors
because of the inexpensive work force provided by the uncertainty
of the status of Native Americans, and by the grants of land that
the Spanish king had made to them. In addition, goods and objects
made by craftsmen were produced for the Spanish empire at a very
low cost. Currently, human embryos have the potential to cause a
revolution in the health industry worldwide, because of the
massive development of palliatives to diseases. In addition, the
207. GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 119, at xxv.
208. Lozada, supra note 111, at 280.
209. Lesley Byrd Simpson, Book Review, 16.1 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN
HISTORICAL REVIEW 49, 49 (1936).
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controversial creation of banks of human organs for transplant may
affect the current situation of tissue replacement. Finally, the
patent law scheme also may be affected by the new challenges that
laboratories and research centers may create.
Culture is another perspective that may be used when
approaching controversies. The mix of races, generated by the
Spanish presence in the Americas, turned out to be the Latino race,
which varies considerably in each region of the Americas, but
which mainly consists of the interbreeding of Native Americans,
Blacks from Africa, and Whites from the Iberian Peninsula. At the
time of the Valladolid controversy, there was exploitation of
Native Americans, not only as a work force, but also as members
of society at large. Currently, the experimentation with human
embryos may result in clones or chimeras, which may tend to
change family contexts or races. 210 In addition, exploitation of
women and embryos (in the event the reader understands embryos
as persons) could also coexist. 211
Science and technology may also be considered when facing
developments or discoveries. After the Spanish conquest, many
developments in science occurred due to the interaction of
European developments in the Americas. The research with
human embryos may generate new discoveries in science and
technology. 212
Law, being a social science, is always present when facing
discoveries or developments. Necessary legal frameworks derive
from those developments, and try to catch up with the new trends.
The Spanish presence in America generated a body of legislation
to be applied in the new colonies. In addition, it was shown that
the Valladolid debate influenced the provisions of the Recopilación
de las Leyes de Indias. On the other hand, the debate on human
embryos will generate legislation that will help regulate all the
different aspects of such development. Also, judicial decisions of
the highest courts are expected (e.g. the US Supreme Court),

210. Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional
Challenges to Bans on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 656 (1998).
211. Francesca Crisera, Federal Regulation of Embryonic Stem Cells: Can
Government do it? An Examination of Potential Regulation through the Eyes of
California's Recent Legislation, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 355, 361 (2004).
212. Christopher L. Logan, To Clone or Not to Clone: Should Missouri
allow Cloning for Biomedical Research?, 73 UMKC L. REV. 861, 874 (2005).
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helping to settle the controversial matters in the common law
jurisdictions.
VIII. CLOSING REMARKS
The challenges that society currently faces with human
embryos have been also faced, mutatis mutandis, in many other
instances, for example at Valladolid during the 16th century. The
view of the past may help us understand the present. Considering
what happened in the past, we can now expect regarding human
embryos that legislation, case law, and some main actors will
occupy a leading role in the years to come, and will help society
define positions regarding the debate. As in the case of Valladolid,
when the Native Americans were not present during the debates,
the leading roles with human embryos will be occupied by others
other than the human embryos themselves. History seems to have
shown us that it is a fact impossible to avoid.
Society may sit and wait for a consolidated decision about
human embryos: will they be seen as persons? Will they be seen
as things? Or will they deserve a special intermediate treatment?
Once those questions are answered, legislation and case law will
face new questions, the first of which may be: what rights and
obligations will they have, if any? Like when facing the status of
Native Americans, this takes us to fundamental questions: What is
a human being? Where does humanity begin and end? Times of
great discoveries are also times of great interrogations.
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INTRODUCTION
As everyone knows, the mapping of the basic components of
the genetic code was completed in June of 2000. 1 Its beneficial
effect gave us the ability to analyze the smallest biologic samples
derived from an individual (a drop of blood invisible to the naked
eye, a strand of hair, or a scale of dandruff), and it allowed us to
verify the presence of specific genes, hence to reveal a multitude
of information regarding the individual that the sample originated
from. In particular, the DNA structure contains an infinite amount
of information regarding the specific traits of an individual, such
as, ex multis, the body's morphology, skin pigmentation, ethnic and
racial traits.
Furthermore, studies have shown that DNA
determines, at least to some extent, intelligence and personality
and it provides additional means of detection for the identification
of hereditary illnesses, such as Down syndrome, hemophilia, and
cystic fibrosis. Its negative effect was to establish a different,
ulterior method, by which the personal rights of that same
individual can be illicitly violated.
The analysis of the legal implications of such a phenomenon is
a very complex one because of the needs to balance two opposite
interests. On one side is scientific research, which fears that
imposing overly strict limitations on the developments of new
techniques of manipulation of genetic information would
excessively restrict the research itself and would impede the
achievement of new results beneficial to human society. On the
other side are the privacy concerns; the need to take into account
the interests of individuals to be granted efficient protection of
their genetic identity. In addition, the complexity of such an
analysis is increased by the speed of the above mentioned
developments in respect of the lack of ad hoc legal provisions in
1. See for example Michael J. Malinowski, Separating Predictive Genetic
Testing from Snake Oil: Regulation, Liabilities, and Lost opportunities, 1
JURIMETRICS J. 23 (2000) (arguing that the completion of the maps of human
genome has raised concerns related to the inadequacy of existing law provisions
to properly deal with the new challenges of biotechnology); and Michael J.
Malinowski, Ethics in Global Biopharmaceutical Environment, 1 SANTA CLARA
J. INT. L. 57 (2006) (identifying different options to establish a workable
baseline of protection of human subjects in order to develop in a responsible
manner the biopharmaceutical research, and, therefore, being benefited by the
manifold opportunities related to such developments).

2008]

THE PROTECTION OF GENETIC IDENTITY

141

order to deal with such new issues, and the consequent need to try
to address these challenges by means of the traditional legal
doctrines.
It is interesting to consider the North American judicial system
in this respect, in view of the fact, as some may say, that it has
developed the most advanced genetic research and techniques, and
also because, as Antonio Gambaro says, it was the “cradle” of
privacy rights. 2 Because of this, this system has been acclaimed as
being the best foreign model from which to derive legal provisions
aimed to discourage these new types of attacks on personal rights,
and mandate compensation for their victims. Within this context,
we find not only the analysis of the collection of different possible
violations (intrusions), but also a list of entities capable of
executing them, an array of legislative, doctrinal and
jurisprudential sources that are used to protect the genetic identity
of the individual, and an initial panel of solutions to the problems
encountered so far. The reference to privacy rights in particular
deserves to be highlighted because of the strong arguments
supporting the idea that a violation of an individual’s genetic
information could be deemed a violation of their right to privacy.
On the contrary, the specific topic of genetic identity within the
Italian legal framework, with some exceptions, 3 appears to be
taking off. 4 This may be due to several factors, among which we
2. Antonio Gambaro, Falsa luce agli occhi del pubblico, 1 RIV. DIR. CIV. 84
( 1981).
3. See in particular, Stefano Rodotà, Tra diritto e società. Informazioni
genetiche e tecniche di tutela, RIV. CRIT. DIR. PRIV. 571 (2000); AMEDEO
SANTOSUOSSO, CORPO E LIBERTA, UNA STORIA TRA DIRITTO E SCIENZA (Milano,
2001) (both focusing on the legal implications of the human body as a source of
genetic information and dealing with the issues that will be addressed later in the
present paper, for example that of biologic group and the collection of DNA
samples).
4. Within the Italian scenario, as well as many other countries, the topic of
genetic information has been deemed as a species of the broader notion of
“sensitive data” pertaining to an individual and falling within the notion of
“privacy right.” In particular, Stefano Rodotà, the former President of the
Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (the Italian Authority for the
protection of privacy rights, hereinafter “Garante”), highlighted that genetic
information has a “structural and lasting attitude,” because “the genetic asset is
defined and unalterable during the whole biological life of an individual; it
shows his/her uniqueness and puts the individual in relation with others; it is the
direct biological link between the individual and the other generations; and, as a
consequence, it is an immortal element, while, on the contrary, all the other
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can briefly recall two concurring elements. On one side is the
issue of genetic identity as a new concept of personal identity
which shows to have a peculiar nature because the whole identity
pertaining to an individual can be found even in the smallest–and,
at least at first sight, insignificant–sample of human biological
material separated from the body to which it pertains, 5 seems to
have been neglected within the Italian scenario in favor of other
issues related to the implication of the DNA manipulation and the

biological traits will die with the individual.” Stefano Rodotà, Le informazioni
genetiche, TECNOLOGIE E DIRITTI 208 (1995). The same, in addition, pointed
out that, since the genetic information is almost always manipulated in order to
transform it in “genetic data,” such data must be equated to the category of
“personal data,” subjected to the protection allowed by Italian privacy
provisions. However, those provisions lack a specific definition of “genetic
data” (as highlighted by the Garante in its decision as of May 22nd, 1999) and,
consequently, it becomes very difficult to grant an appropriate protection to such
a peculiar category of information. In order to fill this gap, it has been
suggested to apply the definition of genetic data adopted by the Eur. Council
Recommendation, Doc. No. R (97) 5, which includes in such a concept all data–
regardless of their nature–concerning the hereditary characters of an individual
or the ways to transfer them within a group of individuals linked by blood ties.
Within the legal category of personal data, genetic data belong to the sub-class
of “sensitive data,” which–according to the Italian privacy provisions–can be
used only with the written consent of the owner and the previous authorization
of the Garante. But, it must be stressed that, in spite of such a general rule,
several exceptions to the collection and utilization of those data are allowed: for
further details see the so called Privacy Code (Codice della privacy) enacted
with the D.lgs. as of June 30th 2003, no. 196, issued in the Ordinary section of
the Italian official bulletin of the law (Gazzetta Ufficiale) as of July 29th, 2003,
no. 174; and, in particular, art. 90 of it, named Trattamento dei dati gentici e dei
donatori di midollo osseo. This rule requires an authorization ad hoc of the
Garante for the purposes of the utilization of those data and, therefore, it could
help in better dealing with the issue at stake: but, it must be warned that such a
provision is a pretty recent one, since it has been adopted as of February 22nd,
2007. In the meantime, in order to fill such a gap, temporary provisions had
been enacted, which contributed to render the Italian legal scenario more
complex and more heterogeneous. Anyway, it deserves to be highlighted that
the Italian legal framework, as well as that of many other countries, is grounded
around the idea of “free and informed consent” of the individual as main
element to deal with the issue of genetic information and, therefore, it raises
concerns similar to those already addressed in other foreign legal models and
among them the US one represents a very interesting model of comparison, as
already explained.
5. For example: a broken nail, a hair, a droop of saliva left on a cup of
coffee, a droop of blood in the event of an accidental cut, etc.
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notion of genetic material: i.e., assisted procreation, utilization of
human embryonal staminal cells, the legal status of the embryo and
of the so called pre-embryo, the issue of genetic modified
organisms, and so on. 6
On the other side, the specific topic of genetic identity and the
related opportunity to identify an individual by means of his/her
genetic information, has thus far been presented to the eyes of the
Italian society mainly in its positive aspects, as an efficient and
fundamental tool in order to pursue very worthwhile aims,
especially for investigational purposes: in this respect, two
significant examples may be provided.
The Italian judge Giovanni Falcone–who was well known even
outside Italy because of his fight against the phenomenon of the
mafia, and who also had the opportunity to actively cooperate with
the American investigative authorities–was killed by an explosive
device while he was driving from the airport of Capaci to his
apartment in Palermo. Since this event occurred in 1992, and at
that time the new tools of DNA investigation were not so
developed in Italy, the Italian investigative authorities required the
cooperation of Americans in order to try to identify the perpetrator
of such a crime. The identification was possible by extracting the
DNA sample of the killer from the saliva left on the cigarette filters
he had smoked while waiting for Mr. Falcone’s car. In current
news, the whole European society is riveted by the story of Maddy,
an English child who disappeared in Portugal during a holiday with
her family. At one point, it appeared she was in Belgium because
a lady had seen in a coffee shop a child who resembled her. In
6. See, among others, Massimo C. Bianca, Nuove tecniche genetiche, regole
giuridiche e tutela dell’essere umano, 3-4 IL DIRITTO DELLA FAMIGLIA E DELLE
PERSONE, 955-970 (1987) (focusing on the legal implications of artificial
insemination); Stefano Rodotà, Trasformazioni del corpo, in Politica del diritto,
2006, issue no. 1, at 3-24 (dealing with the manifold notions of the term body
when related to the human being). In addition, such an issue has been perceived
as falling within the more complex area of the relationships between law and
ethics and, in particular, within the bioethics field, about which the debate is
very developed and many contributions have been published: see, for example,
FRANCESCO DONATO BUSNELLI, BIOETICA E DIRITTO PRIVATO. FRAMMENTI DI
UN DIZIONARIO 3-4 (2001); Paolo Zatti, Verso un diritto per la bioetica, in UNA
NORMA GIURIDICA PER LA BIOETICA 3 (Cosimo M. Mazzoni ed., 1998). See also
the reports of the Italian “Comitato nazionale per la bioetica,” available at
http://www.governo.it/bioetica.html (last visited November 6, 2008).
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order to verify whether that child truly was Maddy or not, the
competent authorities were able to obtain a sample of her DNA by
the glass she had used to drink, and then they could compare it
with the sample of DNA provided by the family of Maddy.
Thanks to such a technique, they were able to determine that
(unfortunately) the child was not Maddy.
In Italy, the debate about the opportunity of establishing DNA
databanks for the collection of DNA profiles and/or DNA samples
for investigational purposes–as well as it has been done within the
US and in other European Countries–has just arisen. 7
Consequently, the analysis so far carried out has not yet reached a
deep perspective, unlike those which have occurred within the US,
at least with reference to the concerns about the possible new
forms of intrusion and violation of the individual’s genetic identity
together with the manifold legal implications of such a
phenomenon.
Within the European Union, such a topic so far has been
addressed only from a specific perspective: the protection of socalled “biological inventions.” In fact, the Directive 98/44/CE, 8
which has been implemented in Italy by Law 78/2006, addresses
the new phenomenon of biological inventions and manipulation of
organic material (even human). It allows such inventions,
provided that they meet all the requirements to be deemed an
“invention” according to the Directive’s provisions, to be subjected
to the rules of patent law. The first concern of the Directive,
therefore, appears to be economic. Nevertheless, the same
Directive shows a willingness to take into account the moral
concerns related to such a phenomenon, together with the
opportunity to preserve the dignity of the individual. Therefore, it
7. As of November 2007, such an issue is in the agenda of the Italian
Parliament: see, for example, the Attachment A to the hearing n. 221, held on
October 10th, 2007, at 34-35, including proposal of amendments to article 6 of
the draft of law n. 782 (arguing, in particular, for the introduction of ad hoc
DNA databanks, to be created with the consent of the Garante), available at
http://legxv.camera.it/docesta/312/14367/documentoesterno.asp?a=internet&ann
omese=2007%2C10&commit=invia (last visited November 6, 2008)
8. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
July 6th, 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions. Official
Journal L 213, 30/07/1998 P. 0013–0021; available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/index.htm (last visited December 19, 2008).
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expressly recognizes some limits to the activity related to
biotechnology, in particular those of public order and good morals,
in addition to strictly forbidding the patentability of human cloning
and the utilization of human embryos for commercial purposes
(Art. 6 § 2 of the Directive). Finally, the Italian law implementing
the Directive requires the free and informed consent of the donor
of biological material as a fundamental element in order to submit
the request of patentability of the invention, thus complying with
art. 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union. 9
But, again, such provisions appear to address the present
phenomenon only from a specific point of view. The mere
reference to the notion of “public order and good morals” is not
able to cover all the juridical implications of it; furthermore, those
are evolving concepts, whose determination is subject to periodical
assessment. In addition, as we will show with our analysis, the
“consent argument” does not always seem to be the best solution in
order to address such an issue. Therefore, in spite of the
regulation, the specific issue of genetic identity cannot be deemed
to have yet been thoroughly examined or have taken into account
all the possible and manifold legal implications pertaining to it.
Furthermore, in order to try to reach a more complete awareness of
those implications, the analysis of genetic identity, in our opinion,
could benefit from comparison with the developments in a
different legal system, such as the American one.

9. Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01):
Article 3–“Right to the integrity of the person”
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and
mental integrity.
2. In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be
respected in particular:
. The free and informed consent of the person concerned,
according to the procedures laid down by law,
. The prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at
the selection of persons,
. The prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such
a source of financial gain,
. The prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings.
The full text of the Charter is available in English at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf (last visited November 6,
2008).
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Accordingly, the present work will try to address the legal
implications surrounding the issue of genetic identity by referring
to the complex and heterogeneous scenario of doctrines and legal
provisions which characterizes the American legal system in
attempting to better understand such a phenomenon. 10
PART I
THE LIMITS OF THE LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
A. Intrusions and the Intruders
Initially the ability to perform DNA analysis was beneficial to
the individual, as it was used to diagnose illnesses, and determine
the best course of medical treatment. However, thereafter, these
tests started to have a negative impact on the individual. They
provided an ideal tool to benefit and facilitate the potentially
discriminatory activities of entities such as employers and
insurance providers, for example, that could use the otherwise
unknown genetic information to determine who to hire and who to
insure. 11 As it has been highlighted:
The danger is that individuals will be judged according to
genetic stereotypes and divided into groups based upon
their genetic predispositions. Thus, invasions of genetic
privacy are not only selective, but also segmenting: they
balkanize a population based upon its genes, generating
genetic divisions that may produce new structures of
inequality. 12
The potential for misuse of the data is at times augmented by
the prevailing cultural environment that tends to regard genetic
data as a magical force and some sort of cultural icon.

10. Attilio Guarneri wrote Part I of the present paper, while Laura Franciosi
developed Part II.
11. See for example: Nathalie Smith The right to Genetic Privacy? Are We
Unlocking the Secrets of the Human Genome Only to Risk Insurance and
Employment Discrimination?, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 705 (2000).
12. Radhika Rao, A Veil of genetic ignorance? Protecting Genetic Privacy
to Insure Equality, 51 VILL. L. REV. 827, 828 (2006).
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Ken M. Gatter has addressed the current gene hegemony in his
speeches, 13 and the anthropologist Kaja Finkler described the
central role of DNA in the definition of our identity:
Everything about an oorganism's existence is
predetermined and genetically programmed, including its
variation, although geneticists recognize that the program
may be affected by unknown and external factors in the
environment, chance, or human manipulation.
The
sequence of our DNA reveals to us who and what we are;
that is, what it means to be human. With DNA sequencing,
some scientists have maintained that the riddle of life is
close to being solved. 14
Dorothy Nelkin and M. Susan Lindee, in turn, described how
public opinion views the role of DNA:
Just as the Christian soul has provided an archetypal
concept through which to understand the person and
continuity of self, so DNA appears in popular culture as a
soul-like entity, a holy and immortal relic, a forbidden
territory. The similarity between the powers of DNA and
those of the Christian soul, we suggest, is more than
linguistic or metaphorical. DNA has taken on the social
and cultural functions of the soul. It is the essential entity–
the location of the true self–in the narratives of biological
determinism. 15
The information's potential for misuse is made particularly
dangerous by the fact that the practice of analyzing data has
quickly spread over multiple levels. In fact, today there is much
apprehension surrounding potential misuse of genetic information.
The results of a survey conducted in North America in 1997
showed that two-thirds of the people interviewed would refuse to
undergo genetic testing if they knew that their employer, or the

13. Ken M. Gatter, Genetic Information and the Importance of Context:
Implications for the Social Meaning of Genetic Information and Individual
Identity, 47 ST. LOUIS L.J. 423 (2003).
14. KAJA FINKLER, EXPERIENCING THE NEW GENETICS: FAMILY AND
KINSHIP ON THE MEDICAL FRONTIER 48 (Univ. of Pennsylvania Press 2000).
15. DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE
GENE AS A CULTURAL ICON 41-42 (1995).
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insurer that covers their medical expenses, could become aware of
the results of said analysis. 16
Scholars remind us that this is also quite relevant within the
scope of major decisions that concern the private life of
individuals. A person's decision regarding choices such as whether
or not to marry someone, or whether or not to have children with
someone, could be affected if that person became aware of the
other individual's genetic profile. 17 Other studies remind us that
DNA findings pertain not only to the individual that was tested, but
also concern all members of the family that person belongs to. 18
Illicit use of data is particularly insidious because–and here we
move beyond the analysis of intrusion to the analysis of intruders–
genetic information is no longer the exclusive monopoly of
researchers, as it will soon be made available to private parties as
well. In the near future, the general public will be able to purchase
reasonably priced market tests. Now consider the analysis that
could be conducted on exfoliated skin left on objects handled in an
office or in a waiting room. The vulnerability of a person's genetic
privacy has increased dramatically.
B. Protective Legislative Measures
The US Congress has intervened several times, and with
increasing frequency, to protect the genetic identity of the
individual, and prevent private entities from using genetic
information as basis for discriminatory practices. The Privacy Act
of 1974 addresses the need to protect privacy in general terms,
with no specific provisions for genetic privacy. It only protects
government employees from divulgation of confidential data
already on file, and it offers no protection to prevent private parties
from acquiring information, even if genetic by nature.19 It was
followed in 1990 by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
which aimed to prevent discriminatory practices against disabled
16. Gatter, supra note 13, at 427-428. See also Paul S. Miller, Genetic
Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 189 (1998).
17. See, for example, George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy: There Ought to Be
a Law, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 9 (1999).
18. On this topic see infra Part II, paragraph 4.
19. See generally Anita Silvers & Michael A. Stein, Human Rights and
Genetic Discrimination: Protecting Genomics' Promise For Public Health, 31
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 377 (2003).
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individuals in the workplace. It contains at least two prerequisites:
an act of discrimination and a documented disability. However,
because the Supreme Court has interpreted the ADA in a manner
that excludes genetic predispositions, and also because it does not
pertain to acquiring data per se, it is largely inept for the purpose
of safeguarding genetic identity. 20
In 1996, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) followed. It was issued to protect the privacy of
health records, and specifically addresses genetic information, but
the law only applies to specific types of information and not
others. 21 In summary, the overall scope of federal legislation does
not offer sufficient protection against illicit genetic data
acquisition. For this reason some states, such as Florida, have
adopted more rigorous and restrictive laws, which mandate that
DNA testing may only be conducted after obtaining consent from a
duly informed individual, and that violators are subject to
sanctions, incarceration, and fines. 22
Practitioners express, however, that there are some doubts
concerning the effective application of these more rigorous state
laws. 23 If we look beyond the actual legislation (Federal and
State), and consider the jurisprudential and doctrinal aspects, we
immediately notice that there are two distinct levels of protection
for genetic information: protection from government intrusion and
from intrusion by private entities. The first contains a collection of
cases pertaining to military personnel, inmates, etc.; the level of
protection here is “weak,” and at this point somewhat established,
although not free of problems, both old and new.
The analysis of the second level of protection, which we now
expand upon, starts with a reconstruction of the protection of
20. See, for example, Mark A Rothstein, Genetic Privacy and
Confidentiality: Why They Are So Hard to Protect?, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 198,
201 (1998).
21. Joanne L. Hustead & Janlori Goldman, The Genetics Revolution:
Conflicts, Challenges and Conundra, 28 AM. J. L. AND MED. 285, 287-292
(2002).
22. See, for example, Ben F. Overton and Katherine E. Giddings, The Right
of Privacy in Florida in the Age of Technology and the Twenty-First Century: A
Need for Protection From Private and Commercial Intrusion, 25 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 25 (1997).
23. June Mary Makdisi, Genetic Privacy: New Intrusion a New tort?, 34
CREIGHTON L. REV. 965, 978 (2001).
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privacy in tort, which finds its roots in the history of North
American common law. The ancestry of the current remedy for
privacy intrusion lies in the physical trespass, which was, in turn,
the heir to the British medieval transgressio. It was elaborated
upon in a famous essay written by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, that was published by the Harvard
Law Review in 1890, 24 and preceded, two years prior, by a treatise
named On the Law of Torts by Judge Cooley, the author who
defined privacy as being the right to be let alone. 25
Approximately 70 years later, William L. Prosser, in a famous
essay that appeared in 1960 in the California Law Review, tried to
systematize the variegated constellation of juridical examples of
personal rights violations. On the theme of privacy, he created
four related yet distinct subsections: Intrusion; Public Disclosure
of Private Facts; Appropriation of the Name or Likeness; and
False Light in the Public Eye. 26 That classification, after being
widely circulated in literature and Courts’ opinions, was
incorporated in the Second Restatement on the Law of Torts. 27
In order to analyze the juridical instruments most widely used
in genetic identity proceedings that pertain to violations made by
private parties, we must start with the sub-tort named Intrusion. Its
origins can be reconstructed, by means of Prosser's classification,
to the violation of privacy. The sub-tort of Intrusion, as a type of
disturbance, may have three different aspects: physical, spatial, and
psychological. The first and second indicate an actual physical
space, as expressed by the aphorism: A man’s home is his castle.
Let us also recall the famous quote from The Right to Privacy:
‘The common law has always recognized a man’s house as his
castle, impregnable, often, even to its own officers engaged in the
execution of its commands. Shall the courts thus close the front
entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the back door to
idle or prurient curiosity?’ 28 The third relates to non-physical
intrusions, and is tied to technological advances, such as telephone
taps, microphones, etc., that involve some sort of high-tech prying,
24. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890-1891).
25. THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
26. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 6A, v. “Privacy.”
28. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 220.
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espionage-like virtual trespassing; investigative harassment,
continual phone calls and sexual harassment can also be viewed in
this context. The common factor in these type of cases is Judge
Cooley's “right to be let alone,” that when extended from its
original material and spatial concept of what is proprietary by
nature, to a scope that also includes the degree of control any
individual has over his/her information, impacts the overall dignity
“profile” of a person. The original proprietary concept of the
inviolability of a castle or a sanctuary can also be associated with
the last mentioned personal profile, and in this manner convey the
image of a person as being inviolable.
Psychological violations evoke the idea of peace of mind, an
area that is proprietary and personalistic at the same time; it
pertains to information about an individual, and is ruled by the
principle of jus excludendi alios. 29 The intrusion truly consists of
a violation of this private sphere, which is dominated by the
identity and personality of a single individual.
Protection against intrusions into the sphere of information
about oneself (information one wishes to keep private) preserves
the dignity of the individual in two ways. On the one hand, it
precludes unauthorized access to personal information; on the
other, it prevents falsification of this data. In both directions this
protection is applicable to Genetic privacy.
C. Balancing the Rights
Privacy protection, even genetic, must not however mean
absolute protection from all types of intrusions by others. As
proposed in the Restatement Second of the Law of Torts, the rights
must be properly balanced. According to that disposition, one,
who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns,
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 30
29. From a comparative perspective, such an argument is very interesting
because it involves also the proprietary paradigm because, for example,
according to art. 832 of the Italian Civil Code, the so called ius excludendi alios
is one of the main powers embodied in the definition of property and therefore
granted to the owner of a good.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
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Hence, making annoyance calls and probing into someone's life
with no due cause are considered to be illicit activities. On the
contrary, the need to establish an adequate level of protection
against thefts can justify an employer's “intrusions” upon the
privacy of employees, and similar intrusions are permissible when
government authorities need to gather evidence for a case.
While talking specifically about genetic identity violations, we
must consider Prosser's principle, by which the right of being let
alone does not apply to an individual while in a public place
unless, as mentioned in the Restatement Second of the Law of
Torts, the matter involves a violation of private rights. To better
identify what constitutes this type of matter, it's useful to recall
cases that involved photographers taking pictures of people who,
while in public places, unwillingly found themselves in a
vulnerable situation. An example of this could be a woman whose
skirt had been thrown up by the wind, and is therefore
photographed with her private parts exposed. 31 Briefly, the act of
regulating the balance of rights poses restrictions upon Prosser's
principle when there are specific reasons to aptly justify the
applicability of privacy protection measures. The current trend is
to progressively expand the sub-tort of intrusion, as occurred
within the specific contexts later discussed, and apply this
definition to cases that pertain to the protection of genetic
identity. 32
The topics of sexual harassment in the workplace, employee
drug testing, and surveillance conducted by mechanical means
such as cameras, video recording equipment etc. require, as
always, the careful balancing of interests. Actions undertaken to
fight drugs and thefts justify intruding upon someone else's private
life, as long as any reasonable individual would deem that they did
not violate the personal integrity of an individual. Sometimes, the
valuation depends upon the actual intent (or lack thereof) of the
intrusion, and the values involved. For example, in a spousal
separation civil suit that included awarding custody of a minor, the
husband took a picture of his semi-nude wife from the window of
her lesbian lover's bedroom. This was not deemed to be a violation
of the wife's right to privacy in view of the intent to protect the
minor from being exposed to sexual activities that could occur in
31. See generally Makdisi, supra note 23.
32. Id.
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the family dwelling. Briefly, a reasonable opinion takes into
consideration the purpose, the psychological motives (intentional
or not), the means, the methods used, and the intensity of the
identity violation committed towards others.
D. The Applicability of the Sub-Tort of Intrusion within the Scope
of Genetic Identity
According to June Mary Makdisi, there are at least three
specific questions that need to be answered in order to verify
whether the sub-tort of intrusion could be applied to protect genetic
identity: a) can genetic information be qualified as strictly personal
information, and be protected under the assumptions of tort by
intrusion; b) whether this constitutes a tort when it pertains to
genetic information obtained from biological samples initially
collected in a “public place;” c) if the extraction of genetic DNA
information from biological tissues would be deemed as being
highly offensive by a reasonable person. 33
Genetic information resides within tangible materials, ones that
can be seen, touched, and collected, and performing any of these
actions does not necessarily mean committing a tort of intrusion.
Genetic material exposed to public view does not reveal any
information by itself. It can yield genetic information only after
being subjected to close-up examinations, such as being viewed
under a microscope for example, or via a genetic test. There is no
doubt, in answer to the first question, that genetic data is strictly
tied to someone's identity, and that acquiring all of the genetic
information is essential in discovering the identity of an individual.
There is no doubt, in answer to the second question, that the act of
collecting genetic information does not per se constitute a tort of
intrusion: if that were the case, professionals could be at fault each
time they perform a genetic test. In this scenario, the genetic
doctor's position is equivalent to that of the previously mentioned
photographer’s position. The doctor could be held liable of
committing an act of intrusion only if he takes advantage of the
involuntary vulnerability of the test subject and, without the
informed consent thereof, breaches the sphere of privacy of an
individual.

33. Id. at 1024.
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The Restatement Second of the Law of Torts suggests that illicit
intrusions should be considered as being those that are deemed to
be offensive by the victim, and those the extent of which is
objectively disproportionate compared to the interests of the
aggressor. Generally, the diffusion of genetic information could
subjectively be considered as being both offensive and
unreasonable. Let's consider the case of a genetic test that reveals
a predisposition to pedophilia. Even a test that is the most accurate
from a scientific standpoint can not reliably predict the future
development, or on the contrary, the regression of the hereditary
genetic traits of a person. In the same manner, no one can be sure
that a person predisposed to develop great musculature will
actually become an athlete.
In view of this premise, it then becomes clear that individuals
should have the right to choose if they wish to reveal or not to
others genetic information that by its nature could compromise
their personal dignity. Some could argue that a genetic test
showing a predisposition to rise early in the morning or retire late
contains no information that warrants legal protection. What
would happen if those genetic traits were later found to be
connected to other chromosomes, and thereby yield a store of
genetic information that current science is unable to predict? How
could we deny responsibility for that intrusion when genetic
information, once disclosed, cannot be retracted?
These questions are only indicative of the overall complexity
of the topic, and, in answer to the third question, lead us to
conclude that the legalities of disclosing genetic information
should be established on a case by case basis. It is certain that we
should consider that: a) the extraction of genetic information from
someone else's tissue without their prior consent is illegal; b) the
potential for intrusion should be assessed not at the time of
collection of the sample, but when said sample is used; c) the
intrusion may be justified in some cases due to extraordinary
circumstances, such as the need to obtain relevant genetic
information to prove that certain events took place and provide
equitable evidence for a legal case; and d) when a person is
subjected to any kind of justified genetic privacy intrusion, he
should always be notified of it (a sub case of c).
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E. The Limits of Privacy Protection
This panorama is completed by the assessment of the
perplexities and limits surrounding the generalized application of
the privacy doctrine for the purpose of protecting genetic identity.
First of all, we should mention the concerns expressed by several
worldwide medical associations regarding the establishment of
generic genetic privacy regulations. In their opinion, these would
protect the patient but would also represent a major obstacle for
medical research.
From the same environment arises a somewhat myopic view,
one that would, on one hand emphasize some sort of genetic
existentialism, while on the other hand it proposes equal treatment
of genetic data, with no distinction between data worthy of legal
protection and data that is not. Specifically, as far as the insurance
and employment worlds are concerned, it would be useful to
identify and limit the scope of information employers and
insurance providers may legally obtain.
It is true that by acquiring genetic information about their
respective insured persons and workers these entities would be
able to attain various types of cost reductions, and better plan their
activities. This notwithstanding, it is also true that said access
could constitute a violation of the privacy of those same
individuals.
PART II
SEARCHING FOR OTHER DOCTRINES
Much of the doctrine and the jurisprudence of the US maintains
that an adequate form of protection for an individual's genetic
information can be found in the methods used to regulate other
types of medical information, which mandate that no data may be
collected or disseminated without the informed prior consent of the
subject it pertains to. 34 In this fashion, genetic information would
34. For a synthesis of said trends, see for example, Henry Miller III, DNA
Blueprints, Personhood and Genetic Privacy, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 179 (1998),
that resorts to philosophical discourses to prove that the identity and
individuality of a person do not coincide with the store of genetic information
contained in DNA. According to this train of thought therefore, this data would
only have mere medical value and should be regulated accordingly. Said trend
is in opposition with that of the so called genetic exceptionalism, according to
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be protected as well as medical data tout court, and would fall
under the owner's privacy rights, meaning that the owner would
have the right to control the management and diffusion of said
information, 35 in accordance with the traditional concept of the
right to privacy formulated by Warren and Brandeis. 36
This legislative option however has proven itself to be an
inadequate solution to the delicate issue of effective protection of
genetic information. This is due to the peculiarities that connote
this type of information and the values inherent thereto (e.g., the
identity of the person, protection of individual dignity, etc.). The
inadequacy of privacy protection is especially evident in view of
three specific issues: (a) the collection and storage of DNA
samples from innocent people; (b) the collection and storage of
what is commonly known as “abandoned DNA”; and, (c) the issue
of the “biologic group.”
A. Collection and Storage of DNA Samples from Innocent
Individuals
Scientific progress has not only made it possible to gather
“physical” samples of DNA, but it has also given us the ability to
create, using specialized programs, a series of DNA profiles that
can be stored in specialized data banks. 37 While the usefulness of
this data is unquestionable, especially for investigative purposes,
some of the techniques used by public authorities have created

which genetic information constitutes a unicum, and as such should be subject to
ad hoc discipline. See on the subject: Deborah L. McLochlin, Whose genetic
information is it anyway? A Legal Analysis of the Effects that Mapping the
Human Genome Will Have on Privacy Rights and Genetic Discrimination, 19 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 609 (2001).
35. See, for example, Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property:
Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
737 (2004); R.A. Curley & L.M. Caperna, The Brave New World Is Here:
Privacy Issues and the Human Genome, 70 DEF. COUNS, J. 22 (2003). Within
the case law, for example, Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602,
616 (1989); and, lastly United States v. Kinkade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
36. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 193.
37. See, for example, Michael J. Malinowski, Taking Genomics to the
Biobank: Access to Human Biological Samples and Medical Information, 66 LA.
L. REV. 43 (2005) (focusing on the legal implications of storing human
biological material in biobanks).
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many doubts regarding the constitutional legitimacy of mass
gathering and storing data and information of such a delicate
nature.
Some of these activities are in fact conducted by means of a
technique named dragnet (which, figuratively speaking, means
“trawling”). When performed on a large scale for investigative
purposes, it gives the authorities the ability to gather, analyze and
archive genetic information on a multitude of individuals, the
majority of whom have no penal record, or have never been
connected to any potential criminal activity. 38 Consequently, once
the investigative purpose has been concluded, and the criminal
identified, the authorities find themselves in possession of vast
amounts of sensitive information that, aside from its former
investigative value, may be of interest to many other entities (such
as insurance companies, administrative agencies, and
employers). 39 Since current legislative measures and previous
legal rulings do not seem to offer adequate protection in this
context, there is a trend of thought that advocates addressing the
issue by means of a paradigm similar to the one already instituted
to protect privacy. Specifically, such a trend seems to favor
granting to individuals that provide genetic information some type
of actual ownership right, therefore affirming that they would hold
the proprietary rights for the data.
Such an option would allow for the vigorous reaffirmation of
constitutional guarantees of protection for the rights of individuals,
the efficacy of which would actually be paralyzed if the norms that
regulate privacy were to be used. 40 In order to better understand
the juridical implications of this debate, we must closely examine
the subject matter itself. As stated, the collection of DNA samples
38. See infra note 47.
39. See, for example, the critical remarks of Michael J. Markett, Note,
Genetic Diaries: An Analysis of Privacy Protection in DNA Data Banks, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 185 (1996).
40. Examples of the large portion of the doctrine that favors the institution
of actual protection measures founded on the recognition of proprietary rights
for genetic data versus personal rights, based on the privacy rights, are among
others: Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and Property Theory,
87 NW. U. L. REV. 1037 (1992); and recently, Leigh M. Harlan, When Privacy
Fails: Invoking a Property Paradigm to Mandate the Destruction of DNA
Samples, 54 DUKE L.J. 179, 187 (2004). There is no lack of decidedly
antagonistic views, for example, Suter, supra note 35. The question will be
specifically addressed in the paragraph that follows.
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and the creation of an ensuing genetic profile have assumed a
fundamental role in investigative environments. The process that
leads to the identification and incrimination of the perpetrator of a
crime is conducted in four steps: 41 the DNA must be collected
from the scene of the crime, and analyzed; 42 the investigative
authorities, on their part, must compile the profile of the potential
crime perpetrator, and select the individuals from which DNA
samples should be obtained; DNA samples are collected from
selected individuals; and the samples so obtained must then be
analyzed and transformed into an equivalent number of profiles to
be compared with the profile obtained from the sample collected at
the crime scene. After this process is concluded, and after all the
investigative venues have been exhausted, the question of whether
to store or destroy the collected samples arises. 43
As can be noted, one of the crucial stages in this process
involves the ability to obtain a series of DNA samples from
members of a selected group and compare them with the sample
collected from the crime scene. Another fundamental factor is the
selection of the group of individuals from which to obtain DNA.
Traditionally the authorities selected these individuals by availing
themselves of various methods. First of all, legislation was
instituted at state level to impose ex lege the collection of DNA
from individuals known to have committed violent crimes.
Recently, many states have expanded the parameters that apply to
the collection of genetic material by passing ad hoc legislation.
Some states actually also allow for collection of DNA samples of
people convicted of non-violent murders, meaning lesser crimes.
Other states provide for mandatory collection upon a simple arrest,
prior to the actual determination of the individual's guilt.44
41. Paul E. Tracy & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His Science Kit:
DNA Databases for 21st Century Crime Control? 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 635 (2000).
42. The nature of DNA is such that there is a high level of probability of
finding “genetic material” left by the person that committed the murder at the
scene. Everyone knows that, in fact, DNA is found in the blood, skin cells,
tissues, organs, muscles, brain cells, bones, hair, saliva, mucus, nails, urine and
human sperm. Id.
43. Id.
44. For further details see SETH AXELRAD, SPECIAL REPORT: SURVEY OF
STATE DNA DATABASE STATUTES (2005), that can be found on the following
web address web: http://www.aslme.org/ (last visited November 6, 2008).
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Lately, a forth technique of genetic material sampling has
gained popularity. It is called DNA dragnets, meaning massive
“trawling” of DNA samples from subjects that fall within a group
that is deemed potentially relevant for the investigation. This
selection criteria uses parameters so broad that the connection to
the crime committed usually loses much of its significance. 45 The
implementation of this technique has raised major concerns. While
in the first three instances the collection and storage of the DNA
samples appears to be constitutionally legitimate according to the
search and seizure clause contained in the Fourth Amendment of
the US Constitution, 46 there have been many questions raised
regarding the constitutional legitimacy of DNA samples obtained
using dragnets. 47
Since, generally, the “trawling” occurs with the consent of the
subjects, the constitutional rights of the Fourth Amendment can not
be applied. 48 The voluntary basis of this consent however, appears
to be rather weak, certainly not one that is strong enough to
overcome the predicament of the above mentioned constitutional
rights issue, considering that, if the individual refuses to give his
DNA, 49 the authorities can obtain a court order that obligates said
45. A paradoxical example, yet one that is apt to understand the import of
the phenomena and the constitutional implications thereof, could be one where
DNA dragnets are performed on all of male individuals of Caucasian ancestry
that live in a State, for the purpose of looking for the perpetuator of a rape. See
Fred W. Drobner, DNA Dragnets: Constitutional Aspects of Mass DNA
Identification Testing, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 479 (2000), according to whom
dragnets are essentially “perquisitions with no mandates, mass conducted on
multitudes of individuals, whose only tie to the crime is the authorities’
suspicion that they belong to a class of subjects that could possibly have
committed that crime”.
46. See infra contained in the text.
47. See, for example, Roberto Iraola, DNA Dragnets–A Constitutional
Catch, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 15 (2005).
48. Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or
Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413 (2001).
49. It must be highlighted that such a collection of sampling, thanks to the
scientific progress and to the circumstance that the DNA is present in many
human tissues, is usually carried out by means of a wood stick with a cottonmade end which is simply rubbed inside the mouth of a person, in order to
absorb the saliva. Therefore, the circumstance that the technique applied to
collect such sampling is not intrusive at all, seems to have weakened the
arguments of who used to deem such a method as a form of physical intrusion,
with prejudice to the individual. See, for example, M.A. Rothstein & S.
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person to undergo sampling, on the basis that he refused to
cooperate with the investigation. 50 In this regard however, it may
be best to make a distinction. The collection of biologic material is
only the initial phase of the analysis process. Once the material
has been obtained, it will have to be processed in order to extract
its DNA profile.
The DNA sample thus obtained will then be transformed into a
DNA profile (commonly compared to some type of digital print)
and this profile will be used for investigative purposes. 51 The
process of comparing genetic information obtained from the crime
scene to that of the samples collected pertains exclusively to the
DNA profile, and is totally independent from the storage of the
organic material the sample was derived from (blood, saliva, hair,
etc.). On the other hand, the fact that organic material containing
an individual’s DNA is accessible could allow someone to obtain
highly sensitive genetic information concerning said individual, for
purposes that are extraneous to actual investigative needs. For
example, analysis of DNA samples could reveal personal
information concerning predisposition to more than four thousand
different illnesses and hereditary conditions; the propensity
towards a certain sexual orientation, predisposition to become
addicted to some narcotic drugs or other substances (for example,
the tendency to become an alcoholic) and, according to some, any
criminal tendencies. 52
Vice versa, since a DNA profile really only consists of a
sequence of numbers, it can only be used for identification
purposes and is not apt as a mean by which to discover any
relevant information concerning the peculiarities of each

Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement
DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127 (2001).
50. See Drobner, supra note 45, at 508; and Imwinkelried & Kaye supra
note 48, at 423-24.
51. On this and other aspects pertaining to the manipulation of DNA, see
R.A. Nakashima, DNA Evidence in Criminal Trias: A Defense’s Attorney
Primer, 74 NEB. L. REV. 444, 447-50 (1995).
52. D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases:
Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L.
REV. 413.
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individual. 53 For this reason, the DNA profile can be intended as
being an investigative tool. 54
In this context, all fifty states have adopted laws that authorize
the storage of DNA profiles of anyone that has been convicted of a
crime in the appropriate data archives. To integrate the activities
that occurred at the state level, in 1994 the US Congress issued the
DNA Identification Act, 55 which authorizes the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to create a federal reference system that
centralizes all of the DNA-profiles contained in the national
archives. This activity led to the creation of the National DNA
Index System, a national database that allows local authorities and
administrative agencies to contribute DNA profiles in their
possession. The system thus created allows administrative and
state authorities to use and share data originated from the collective
databases, and is known as the Combined DNA Index System
(CODIS). 56
As briefly mentioned, in the US the cause of major concern,
and the object of the current debate, is the legitimacy of storing the
organic material (the DNA profile) of an individual after the
investigative requirements of identifying the perpetrator and
obtaining a conviction have been satisfied. It is notable that, while
one side asserts that it is legal to preserve the DNA profile of a
person who has been convicted of a crime, and the other side states
that there are still doubts regarding the legitimacy of also
preserving organic materials taken from those subjects, or vice
versa, almost everyone agrees that the overall issue of storing the

53. Id.
54. In this regard, the American doctrine agrees that due to the regulation of
“specification” (such a juridical concept can be compared to the Italian
“specificazione” as a peculiar way to acquire property rights on a thing), the
proprietor of the DNA-profile should be the investigative authorities. Recently,
Harlan, supra note 40. In particular, an Italian scholar admits that there is the
possibility that the norms on specifications may be applied to the subject of the
legal relationship between the individual, the body and the parts of the body. See
Gambaro, infra note 106, at 45. Otherwise, it could be argued that the rules
concerning intellectual property and copyrights might be applied to such an
issue.
55. 42 U.S.C. 14, 312 (2000).
56. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 (2002).
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DNA samples of innocent people is a genuine “constitutional
emergency.” 57
The debate is also fueled by the notable discrepancies that exist
between the laws of different states. At least twenty-nine states
have adopted legislative measures that expressly authorize
preserving the DNA samples in debate. 58 In contrast, only five
states expressly prohibit the preservation of samples once the DNA
profile comparison has been completed, 59 while at least eleven
states have yet to adopt any measures on the subject. 60 As
previously highlighted, part of American doctrine is of the opinion
that the issue should be re-conducted to the right of privacy and to
the constitutional status that said principle accords.
B. The Limitations of the Privacy Doctrine and the Affirmation of
the Proprietary Paradigm
In this regard, it should be noted that the most significant
systemization of the American right of privacy is contained in the
celebrated essay of Warren and Brandeis, followed by other
doctrinal contributions of remarkable prestige, together with a
series of jurisprudential precedents that acted upon those same
lines. 61 As far as specific legislative measures, the Constitution
57. Id. and Iraola, supra note 47.
58. Among these for example we can cite: Alabama, Connecticut, Idaho,
Massachusetts, Oregon, South Carolina, and Washington State.
59. Alaska, California, Montana, New York, and Vermont.
60. For further details, see Jonathan Kimmelmann, Risking Ethical
Insolvency: A Survey of Trends in Criminal DNA Databanking, 28 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 209 (2000).
61. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24. Warren was a well known lawyer
from Boston, while Brandeis eventually became a Judge of the US Supreme
Court. In synthesis, within their publication–defined as “perhaps the most
famous and certainly the most influential article of doctrine ever written”
[LANDMARKS OF LAW, HIGHLIGHTS OF LEGAL OPINION 284 (Henson ed. 1960)],
the authors tried to demonstrate that the Common Law, within a collection of old
decisions, thanks to the recourse to different doctrines, had in the end
recognized the existence of a general sphere of privacy rights, or of a right to
privacy worthy of protecting. Among the decisions that were inspired by said
premise we can recall specifically a verdict of the Supreme Court of the State of
Georgia, that distinguished itself because of its strongly convincing opinion on
behalf of such a theory: Pavesich v. New England Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E.
68 (1905). For an initial in depth elaboration of the rights of persons from the
comparative point of view, see 2 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ,
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does not acknowledge any type of privacy right in any of its
articles, or in the Bill of Rights, the fulcrum of the fundamental
rights granted to individuals. 62 Nonetheless, the route followed by
the legal interpreters while striving to institute a constitutionally
warranted privacy right involved their having to resort to the
substantive due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution, and the so called theory of penumbra. 63

INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATO (INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW)
396, 415 (E. Cigna trans., 1995).
62. The Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791 and it comprises the first ten
Amendments of the American Constitution. Other Amendments were approved
later: the last Amendment in particular (XXVII)–concerning retribution for the
members of Congress–was approved in 1992. For further details on the history
of the American Constitution, refer to WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES ch. 7 (3rd ed, West
Group 2002). In this regards, we remind you that originally the Bill of Rights
was formulated as being applicable only to the Federal authorities. In the 1960',
the Supreme Court began issuing a series of decisions, which ruled that the
applicability of guarantees contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, issued in
1868, should be extended to include the activities of the individual States. Id.
63. According to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment a person shall not
“be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”. Common
agreement on this subject is that the Amendment includes two distinct notions of
due process: the first–named procedural due process–would consist of the
guarantee directly derived from text of the Amendment, the second–called
substantive due process–would postulate the existence of specific personal
rights, comprised in the notion of “liberty.” This is when, among others in the
shadow of the right to freedom law, the existence of an actual right to privacy
was acknowledged, its existence was vigorously sustained in two leading cases
on the topic of birth control and abortion. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1969) the Federal Supreme Court ruled that a State law prohibiting the use
of all means of birth control was unconstitutional, based in fact on the right to
privacy of individuals, which–the majority of opinion argued–was to be intended
to be in “the shadow” of the guarantees expressly recognized by the Bill of
Rights. This right therefore gave married couples the freedom to use means of
birth control. Subsequently, in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)–a case that
directly involved the issue of abortion, the same Court's majority opinion,
instead of referring to the Bill of Rights uti universus, substantiated the ruling by
anchoring the foundations of the right to privacy to the substantive due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment. In synthesis, the Court deemed that said right
was also inclusive of the right to abortion; at the same time however, it
recognized the existence of two conflicting interests equally worth protecting:
the matter of the mother's health and the fostering of potential human life. In
view of this, the gestation period was divided into three trimesters, each of them
characterized by the prevalence of one of the above mentioned interests. The
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Although the genesis of the right to privacy in the American
legal system may lie, as noted, in the Fifth Amendment, at a
constitutional level the source of the protection afforded under the
right to privacy, as well as its applicable limitations, nonetheless
lies in the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment. 64
In fact, recent jurisprudence strengthened the connection between
the right to privacy and the above Amendment to the point that it is
now regarded as being the core value of this last. 65

right to privacy was also invoked to protect some of the aspects of family and
marital life. Hence a zoning regulation was deemed to be unconstitutional, on
the basis that it violated the right to privacy of the family, because it specified
that housing in a certain area was to be used exclusively by families composed
of parents and children, which implied that families whose composition
extended to include other relatives such as grandparents, could not inhabit it.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). In contrast, it was
ruled that the right to privacy does not extend to include acts of consensual
sodomy performed by a homosexual couple within the privacy of their own
home. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986): at this junction, the subject to
be examined by a Court was a law from the State of Georgia that prohibited the
performance of those acts. That law was subsequently declared to be
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of that State, because it was deemed to
be contrary to the dispositions of the State constitution. Powell v. State, 510
S.E. 2d 18 (Ga. 1999). Finally, in the case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept.
Of Health 497 U.S. 261 (1990), it was argued that the right to privacy
encompassed also a “right to die:” Nancy Cruzan was an irreversible coma
patient. Her parents sought to remove of the tube that provided her with
artificial nutrition, so that she may be allowed to die a natural death. The
Supreme Court ruled that artificial nutrition is a medical treatment method, and
as such can be discontinued to satisfy an person’s wish to die with dignity. In
this case, however, the law of the State of Missouri–that imposed a very high
probationary standard on the interruption of medical treatment–was not deemed
to be unconstitutional in recognition of the fact that it ensued from the State's
strong intent to preserve human life. In 1997 the question of “the right to die”
was revisited, and this time said right morphed into the “right to assisted death.”
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
64. The Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution prescribes:
. . . the right of the people to be secure in their persons, house,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizure, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall be issued, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
65. For illustrative examples of these movements see Scott E. Sundby,
“Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between
Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1756 (1994).
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The Fourth Amendment guarantees pertaining to the
inviolability of a person, dwellings and personal property is not,
however, absolute. Instead, as clearly enunciated in the written
content of the clause, 66 it may be subjected to limitations, upon
condition that these last are reasonable and within the scope of the
formal requirements established therein. Therefore, for example, a
house can only be searched after obtaining a warrant ad hoc from
the appropriate authorities, etc. 67
Besides reasons that meet the formal and substantive
requirements to restrict the rights granted by the said Amendment,
another factor that nullifies the inviolability of that right is the
subject’s consent. Obviously, consent must be freely given, and as
such not granted under any form of coercion, or at least not given
as a result of false statements made by public officials. 68
Another element worth considering is the important question of
what exactly is intended by the word search. In fact, whenever the
actions undertaken do not constitute a “search” in the technical
sense, the rights accorded by the Fourth Amendment cannot be
enforced. Originally, the opinion was that matters of this kind
66. See supra note 64.
67. Additionally, it was ruled that it is legal to conduct a search without a
warrant, if extraordinary circumstances arise (for example, for an emergency
situation of such nature that it was objectively impossible for the authorities to
obtain a warrant in advance). See Illinois v. Mc Arthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
Another ruling exception that was peacefully accepted was the legitimate arrest
of a citizen: in this junction, the public officials that perform the arrest have not
only the right but the duty to conduct a search (for example, to verify that the
subject is unarmed or to prevent him from destroying evidence, i.e. bags of
drugs in the case of a drug dealer's arrest). See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969). This right encompasses not only searching the arrested person, but
also his/her house, car, etc.; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973);
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
68. In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) the officers in charge
of the search told the homeowner–untruthfully–that they possessed a legal
search warrant. The woman then gave them permission to come in. During the
Court proceedings, when the defense lawyer objected to the lack of a warrant,
and argued that the search was therefore illegal, the public prosecutor replied
that the search was rendered legal by the explicit consent of the subject thereto.
The US Supreme Court ruled that said consent was invalid because it was
obtained under coercion, specifically “by acquiescence to a claim of a lawful
authority.” In any case, it should be mentioned that public officials are not
required to inform the subjects of their right to withhold consent. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 543 (1968).
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could be settled only under the hypothesis of physical intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area. 69 For example, in 1928 the
US Supreme Court ruled that using a phone tap device to record a
subject’s incriminating phone conversations did not fall under the
criteria of search; since a conversation per se can not be intended
as being a tangible object, it could not be said that an actual form
of physical intrusion onto a constitutionally protected area 70 had
taken place.
The court abandoned this “tangible” criterion only in 1967,
with the leading case Katz v. United States, 71 which also pertained
to the issue of phone taps, and elaborated the criteria of reasonable
expectation of privacy. Specifically, the ruling established that the
act of placing an electronic device on an external wall of a public
phone booth, for the purpose of intercepting telephone
conversations, constituted an actual search and is subject to the
mandates of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that it occurred in a
public place was deemed to be irrelevant, based upon the fact that
the provisions contained in the Fourth Amendment were
formulated to protect the rights of individuals, and not of locations.
What the provisions were meant to protect as “private” should
have been respected whether the scene of the intrusion was
considered public or not. Since Mr. Katz had a reasonable
expectation that his phone conversations would remain private, the
interception constituted an actual search, and, in order to perform
said search, the investigators should have obtained an ad hoc
warrant in advance.
As can be noted, the ruling marked the shift from an approach
based on substance to a personalistic one. A contrario, meaning
what individuals willingly disclose to the public, even while in
their homes or in their offices, falls outside of the circle of
protections granted by the Fourth Amendment. 72
In spite of the revaluations caused by the Katz case, the court,
in a subsequent case, pronounced a ruling based on the tangible
physical intrusion criteria, reintroducing the open fields doctrine,

69. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
70. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
71. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
72. Id.
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which had been seemingly overruled. 73 The expression open field
is intended to describe the stretch of terrain that is on the outside of
the curtilage of a dwelling. Specifically, this includes the plot of
land on top of which a dwelling was built, and it includes all the
facilities it may contain (such as garages, verandas, access paths,
lawns, flower beds, etc.). 74 The principle affirmed by the court
was that the open field could not guarantee the privacy of those
activities that the Fourth Amendment meant to protect from
interference and surveillance conducted by public authorities. 75
The rational parameters of said movement were for the most
part founded on the consideration that, although in theory the
legitimacy of those intrusions is questionable, in reality the
associated entities generally tend to make allowances in these
areas. One last hypothesis deserves to be considered: that of trash.
According to the court, trash is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment, because “plastic bags of refuse, left on or along
public roads, can be easily accessed by animals, children, refuse
collectors, the curious and anyone else.” Because of this, “the
owners cannot claim to hold a subjective expectation of privacy,
that society can accept as being objectively reasonable,” 76 with this
recalling the arguments a contrario deducible by the Katz 77 case.

73. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). The so called “open field
doctrine” was mentioned for the first time in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S.
57 (1924).
74. In the case of a country home, curtilage indicates the area of ground that
surrounds a dwelling, but it does not pertain to the whole parcel of land. See
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S: VOCABULARY OF ENGLISH (last ed.).
75. Therefore the actions of the police, which consisted of walking around
the lot and discovering the existence of marijuana plants via a gap in the fence at
the back of the property, did not constitute a search, and as such did not require
a warrant, regardless of the fact that said plants were not visible from the road in
front of the house. Along the same parameters, United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S.
294 (1987).
76. California v. Grenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988): in the case de quo, the
police, who suspected the homeowner was selling narcotics, checked the
garbage left just outside of the curtilage of a dwelling. The Court ruled this
action did not constitute a search in the technical sense, and as such did not
necessitate a warrant. The accent was posed particularly on the fact that the
rubbish was left in a public area for the deliberate purpose of consigning it to a
third party–in charge of the collection–who would have been able to go through
the garbage himself, or allow someone else to do so i.e. the police.
77. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and the corresponding text.
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The court’s decision constitutes a specific application of the
open fields doctrine. The motive for the verdict, however,
postulates the recall of a distinct juridical institution: property
rights. 78 In synthesis, according to the court, abandoning goods
outside of one's own sphere of jurisdiction (limited to the area that
can be qualified as being curtilage) suggests that someone is
willingly renouncing their rights thereto, and a fortiori, the right to
exercise any form of control over these goods which, therefore,
acquire the status of res derelictae. 79
78. On this subject, we must keep in mind the caveat mentioned by A.
Gambaro in regards to the ambiguity of the term “property” and the risks that
would be encountered while doing a comparative investigation whereas the term
“property” was to be translated into the Italian term proprietà; this would lead to
the suppression of precious juridical situations connected to said term both
within the Common law itself and along the lines of the less prominent category
of “diritti reali” (i.e. rights on a thing) of the Italian legal system. ALBINA.
CANDIAN, ANTONIO GAMBARO, & BARBARA POZZO, PROPERTY, PROPRIÉTÉ,
EIGENTUM, 3 (1992). The same author also highlights the possible connotations
of the juridical language, as pertaining to property, also as viewed from within
the same legal system (from example, in American Law, the concept of
“property” and the reference sources vary between the ones obtained from
approaching the issue of rights protection from a Constitutional standpoint
against the inhibiting actions of the public authorities or whether the subject is
approached in order to discuss the issues concerning the transfer of titled
property rights). In view of these considerations, the same author proposes to
“refer to the central nucleus of the ownership issue, considering the different
disciplines as being the blade-like solutions that originate from an individual key
issue, or rather, establish which subject has the most potential to be useful, be
enjoyed and is flexible enough to allow for the expansion or disposal of objects
in our collection that can directly satisfy life’s needs.” As a result of this
approach, the proprietary discipline would then be “assumed independently of
the categories it derived from, meaning the group of regulations that dictate
what the subjects that are authorized to act in regards to an item and, on the
contrary, determine everything that the other subjects should do, not do or
tolerate in regards to that same item.” Id., Proprietà in diritto comparato
(Property in Comparative Law), in XV DIGESTO DISC. PRIV. 504-506 (1997).
For an analysis of the challenges inherent to juridical translation, as well as the
various options available to those who wish to study a foreign legal system, refer
also to the brilliant suggestions of Rodolfo Sacco, Traduzione giuridica,
DIGESTO DISC. PRIV., Aggiornamento 722 (2000); and to those of OLIVIER
MORÉTEAU, DROIT ANGLAIS DES AFFAIRES (Précis Dalloz 2000), whose analysis
focused mainly on the language issues within business relationships.
Accordingly, during the present analysis, references made to the property
paradigm shall be viewed from the standpoint of the preceding observations.
79. In a previous verdict, the Court's ruling was based upon bona vacantia,
deeming that the conduct of police officers, who looked through the trash of a

2008]

THE PROTECTION OF GENETIC IDENTITY

169

Although it may appear to have been initially neglected, the
paradigm of ownership started to resurface with all of its might in
the debate pertaining to the fundamental rights of the individual
and their limits of applicability. What we wish to highlight is the
fact that, although rights such as privacy and ownership are
connected, they are addressed autonomously and separately, with
different regulatory legislation. Having concluded the detailed
examination of privacy doctrine’s jurisprudential evolution, we can
now address the constitutional implications that pertain to the
collection and storage of DNA samples. Specifically, we will try to
verify if applying the regulations of the privacy protection laws to
the delicate matter of genetic information is the best and most
efficient option by which to direct them, or if, as the doctrine
already proffered, it may be preferable to grant each individual
ownership rights over this information, rights that would be
constitutionally guaranteed and protected with ad hoc measures.
We must premise the discussion of this subject with an
important distinction. As previously stated, whenever a sample of
DNA belonging to an individual that has been convicted of a crime
is collected or stored, these activities appear to be constitutionally
legitimate, since they are conducted in accordance with the formal
and procedural guarantees prescribed by the Fourth Amendment
(noting that the constitutional legitimacy of State regulations has
never been questioned). As far as what pertains more specifically
to the dragnets phenomena, the constitutional legitimacy of that
practice is guaranteed by the subject’s consent, who voluntarily
decides to authorize collection of a sample of their DNA under
conditions, of course, that do not involve any form of coercion or
false statements on the investigative authorities’ part. 80 In this
regard, it seems appropriate to recall that in the context of the
practice of dragnets, the consensual element tends to lose its
efficacy due to the fact that if when confronted with the rightful
refusal of the subject, the appropriate authorities can be petitioned
to issue an order that effectively coerces that person into agreeing

hotel room to verify if the suspect was indeed using narcotics, did not constitute
a “search,” but in fact, the trash was an example of bona vacantia.
80. On the topic see supra the opinions listed in supra note 34, and the
corresponding text.
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to the DNA sample 81 collection. In both instances–voluntary and
coerced consent–the limitations imposed by the Fourth
Amendment are inapplicable, and as a consequence, the privacy
rights are nullified. 82 Consequently, the genetic material acquired
by means of dragnets is no longer covered by the constitutional
privacy right. 83 The above conclusion is vulnerable to critique
when it fails to consider that the issue being examined, as
previously indicated, involves two distinct events: the collection
of genetic material, and, once the investigative needs are
exhausted, its subsequent storage. There is no doubt that both
voluntary and mandated consent, in the instance of biological
material collection (and the processing needed to extract a DNA
profile), 84 result in the invalidation of the subject's privacy rights.
Conversely, it is highly debatable that the effects of the consent or
injunction can also be considered an implicit authorization for the
final–ulterior and distinct–purpose of storing the genetic material
for an indefinite amount of time, and, for example, consent to its
being potentially used in an investigation connected to a different
crime. The consent to the subsequent storage of the sample could
be documented, meaning it could be specifically addressed within
the above named official mandates. In that case however, the
validity of the consent may become an issue. It seems unlikely that
the subjects consenting to the indefinite storage of their DNA
sample can be considered as having done so while duly informed,
since future scientific advances could render DNA samples able to
fulfill purposes that were inconceivable at the time said consent
was given. On the other hand, as far as the court injunction is
concerned, the constitutional legitimacy of the provision could be
81. See supra note 50, and the corresponding text.
82. According to the teachings of Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at
218, “the right to privacy is extinguished by the effects of divulging the
information pertaining to the individual, or by the consent of this last.”
83. About this see the concerns mentioned by Iraola, supra note 47.
84. We must also consider the fact that, while a DNA profile is rendered by
a sequence of numbers, only apt to serve as identification for investigative
means, genetic information obtainable through biologic materials is highly
sensitive by nature and can be used for a multitude of purposes. In this regard,
see the n. 18-23 and their corresponding text and, in particular, Michael J.
Malinowski & Radhika Rao, Legal Limitations of Genetic Research and the
Commercialization of Its Results, 54 AM. J. COMP. LAW 45 (2006) (analyzing
the economic and financial implications of the developments occurred within the
biopharmaceutical and biotechnological field).
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contested on the basis of the alleged public reasonableness thereof,
as referenced in the Fourth Amendment. 85
Aside from the above observations, we must keep in mind that
these legal situations are totally independent and distinct from the
initial collection and the analysis of genetic data. This necessitates
conducting two separate assessments of the factors that nullify the
constitutional provisions of the Fourth Amendment. Waiving the
privacy rights concerning the collection of the DNA sample does
not involve, ipso iure, the willingness to forego privacy rights
concerning the subsequent storage thereof. 86
This specific issue, for example, has been expressly addressed
in The Netherlands, where there has been a debate concerning the
legal status of the human biological material as a consequence of
the fact that, due to recent developments in genetics, the
preservation of DNA samples in specific data banks has become
customary. In this regard, in spite of the fact that the issue seems
to have been addressed from the privacy right perspective, the
property and privacy paradigms appear to be strictly intertwined.
In particular, the debate focused on the status of human biological
material stored in those data banks is unclear and implies the risk
of violating the donor’s rights. Accordingly, the enactment of
regulations has been strongly recommended to clarify the purpose
of the cell bank, the time period for which the material may be
kept, and the possible uses of the material. 87 In this regard, it has
been suggested to strengthen the consent argument by imposing
upon keepers of DNA samples the duty to require ad hoc and time
by time informed consent from the owners of such material, not
only for present applications but also for future ones. In addition,
the individual to whom the DNA sample pertains to should be
entitled to request full information about the use and the status of
his/her DNA sample and even to exercise the right to have that
sample destroyed. 88 Those last remarks show how the property
paradigm plays an important role in spite of an approach which at
85. Ref. Ken M. Gatter, Genetic Information and the Importance of
Context: Implications for the Social Meaning of Genetic Information and
Individual Identity, 47 S. LOUIS U. L.J. 423, 445-446 (2003).
86. On the topic see Harlan, supra note 40, at 192.
87. See in particular Joke I. De Witte & Jos V.M. Welie, The status of
genetic material and genetic information in The Netherlands, 45 SOC. SCI. MED.
1 (1997).
88. Id. at 47.
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first sight is oriented in favor of the privacy doctrine. In fact, it has
been held by part of the doctrine that keepers of the DNA data
banks should be deemed as being in the same position as that of
the owner of a storage facility, who, after all, does not own what is
stored. On the contrary, the individual to whom the DNA sample
belongs would retain the ownership of that sample. 89
In view of the observations made so far, we could deduce that,
as long as great care is taken to respect the sensitivity of the
subject matter, the right to privacy laws could be employed to
adequately protect the genetic information of an individual. As
premised, this is the direction taken by the currently prevailing
doctrine, 90 and has seemingly been endorsed by the legislative
bodies as well. 91
This being said, other scholars consider this legislative
approach to be totally inadequate due to the intrinsic limits of
privacy protection laws, and in view of the unique traits of genetic
information itself. Specifically, arguments proffered by the
supporters of said orientation (which is certainly not a minority
trend) are founded on the following observations:
(i) The obsolete nature of the reasonable expectation of
privacy criteria. According to the prevailing judicial interpretation
of this formula, in order to maintain said expectation, an individual
should not sign checks (since they are legal instruments destined to
be circulated), nor should that person conduct telephone
conversations or walk around his neighborhood. Further, once
home, this individual should take care to shutter all windows, to
eliminate each and every fissure, and speak softly while
conversing; 92
(ii) The tendency to accord public opinion an important role in
the judgment of the bearing of opposite interests, with the

89. Id. at 46-48.
90. Compare with n. 1 and 2 and the corresponding text.
91. These anchor the protection of genetic information to the privacy
doctrine, for example: the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) of 1996 (Pub. L. no. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 42 & 29 U.S.C.); and the
Standards for Privacy of Individual Identifiable Health Information, issued by
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in 2000 (65 Fed. Reg. 82,
461; 45 C.F.R., pts. 160 & 164).
92. Specifically, Sundby, supra note 65, at 1789-1790.
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subsequent, progressive weakening of the inviolable nature of the
right being examined. 93
Specifically in regards to genetic information, the inadequacy
of the prevailing privacy protection laws are fully revealed once
the information is “unveiled.” For example, we may think about
an instance where a doctor analyses a DNA sample to determine if
the patient is predisposed to develop a certain ailment. In the
American legal system, the doctor-patient relationship is among
those classified as being confidential relationships, meaning a type
of legal relationship whose connotations have a very strong
fiduciary element, and is intrinsically intuitu personae by nature. 94
This dictates that the doctor, as recipient of the patient's trust, is
bound to abide to a series of specific obligations in addition to
those traditionally attributed to a standard contractual relationship.
Chief among said obligations–at least for the purposes of this
work–is to maintain the confidentiality of any information
acquired. 95
What is most dreaded by the privacy doctrine critics is the risk
that DNA samples taken for medical reasons, and their pertaining
genetic information, may be subsequently passed on to official
authorities and then be used for investigative purposes. The
protection offered by the prescription that prevents disclosure of
that information is not, in fact, absolute. The acts of acquiring and
using highly confidential information do not constitute, according
to a US Supreme Court ruling, a violation of the constitutional
rights granted to an individual. This was observed in a 1976 ruling
that stated:
93. Id.
94. A confidential relationship involves parties in different contractual
positions: from within said special relationship. The individual that assumes a
so called dependent role must be identified; this would be the person who
legally confides in the counterpart, who is defined in turn as being the dominant
party, and consequently trusts in the judgment of this last, believing that this
individual will act in the best interest of the first party. J.D. CALAMARI & J.M.
PERILLO, CONTRACTS 353 § 9-10 (Thomson-West ed., 5th ed. 2003); W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 738 § 106 (5th
ed, 1984).
95. For a specific application of the discipline being examined in regards to
genetic information, see the latest work by Susan M. Denbo, What Your Genes
Know Affects Them: Should Patient Confidentiality Prevent Disclosure of
Genetic Test Results to a Patient’s Biological Relatives?, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 561
(2006).
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This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a
third party and conveyed by him to Government
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed 96
In this regard, it should be noted that the appointed courts
applied this principle specifically to the collection of biologic
material samples, deeming that the actions of health institutions,
who forwarded samples of genetic material–collected for medical
reasons, with the legal consent of the subject–to investigative
authorities, did not constitute a violation of the constitutionally
protected expectation of privacy. 97
Lastly, there is another argument that exposes the inadequacy
of using privacy rights legislation as an instrument by which to
protect genetic information. As briefly suggested previously, 98
DNA resides in many types of human tissue, easily acquired even
in public places (let's consider the examples of hair or saliva left on
a cup at a coffee shop). The “public” nature of DNA effectively
weakens the expectation of an individual who believes he/she is
the only one that has access to, or can determine the use of, said
information. Therefore, the peculiar nature of DNA effectively
lowers the level of what can be perceived as a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The complexities pertaining to the issue at
hand become truly evident when applied to the case of
“abandoned DNA,” the principal topic of discussion in the section
that follows.
Due to the asserted inadequacy of the regulating genetic
information by means of the privacy doctrine, a new direction,
previously outlined, has appeared on the horizon of American
96. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
97. For example, People v. Perlos, 462 N.W. 2d 310, 324 (Mich. 1990).
These trends seem to infringe upon the validity of the theory sustained by the
doctrine, according to which, in order to guarantee the efficacious protection of
the individual genetic privacy, we must emphasize the confidential nature of that
information and the importance of the element of trust in the relationship
between the owner of the information and the recipient thereof, instead of
resorting to a property right based paradigm. Suter, supra note 35, fully agrees
with this opinion.
98. See supra note 42.
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legislation. This favors endowing an individual with actual
property rights over his genetic information. This option, it is said,
would be more effective in protecting the individual from illicit
intrusions upon his sphere of intimate genetic information and, on
the other hand, would also serve to duly recognize the peculiar
nature of this information, and the values that pertain thereto (i.e.,
the identity of individuals, protection of the dignity of individuals,
etc.) 99 The option in favor of the proprietary paradigm would
therefore be better because it would:
(i) Guarantee an ad hoc process for all of the possible
juridical scenarios that may arise in regards to this subject.
Different from the right to privacy, which seems to have been
modeled along rigid criteria and are reconducible to the double
binomials of “confidentiality of information-privacy” and
“disclosure of information-decrease of privacy,” the paradigm of
property rights–especially as denoted by Hohfeld's definition on
the merit of which is it has been greeted–seems to hold greater
flexibility and malleability. 100 The right in question is composed
of a number of authorities and powers, which can be restricted or
limited without abrogating the right itself. A specific application
of such a theory is, in fact, the so called “resilience of property
rights,” which imports that the scope of a right can be restricted,
99. See the observations made in Section 3, which follows.
100. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld was the author of two influential articles
published in the Yale Law Journal, in which he identified and divided the
fundamental concepts used to describe legal relationships among parties, taking
care to also express the pertaining concepts in precise and rigorous terms
(Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal
Reasoning (I), 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); and Id., Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Legal Reasoning (II), 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1916)). The American
Law Institute adopted the orientation of Hohfeld as paradigm upon which to
structure the establishment of the Restatement of Property. The fulcrum of that
structure is truly the adoption of a concept of property as understood in
comparative terms regarding relationships, among which the notions of “right,”
“privilege,” “power” and “indemnification” are weighed against just as many
opposite concepts. The eventual limitations imposed upon one or more of these
relationships would not invalidate the object right. Recently within the doctrine
it was stated that “it is truly the metaphor of property as a range of rights
constitutes a more appropriate description of the way by which the majority of
these new acknowledged forms of property operate.” See Recent Cases, infra
note 134. For further elaborations on this point, see Barrad, supra note 40, at
1054; and Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of
Cultural Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1995).
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then extended back to its original form without impediments (as
well as it happens in the Italian legal system about the so called
elasticità del dominio principle, according to which the right of
property significantly restricted by the concurrence on the same res
of another right, as for example the right of usufruct, can be
nevertheless expanded again when the latter has expired); 101
(ii) Give the person who owns the rights instruments of
authority more efficient than those offered by privacy protection
laws. In this case for example, it would allow the titled owner of
the biological material, and genetic information, the right to regain
possession of the sample after the investigative needs have been
met. Conversely, the protection offered by the right to privacy
legislation only extends to prescribing compensatory damages for
violations, and as such is inadequate to effectively protect the
individual after that right has been violated; 102
(iii) Offer constitutional guarantees for this right, and
specifically those granted by the Fifth Amendment. As previously
stated, the subject's consent, the actions of the pertaining
authorities, or the inability to adjust the threshold of a reasonable
expectation of privacy, cause the diminishment–if not the
obliteration–of the individual right to privacy. As a result, the
Fourth amendment provisions would not apply. Vice versa,
granting property rights over the “assets” in question would ensure
the ability to enforce the provisions contained in the Fifth
Amendment. Said Amendment provides that citizens cannot be
deprived of their property rights without due process of law, and it
also mandates that property cannot be seized for public use without
duly indemnifying the owner. For DNA dragnets, the principles of
due process of law and public use could be applied, while the
requisite of due indemnification would not be satisfied, as it would
be constitutionally illegal for the authorities to store DNA. 103
The question, as previously outlined, is in any case
controversial, and there is no lack of arguments supporting the
opposite theory. 104 These last can be summarized by a single

101. Id.
102. Harlan, supra note 40, at 215.
103. Id.
104. In this regard, see notes 34-35 and the corresponding text.
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theme: the fear of commercializing the human body, 105 which is
founded on the notions of alienability and the freedom to dispose
of goods, intrinsic to property laws. 106 This worry may be calmed
by the jurisprudential precedent established by the ruling in Moore
v. Regents of the University of California 107 case. The Supreme
Court of California rejected inter alia the plaintiff's suit. The
claimant was a patient whose cells had been processed in order to
obtain “cell line” that could be patented and become object of
numerous lucrative commercial agreements. The plaintiff sought
restitution of the cells, or at least recognition of his ownership and
therefore his entitlement to reap the financial benefits derived from
the commercialization of said “asset.” The court, specifically,
based its decision on the lack of jurisprudential precedents to
legitimize that an individual holds a property interest right over
parts or materials that have been detached from his body. 108 In the
105. On the latest, for example, see Radhika Rao, A Veil of Genetic
Ignorance? Protecting Genetic Privacy to Ensure Equality, 51 VILL. L. REV.
827 (2006), that presents a stimulating proposal: to wrap the “veil of genetic
ignorance” around every individual, to insure that people are equally treated,
and by this prevent any possible form of discrimination.
106. Within the Italian doctrine, the theme of adequacy of the proprietary
paradigm, in regards to the body and its parts, has been specifically addressed by
Antonio Gambaro, who offered a critical assessment of the traditional arguments
sustaining the intangibility of the human body. Antonio Gambaro, Tessuti
biologici e parti del corpo, in LA PROPRIETÀ, TRATTATO DI DIRITTO PRIVATO 39
(Giovanni Iudica & Paolo Zatti dir., 1990).
107. 249 Cal. Reporter. 494 (CA. COA 1988); aff’d in part, rev. in part, 793
P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991). The Italian
translation of the California Court of Appeals sentence is available in Foro it.,
1989, IV, 417, with notes by M. Paganelli, Alla volta di Frankestein:
bioteconologie e proprietà (di parti) del corpo umano, as well as the RIVISTA
CRITICA DEL DIRITTO PRIVATO 443 (1989), with notes by B. Edelman,
Discutendo il caso Moore, ivi, 469.
108. Truthfully, there was a precedent: the case Venner v. State, 354 A.2d
483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976), judged in Maryland, in which the actual
question of whether a subject can retain property rights over biological material
detached from the body was addressed. It was concluded that an instance
wherein an individual claims ownership and authority rights over property such
as bodily secretions, nails, hair, blood, escrements, organs or other parts of the
body was not unheard of. The California Court of Appeals in fact referenced
that same case to support its opinion which states that the relationship between
and individual and his bodily parts should be included in the category of
property rights (although in the Moore case said right was not deemed
sustainable). The Venner case was used as a distinguishing by the Supreme
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opinion of the court, this right had been precluded by a number of
factors that sustained the opposite theory. 109 To this effect, it
should be noted that American jurisprudence cannot be said to be
unified in its support of this decision. The same majority opinion
has been countered by vigorous dissenting opinions in favor of
acknowledging property interest rights for materials detached from
someone's body. 110
In view of the observations made so far, in synthesis, it
becomes noticeable that the primary question posed by the genetic
information debate concerns the new era of genetic analysis and
the morphed concept of identity. How should we interpret the
relationships that exist between ourselves, our bodies, and our
identity, now that just about every “particle” of our body can fully
reveal our genetic information? The true magnitude of this
question was revealed by “abandoned DNA.”
C. The Controversial Case of “Abandoned DNA”
First of all, we must define abandoned DNA. This type of
DNA is defined as being any human tissue sample from which
genetic information can be extracted; material that has become
separated from a body for reasons other than the conscious consent

Court of California when it was called to render a verdict in the final instance of
the Moore proceedings. Specifically the Court ruled that, since the Venner case
involved a penal procedural issue and not a civil controversy aimed to establish
“which party was entitled to reap a financial benefit derived from the ownership
of an asset,” as in the proceeding de quo, that same would not have been
applicable to the situation at hand (793 P.2d 489, note 28).
109. The California Supreme Court decision seems to have been drawn on
concerns on political and social nature rather than actual juridical technicalities:
in fact, one of the most important reasons for the denial of the plaintiff's claim of
property right over materials detached from his body, was the concern that if the
right was acknowledged (and the compensation granted) it cold potentially
inhibit scientific research and experimental activities, with great consequences
for the community. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d
489.
110. Id. Those who support applying the property right paradigm to genetic
information do not view said instance as an insurmountable obstacle for their
solution and propose that the distinguishing criteria should also be applied to the
case at hand. From the latest by Harlan, supra note 40, at 202-207.
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of the subject, or subsequent to an official authority's injunction
order. 111
As previously noted, 112 since DNA resides in many types of
human tissue, the fact that a person may leave traces of genetically
relevant material in his/her path is an ordinary event. Routine
examples of this phenomenon are the traces of saliva left on coffee
cups, cigarette filters, drops of blood from an accidental cut, hair,
and even nail trimmings. In this regard, we must remember that
even a very small part of human tissue can be enough for testing
purposes, since this type of analysis does not require significant
amounts of material. On the other hand, as previously noted, 113
thanks to scientific advances, the ability to collect and examine
genetically relevant material from the scene of a crime has proven
to be an extremely useful and effective investigative tool.
Notwithstanding the undisputable usefulness of these activities,
the major cause of concern in the American environment (and
others) is the now widespread police practice of collecting and
analyzing samples of abandoned DNA, which are used not only to
investigate a current case, but also may be used in future or
potential investigations. 114

111. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 48.
112. See supra note 42, and the corresponding text.
113. In this regard, see the contents of Section 1.
114. The collection of abandoned DNA is a very useful method of
investigation since the samples of human tissue are readily accessible and, since
they can be taken without the subject's knowledge, this same cannot raise any
question or objection in regards to it. In this regard, the American culture
denotes the existence of multiple collection techniques. The most frequently
used is the one by which the investigators limit themselves to taking a DNA
sample from the traces of biologic material left by the individual (since it can be
found, for examples, on items used daily). In other instances, this is
accomplished by more ingenious methods. Seattle Police, for example,
suspected an individual of killing a young lady, but did not have enough
evidence to request a warrant. In order to obtain a sample from him, and
compare it with one taken from the crime scene, they resorted to a ploy: they
mailed a letter written on a non-existing attorney's office letterhead that
encouraged individuals to join in a class action lawsuit against municipal
authorities for the purpose of obtaining funds allegedly overpaid to them; in
order to join, the individual had to fill out a form, put it in a pre-addressed
enclosed envelope and mail it back to the sender. Thanks to the saliva left the
envelope flap, the police got the DNA sample they needed, and after the two
samples were compared, the suspect was convicted of second degree murder.
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This topic currently poses serious constitutional problems,
especially since the Federal and State criminal justice regulations
are silent on this point. If, as already ascertained, the acquisition
and storage of an individual’s DNA samples–within the mentioned
limits–is to be disciplined by a set of rules of different rankings
that prescribe specific attributes of form and substance, then
abandoned DNA does not seem to belong to any of the currently
established constitutional and legislative categories. 115
In this respect, it was noted that this phenomenon was partially
due to a terminological error.
Juridical implications and
terminological concerns are intrinsically connected since the
applicable legislative regime varies with the denomination
attributed to the matter. As a result, it was argued that abandoned
DNA could be freely collected and stored because it did not fall
under the provisions of the Fourth Amendment. Its collection, in
fact, did not constitute a search in the technical sense. That theory
is supported by two ruling cases.
In first place, the asset could not be covered by the
constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment because the
contrary criteria applied by the US Supreme Court in Katz, 116
could be applied. According to this ruling, anything that
individuals willingly choose to make public, even from within their
homes or offices, falls outside the scope of protection. 117
The applicability of this form of protection would also be
invalidated by the status legally awarded to DNA after it is
discarded among refuse. In this case the same principle expressed
by the court in the California v. Greenwood 118 ruling would
become applicable. According to the ruling, there can be no
reasonable expectation of privacy in regards to goods that can be
readily accessed by anyone due to the fact that they have been
placed in a public place, with the intent to dispose of them. As can
be recalled, a direct consequence of the court's reasoning was that

On this point, Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth
Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 857 (2006).
115. Curley & Caperna, supra note 35, according to which this type of
material raises new questions in regards to the protection of privacy rights.
116. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
117. See supra note 72, and the corresponding text.
118. See supra, note 76, and the corresponding text.
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trash could be classified as being res derelicta, and as such be
claimed by third parties.
In both cases, therefore, abandoned DNA would fail to pass the
reasonable expectation of privacy test. Both theories have been
criticized. In first place, it was emphasized that renouncement of
the Fourth Amendment rights, according to the ruling rendered by
the court in Katz, presupposed that the goods were “consciously”
exposed to the public. In the instance of abandoned DNA, this
phenomenon would be totally involuntary and unavoidable.
Further, as far as the general circumstances are concerned, it could
be said that this is also an “unconscious” phenomenon. Although
it is common knowledge that hair is shed or that saliva traces can
be left on flatware and glasses, the same cannot be said of the
awareness that DNA samples can be extracted from it nor, a
fortiori, does it seem reasonable to presume that the massive
amounts of information that can be extracted from this material, or
that the extent of its possible uses, 119 are matters of common
knowledge.
Closely tied to the first objection is the argument that supports
the second. Without the element of conscious choice, the
equivalency between abandoned DNA and trash is deprived of any
logical or juridical basis. In fact, while in the case of trash the
animus derelinquendi can be implicitly deduced by the act of
abandoning it in a place where it is likely to be collected by third
parties (and therefore this would result in a loss of rights thereto),
the same cannot be said in regards to biologic material that an
individual inadvertently drops along his path. 120
The question of the intent required for a good to be deemed res
derelicta has been analyzed and elaborated upon by Italian
doctrine as well. Specifically, besides some differences of opinion
concerning elements of secondary importance, it was more or less
unanimously agreed that, in order for an item to be considered
abandoned–with the consequent loss of inherent rights–it must be

119. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 48, at 438.
120. In United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the
Court ruled that “in order to determine if an instance of “abandonment” is
relevant in accordance with the IV Amendment, the Court must focus on the
indent of the individual who is said to have abandoned said object.”
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accompanied by the conscious decision to do so on an individual's
part. 121
It also seems that another consideration may be added. Saying
that a person may appropriate someone else's biological material
(for example a Marilyn Monroe fan that picked up a piece of the
diva's hair from the path she trod and kept it as a relic) is one thing,
but it is vastly different from a situation that involves actually
analyzing said material in order to extract from it the juridically
distinct “asset” represented by the genetic inheritance contained
therein. 122 A great part of the debate unleashed by this event, as
we were saying, focused on the exact qualification and
denomination to be attributed to “abandoned DNA,” in view of the
inappropriate and ambiguous nature of that expression.
In this regard, several suggestions were made. One proposal
suggests considering this type of DNA as being the equivalent to
fingerprints, and applying to the first the same legislative rules that
regulate the second. 123 This option does not however appear to be
121. Worthy of reference: 1 G. Branca, ENC. DEL DIR. 3 (1958), v.
Abbandono (derelictio) (“Abandonment always has two aspects: the material
and the spiritual", this last specifically defines the animus derelinquendi); G.
Deiana, v. Abbandono (Private Law), id. at 5 (“abandonment is commonly
perceived as being the action of an owner who discards something with the
intent to renounce his dominion over it "); 5 S. Romano, NOVISS. DIG. IT. 546
(1960), v. Derelictio,
This material detachment from something, this total discontinuation of
any relationships with it, will then constitute derelictio as it represented
the actuation of the will to lose dominion over it. Chronologically,
therefore, this will is a prius, but it does not become effective until after
it translates into an actual act of abandonment.
Lastly, a contrario, 29 A. Trabucchi, ENC. DEL DIR. 618-621 (1979), v.
Occupazione (Private Law) (“the two elements that render the activity an actual
establishment of ownership are the initial possession and the animus
occupandi;” said affirmation correlates with the preceding declaration of the
Amendment, as far as the type of goods that would qualify as relevant matter
"another category expressly referenced by the code as meeting the applicability
requirements is the res derelictae. And, since it repeats the traditional doctrine
in the matter, these things do not qualify unless the action of derelictio was
accompanied by the intention of abandoning the rights on the subject matter
(animus derelinquendi);” finally “the existence of animus derelinquendi must be
presumed in order to qualify the object as having been subjected to this action”
and “the animus derelinquendi must be intended as being a specific orientation
towards the renouncement of the rights held over the object”).
122. In this regard, see the considerations expressed in Section 1.
123. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 48.
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satisfactory since, although it is true that a fingerprint can be traced
back to an individual, it is also true that this does not contain a set
of genetic information that pertains directly to the core traits of a
human being’s identity. After the investigative purposes are
exhausted, the potential usefulness of a fingerprint tends to
decrease. 124
Another proposal suggests considering DNA equivalent to the
body and its parts, giving the owner property rights over these
“assets.” 125 The topic, as is noted in the previous paragraph, is
highly debatable because it poses challenges of philosophical,
moral, and religious relevance. Also, this option seems to be
hindered by the regulations concerning the matter of organ
transplants, since generally the individual is acknowledged as
having a quasi-property right on these body parts. 126
The extremely controversial nature of the issue has left some
people with the belief that the relationship between the individual,
his body and body parts has been dropped in a sort of “judicial
limbo.” 127 In consideration of this, part of the doctrine brought
forth the proposal to qualify the DNA of an individual as a separate
juridical item, altogether distinguished from any other item and as
such subject to a juridical ad hoc discipline, which would allow
courts to take into consideration the totally peculiar nature of it (as
proposed by the genetic exceptionalism doctrine). 128 This option
also makes the distinction between human tissue and the genetic
information therein contained, and properly accounts for the
complex implications that accompany that type of information. 129
However, it must be warned that nowadays the genetic
exceptionalism approach seems to have lost some ground within
the American debate, in the light of the strong limits to the
development of scientific research which would result from it.
124. After reaching its future potential, the fingerprint will be able to reveal
if a subject has a criminal record or not.
125. See for example Michael J. Lin, Conferring a Federal Property Right
in Genetic Material: Stepping into the Future with the Genetic Privacy Act, 22
AM. J. L. AND MED. 109 (1996).
126. Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L.
REV. 359 (2000).
127. Id. at 375.
128. For further considerations on the matter, see McLochlin, supra note
34.
129. Harlan, supra note 40, at 194.
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The attempt to correctly qualify abandoned DNA also took
place from a terminological standpoint. The question was
confronted directly in Australia, more specifically by the State of
Victoria. The residents of which demanded legislation to prevent
investigative authorities from conducting covert DNA sampling,
due to the authorities' tendency to avail themselves of objects used
on a daily basis in order to obtain from them DNA samples for
their investigative purposes. In this case, expressions such as
“abandoned DNA” were deliberately avoided in consideration of
the juridical implications associated with the term
“abandonment.” 130
In view of the above determination, in the US, it was then
proposed to name abandoned DNA covert involuntary DNA
sampling, to emphasize the absence of any voluntary characteristic
in the subject matter. 131
D. The Issue of the “Biological Group”
The doctrine that postulates to use legislative measures based
on the recognition of property rights in the matter of genetic
information, denounces the inadequacy of the privacy doctrine.
This is also due to a peculiar characteristic of that type of data: the
set of genetic information is common to multiple individuals, by
virtue of a close blood tie.
The scope of genetic information then involves not only just a
single individual, but a plurality of subjects, whom, due to sharing
that tie, form a “biological group.” For example, members of that
group would include ancestors and descendents but not spouses,
due to the absence of a common blood tie with these last. The
biological group, therefore, does not exactly align with the family
nucleus. 132
The magnitude of the issue manifested itself within the
American juridical system thanks to some comparative 133 research
that mentioned a decision rendered by the Supreme Court of
130. The information is reported in Joh, supra note 114, at 882.
131. Id.
132. On the “biological group,” see Denbo, supra note 95, at 564.
133. Recently, Hrobjartur Jonatansson, Iceland’s Health Sector Database:
A significant Head Start in the Search for the Biological Grail or an Irreversible
Error?, 26 AM. J. LAW AND MED. 31 (2000).

2008]

THE PROTECTION OF GENETIC IDENTITY

185

Iceland. 134 In 1998, the Parliament of Iceland enacted a law
authorizing the creation of a centralized, non-identity specific
database. This would be used for collecting and archiving medical
data, in order to promote new (or perfect currently existing)
methods of diagnosis, prevention and treatment of multiple
illnesses. 135
More specifically, in order to facilitate early
prevention and diagnosis, it was deemed proper to include in the
database encoded versions of the medical history of all of the
citizens of Iceland (both living and deceased), that had not
expressly exercised their right to prevent their personal records
from being included in said database (called the opt-out clause). It
was also decided that the data could be connected to that of other
databases that contained genealogic and genetic information. 136
Two years after the law was instituted, the guardian of a fifteen
year old girl whose father had passed away, in accordance with the
lawful right to prevent the collection and archiving of personal
information, asked the authorities to omit the records of the
deceased father from the database. The request was denied on the
basis that the law did not expressly allow for an individual to use
the opt-out clause in regards to the genetic information of a
deceased parent. The event became a legal controversy. The
plaintiff maintained that she held a juridically relevant interest over
the subject matter. If her parent's genetic information was not
omitted from the database, her own current and future state of
health could be gleaned from that data; this information could
potentially cause future discrimination against her. The verdict
rejected the argument on the basis of the encoded and non-identity
specific nature of the data.
134. Guomundsdottir v. Iceland, No. 151/2003, November 27th, 2003
(Ice.), reported in Recent Cases, Icelandic Supreme Court Holds That Inclusion
of an Individual’s Genetic Information in a National Database Infringes on the
Privacy Interests of His Child, 118 HARV. L. REV. 810 (2004).
135. Act on a Health Sector Database, No. 139/1998 (Ice), the English text
http://eng.heilbrigdisraduneyti.is/laws-andversion
available
at
regulations/nr/659 (last visited November 6, 2008).
136. Id. at sect. IV, art. 10. But also look at the critical observations
expressed by on the matter by Jonatansson, supra note 133, at 31, which
underline how, as a result of said practice, Iceland became the only Country in
the world that has authorized a private company to collect and store the genetic
legacy of an entire population, with inter alia of the right to use said genetic
patrimony as object of commercialization.
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The Supreme Court of Iceland however revised the decision,
affirming that: (i) the plaintiff did have a juridically relevant
interest in the matter; (ii) said request seemed to be in accordance
with the dispositions of the Icelandic Constitution; (iii) the original
court had failed to recognize that the natural traits of the subject
matter made the personal privacy right applicable to more than a
single individual; and (iv) the encoded nature of the data was not
sufficient to guarantee adequate protection of the rights of the
individuals involved. The most personal and intimate data of an
individual could in fact be deduced from the contents of the
associated genealogic and genetic databases. 137
The focal point of the verdict is that, for the first time, an
individual was acknowledged legal rights over the genetic
information of another person. Along those lines, part of the
American 138 doctrine asserts that the current configuration of
American privacy law provisions, which are structured over a
strictly individualistic concept of private information, and the fact
that the nature of genetic information is common to a group and
not merely to a single individual, property laws may better serve as
a paradigm to ensure that a greater level of protection is provided
for information that belongs to all of the individuals involved. 139
Once more, the malleability and flexibility of the concept of
property would allow confronting the issues derived from the state
of co-division of said sensitive data among individuals.
Particularly it is sustained that, as far as the characteristics of the
subject matter are concerned, the regulations pertaining to the
theme of joint ownership (joint tenancy, co-ownership) could be
applied. These norms in fact would allow disciplining potential
conflicts among individuals that hold the same right, as well as
137. Recent Cases, supra note 134, at 811-812.
138. From the latest, Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal
Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055 (2004).
139. Contra. see Denbo, supra note 95, who favors applying the
confidential relationship criteria, by which doctors should reveal confidential
information to the family members of the patient only with the express consent
of this last, while they should abstain from revealing the information if it
ascertains the presence of a terminal illness: this would be justified by the fact
that the right to privacy of each biological group member also implies the right
of remaining uninformed. The same, however, admits that it would be difficult
to actuate this distinction without first establishing a criterion by which to define
in which cases information could be disclosed, or not.
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exert control over cases pertaining to the ownership of genetically
shared material. 140
With reference to such an issue, for example, the Italian Civil
Code provides criterion in order to manage the relationships
among co-owners with regard to the owned good; it requires
different types of majorities according to the effect which the
decision that has to be taken will have on the good. In particular, it
might require a simple majority, a qualified one, or even a
unanimous decision depending upon how such a decision will
affect the good and the relevant ownership right. For example, the
unanimity of vote is required for the destruction of the good. 141
But, if these rules on one side could provide for such relationships,
on the other side they do not appear to be a so efficient tool
because of the objective difficulty to apply them in a real situation
involving DNA samples stored in a databank. In addition, the
application of the property paradigm to the phenomenon of the
biological group appears to be problematic with regard to a further
issue: the potential conflicts among members of the same group.
The risk that a member of such group might not be interested in
being aware of his/her genetic characteristics and genetic future
because such an awareness would affect in a negative way his/her
life without procuring any benefit at all, especially with reference
to the “mono-factorial” diseases (i.e. the diseases due to one single
element which can be deemed a sort of “defect” in the genetic
heritage of an individual, and whose development cannot be
avoided or slowed down by adopting, for example, a healthier style
of life). On the contrary, another member of the same group might
be very interested in being aware about the same genetic data, for
example for procreation purposes. About such not-so uncommon
scenarios, a solution could be that of recognizing the equal value of
both interests and therefore to grant the power and the task to
ensure the respect of both interests to a competent authority (for
example, a National Health System Authority) which should
ensure and enforce the right of the first person not to be informed
but, at the same time, the right of the latter to receive full
information. In addition, that competent authority should adopt all
the measures in order to avoid the dissemination of such data. As
it appears at first sight, such a proposal would be very difficult to
140. Recent Cases, supra note 134, at 816-817.
141. Italian Civil Code, arts. 1105 & 1108.
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manage and, on the other side, it would evoke the risk of a sort of
Leviathan, a super-entity entitled to control and manage all data
pertaining to the whole society, and to individuals on their own. 142
CONCLUSION
As can be noted from the previously discussed characteristics
of the subject matter, the protection of genetic information is yet to
be defined. In this regard, the major source of concern appears to
be the need to reassess the traditionally assigned juridical
categories to ensure that the genetic patrimony of individuals is
protected by thorough and effective legislative measures. The
initial tendency appears to point towards regulating genetic
information with measures that may be adjusted according to the
specifics of the context, with the option to choose, as needed,
which of the two doctrines may better serve to effectively protect
this type of information. But, again, the above mentioned appears
to be only one of the possible options to properly address such an
issue which, for the strict interdependency of moral and economic
reasons, in our opinion deserves to be analyzed and discussed indepth, in order to try to find a balance between distinct, and
sometimes conflicting, interests.

142. For further remarks about such an issue, see Carlo Augusto Viano, La
transizione genetica, RIVISTA BIMESTRALE DI CULTURA E POLITICA 1014-1022
( 2000).

RETHINKING CIVIL-LAW TAXONOMY:
PERSONS, THINGS, AND THE PROBLEM OF
DOMAT’S MONSTER
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Since the time of Gaius, whose Institutes divided private law
into persons, things, and actions, the categories of persons and
things have enjoyed an implicit (and sometimes explicit) primacy
as the summa divisio within the private law. Though the third
category–“actions” in Gaius and Justinian, today reinterpreted as
“obligations” or “ways of acquiring property” 1 –has by now
perhaps outstripped the others, “persons” and “things” continue to
have pride of place in civil codes, and by setting up legal subjects
and legal objects, respectively, they make possible the law of
obligations in which persons and things interact.
Gaius’ structure–and its implicit hierarchy–has cast a long
It still provides the basic architecture of
shadow. 2
the civil law–sometimes explicitly, 3
sometimes
more
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I would like to thank Olivier Moréteau for inviting me to present these ideas
at the Civil Law Workshop at LSU, and the workshop participants for the
discussion that ensued. My arguments also greatly benefited from the comments
and suggestions of Jean-Guy Belley, Nicholas Kasirer, David Lametti, Rod
Macdonald, Desmond Manderson, and Shannon McSheffrey.
Earlier
unpublished versions of this article were awarded prizes by the Fondation du
Barreau du Québec, the Quebec chapter of the Association Henri Capitant, and
the Association des professeures et professeurs de droit du Québec, and I thank
these organizations for their recognition and financial support.
1. See Peter Stein, The Quest for a Systematic Civil Law, 90 PROC. BRIT.
ACAD.: LECTURES & MEMOIRS 147, 156-57 (1995) (discussing the early-modern
developments). In what follows I will use the term “obligations” except in cases
where the historical category “actions” is specifically meant.
2. See generally Donald R. Kelley, Gaius noster: Substructures of Western
Social Thought, 84 AM. HIST. REV. 619 (1979).
3. For example in Books 1-3 of the French Code civil (Des personnes; Des
biens et des différentes modifications de la propriété, Des différentes manières
dont on acquiert la propriété) or Books 1-3 of the Louisiana Civil Code (Of
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subtly 4 –and for this reason it is unlikely to disappear any time
soon. Even in the common law, the influence of this structure is
evident in Blackstone’s Commentaries and in the recent English
Private Law, to name just two examples. 5 My purpose in what
follows is recast the dichotomy between persons and things as a
problem not of classification (what goes where) but of the
construction and function of legal categories as normative spaces
within which classification takes place. To do this, I think we need
to replace a static view of legal categories as discrete pigeonholes
with a dynamic view that emphasizes their interactions. This idea
of interaction is crucial, I will argue, since legal categories do not
exist in analytical isolation. Rather, they are in tension with each
other, their fluid and contingent boundaries continually being
renegotiated, with meaning coming out of this process of give and
take. Human interactions themselves are inconceivably complex–
what William James called a “great blooming, buzzing
confusion” 6 –and a static view of legal categories as boxes labeled
“persons,” “things,” and “obligations” belies this complexity. My
point is that the blurring of the boundaries between categories is
not a failure of taxonomy, but a valuable tool for enriching legal
analysis and bringing it into closer alignment with human
experience. 7
Two puzzles of categorization–one recent, the other historical–
can serve to introduce and illustrate my point about the importance
of an interactive understanding of legal categories.
Both

Persons; Things and the Different Modifications of Ownership; Of the Different
Modes of Acquiring the Ownership of Things).
4. For example in the General Part of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (which
begins with the divisions Persons, Things/Animals, and Legal Transactions) or
in the Preliminary Provision of the Civil Code of Québec (“The Civil Code of
Québec, in harmony with the Charter of human rights and freedoms and the
general principles of law, governs persons, relations between persons, and
property”).
5. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
(1765-69) (1979); ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW (Peter Birks ed., 2000).
6. 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 462 (Frederick H.
Burkhardt et al. eds., 1981).
7. See generally STEPHEN WADDAMS, DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE LAW:
CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL REASONING (2003)
(discussing blurring and overlapping of categories in judicial reasoning in the
common law).
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underscore some of the difficulties in negotiating the boundary
between persons and things by putting into the foreground the
constructed and hence normative nature of legal categories.
The first puzzle comes from an unusual news story.8 John
Wood of South Carolina failed to make payments at a self-storage
facility, and found his possessions had been sold at auction in
North Carolina. Another man, Shannon Whisnant, purchased a
barbeque smoker at the auction, and found when he brought it
home that it contained a dried-out, severed human leg–Wood’s leg,
in fact, which he had lost in a plane crash some years before, had
hung on his fence to dry out, and was keeping so he could be
cremated with it after his death. Whisnant, who said he was
“freaked out” by his find, called the police, who confiscated the
leg. But Whisnant quickly had second thoughts, realizing, a bit
belatedly, the profit potential. With Halloween coming, he began
charging people for a peek inside the now empty smoker, $3 for
adults, $1 for children, and he sought to reclaim the leg to improve
gate receipts.
The dispute quickly became legalized, with each side groping
for legal vocabulary to characterize claims that fell into the gray
area between persons and property. Whisnant asserted a property
right, claiming that since he had bought the smoker and its
contents, he was now rightful owner of the leg. Wood on the other
hand called this “despicable,” and asserted a personhood claim: the
leg–though currently detached–was integral to his plans for postmortem bodily reunification. 9 Sensing trouble–he no longer had
the leg, remember–Whisnant suggested a joint custody
arrangement, the details of which unfortunately did not make it
into the papers, but which in any case Wood refused. The police
sided with Wood, but on property rather than personhood grounds.
They gave him back his leg because, by their way of thinking,
“The guy don’t have a leg to stand on:” Whisnant had given up
ownership when he surrendered the leg to the police. 10 In the end,
perhaps inevitably, the affair left behind the realms of personhood
8. Up in arms over a leg, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, October 4th, 2007, at A2.
9. In many ways this is a real-life analogue of the hypothetical “case of the
stolen hand” discussed in JEAN-PIERRE BAUD, L’AFFAIRE DE LA MAIN VOLÉE:
UNE HISTOIRE JURIDIQUE DU CORPS 9-16 (1993).
10. Amputee gets leg, princess wins case, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, October
6th, 2007, at A2.
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and property for a different branch of law: obligations and
contract, as the parties agreed to settle their dispute before the
cameras in the television courtroom of Judge Greg Mathis. 11
Judge Mathis opted for personhood, or did he? Wood got his leg
back, but Mathis ordered Wood to reimburse Whisnant $5,000 for
the cost of the leg. 12
My second puzzle is more serious in intent but it touches the
same problem of the tension, even the competition, between the
categories of persons and things. It comes from the seventeenthcentury French jurist Jean Domat. In his 1689 treatise The Civil
Law in Its Natural Order, in the course of his discussion of the
status of persons resulting from nature (rather than from law),
Domat lists a number of liminal states to illustrate particular
analytical problems. 13 Domat’s list includes children born dead,
children still in the womb, premature children, posthumous
children, hermaphrodites, eunuchs, the insane (Les Insensez), the
completely deaf and mute, and those suffering dementia or other
mental deficiencies (Ceux qui sont en démence, & dans ces autres
imbécillitez). The list ends, however–most interestingly–with
“monsters that do not have human form” (Les monstres qui n’ont
pas la forme humaine). Domat writes: 14
Monsters that do not have human form are not considered
to be persons, nor are they counted as the children of those
who give birth to them. But those that have the essentials
of human form and just have something extra or something
missing count like other children.
Although monsters that do not have human form are not
considered to be persons nor to be children, they count as
such with respect to their parents, and they are counted
among their children for the purposes of any privileges or
11. Eric Connor, TV judge to decide who gets amputated leg, USA TODAY,
October 10th, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/offbeat/200710-10-amputated-leg_N.htm (last visited Novemeber 6, 2008).
12. TV judge rules South Carolina man can keep amputated leg, but must
pay $5,000, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, November 1st, 2007, available
www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/01/america/NA-ODD-US-Abandonedat
Leg.php (last visited Novemeber 6, 2008).
13. 1 JEAN DOMAT, LES LOIX CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL 11-13
(Luxembourg: André Chevalier, 1702). The list that follows translates as
directly as possible Domat’s terminology.
14. Id. at 13 (author’s translation).
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exemptions granted to fathers or mothers according to the
number of children.
Both Domat’s monster and Wood’s leg are taxonomic puzzles
because they fall squarely between our categories of “persons” and
“things.” Wood’s leg clearly has a dual nature–a money-making
commodity to Whisnant, a severed part of himself to Wood.
Domat’s monster, though it appears in the discussion of persons, is
explicitly not a person, but a taxonomic riddle that challenges the
integrity of legal categories and the binary either/or classificatory
decisions that taxonomy is normally held to require. I would like
to leave aside the severed leg for the time being and look more
closely at the problem of Domat’s monster and its implications for
our understanding of the workings of legal taxonomy.
Domat is not alone in his discussion of monsters. In his
Commentaries on the Laws of England, for example, Blackstone
writes:
A MONSTER, which hath not the shape of mankind, but in
any part evidently bears the resemblance of the brute
creation, hath no inheritable blood, and cannot be heir to
any land, albeit it be brought forth in marriage: but,
although it hath deformity in any part of its body, yet if it
hath human shape, it may be heir. This is a very ancient
rule in the law of England; and its reason is too obvious,
and too shocking, to bear a minute discussion. 15
Blackstone’s modestly veiled reference at the end of this
passage is fleshed out by his source, Bracton, writing in the more
brazen 13th century:
Who may and may not be called children and reckoned as
such. Those born of unlawful intercourse, as out of
adultery and the like, are not reckoned among children, nor
those procreated perversely, against the way of human
kind, as where a woman brings forth a monster or a
prodigy. 16

15. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at book 2, chap. 15 (vol. 2 at 246-47)
[orthography modernized].
16. 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF
ENGLAND 31 (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans. 1968-77).
Blackstone also cites Coke, who repeats Bracton’s remarks. See EDWARD
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Ultimately, all these discussions trace back to Justinian’s
Digest, where both Paul and Ulpian discuss the status of monstrous
births, 17 and beyond that to the Laws of the Twelve Tables, which
stated (characteristically laconically) that “a dreadfully deformed
child shall be killed.” 18 The evident discomfort behind these
remarks relates to long popular traditions regarding unusual births–
for example conjoined twins. On the one hand, such children were
historically associated with presumptions of the sexual impropriety
of their parents, specifically with bestiality. On the other hand
they were held to be portents of disaster and divine disfavor. 19
Clearly, popular opinion, at least, put the monster’s status as a
human being in doubt, and the law followed suit in its hesitance to
treat such children as persons.

COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A
COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 7.b, 29.b (Francis Hargrave & Charles Butler
eds., 1853).
17. Dig. 1.5.14, in THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN (Alan Watson trans. & ed.,
1985):
Paul, Views, book 4: Not included in the class of children are those
abnormally procreated in a shape totally different from human form, for
example, if a woman brings forth some kind of monster or prodigy.
But any offspring which has more than the natural number of limbs
used by man may in a sense be said to be fully formed, and will
therefore be counted among children.
Dig. 50.16.135, id.:
Ulpian, Lex Julia et Papia, book 4: Someone will ask, if a woman has
given birth to someone unnatural, monstrous or weak or something
which in appearance or voice is unprecedented, not of human
appearance, but some other offspring of an animal rather than of a man,
whether she should benefit, since she gave birth. And it is better that
even a case like this should benefit the parents; for there are no grounds
for penalizing them because they observed such statutes as they could,
nor should loss be forced on the mother because things turned out ill.
18. XII. Tab. 4.1, in 3 REMAINS OF OLD LATIN 441 (E.H. Warmington
trans., 1961).
19. See David Cressy, Monstrous Births and Credible Reports: Portents,
Texts, and Testimonies, in TRAVESTIES AND TRANSGRESSIONS IN TUDOR AND
STUART ENGLAND: TALES OF DISCORD AND DISSENSION 29 (2000); ZAKIYA
HANAFI, THE MONSTER IN THE MACHINE: MAGIC, MEDICINE, AND THE
MARVELOUS IN THE TIME OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (2000); and DUDLEY
WILSON, SIGNS AND PORTENTS: MONSTROUS BIRTHS FROM THE MIDDLE AGES
TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1993).
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Domat’s monster is something of a test case, an exception to
prove the rule. It is a problem deliberately posed because it
challenges categories, while at the same time having a certain
practical importance. 20 But how does the monster fit into Gaius’
paradigm of persons-things-obligations, a structure that underlies
the work of all of these authors? Domat, in treating the monster
under persons, follows the Digest, which puts the main discussion
of the case of the monster under the title “Human Status,” thus
emphasizing the monster’s nature. Blackstone, however, puts the
monster in his book on the rights of things; he is less concerned
with what the monster is than with what the monster can and
cannot do (namely, inherit). This point is crucial: where we start
the analysis in large measure determines where it will end up.
Domat gives us some hints as to taxonomy by bringing forward
issues that remain implicit in his Roman sources. Following Paul,
he says specifically that monstrous births that do not have human
form “are not considered to be persons” and are not counted as the
children of those who bear them. 21 Those with “the essentials of
human form,” by contrast, are considered to be the children of their
parents, though Domat does not say whether or not they are legally
reputed to be persons (most likely they would be). Again
following the Digest, this time Ulpian, Domat recognizes the
difficulty of this position, since such children “count as [children]
with respect to their parents,” and so they are considered to be their
children for the purposes of privileges and exemptions dependent
on the number of offspring. 22
At this point Domat breaks from his Roman sources and adds a
footnote that changes the terms of the question. He notes, “We can
add, as another explanation for this rule, that these monsters are a
20. As is amply demonstrated today by the difficult moral, legal, and ethical
issues raised by the separation of conjoined twins. See the fascinating English
case Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) No. 1, [2000]
H.R.L.R. 721 (England, C.A.). For commentary on this case, see especially
George J. Annas, The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life: Lessons from
Cannibalism, Euthanasia, Abortion, and the Court-Ordered Killing of One
Conjoined Twin to Save the Other, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1275 (2001); the
symposium in 9:3 MED. L. REV. (Autumn 2001); and ALICE DOMURAT DREGER,
ONE OF US: CONJOINED TWINS AND THE FUTURE OF THE NORMAL (2004).
21. DOMAT, supra note 13 at 13. Compare Dig. 50.16.135, which suggests
the opposite.
22. DOMAT, id.
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greater burden than other children.” 23 This note changes the terms
of the discussion in an interesting way, because we get a hint of
exactly what rides on the solution to the taxonomic question of
what the monster is. Domat’s footnote moves us in a very
different direction: it presents a situational definition of the person
that points out the tensions between taxonomy and the social
function–in this case the human needs–of what is being classified.
I will come back to this point shortly.
Still, we have not answered the question: if these children that
our pre-modern forebears viewed as monstrous are not persons (or
if they are persons only imperfectly and for specific purposes,
rather like slaves in the antebellum American South), 24 what are
they? According to the logic of Gaius’ schema, they must fit
somewhere, since the tripartite division is an exhaustive structuring
of the private law–as Gaius put it, “All our law is about persons,
things or actions.” 25 These children would seem not to be things,
which Domat defines as “everything that God created for man,” 26
but since Domat divides things into those in commerce and those
not in commerce, perhaps monsters without human form (and also
Wood’s severed leg?) might be things not in commerce. 27 Indeed,
there is evidence that in England parents or others sometimes
exhibited such children for profit, and these cases periodically
came before the courts of common law or Equity. Though not
23. Id. at 13 n. x (On peut ajoûter, pour une autre raison de cette regle, que
ces monstres sont plus à charge que ne sont les autres enfans). This point
occurs neither in the Digest nor in its medieval gloss, and seems to have
originated with Domat. It occurs regularly in the other editions of Domat I have
examined–for example in (Paris: Aux dépens de la Société, 1745), vol. 1, p. 13
and (Paris: Nyon, 1777), vol. 1, p. 19–but confirmation of its origins must await
further study of the earliest editions of the work.
24. Slaves were non-persons in some situations, persons in others, threefifths persons in still others. See Malick W. Ghachem, The Slave’s Two Bodies:
The Life of an American Legal Fiction, 60 WM. & MARY Q. 809 (2003).
25. G. 1.8, in THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS 23 (W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson
trans., 1988).
26. DOMAT, supra note 13 at 16 (tout ce que Dieu a creé [sic] pour
l’homme).
27. Compare BAUD, supra note 9 at 78-88 (arguing that the human body
should be considered a thing not in commerce rather than a person). Baud cites
the Digest on monsters as well; id. at 71. See generally ISABELLE MOINE, LES
CHOSES HORS COMMERCE: UNE APPROCHE DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE JURIDIQUE
(1997); and Grégoire Loiseau, Typologie des choses hors du commerce, 2000
REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 47.
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surprisingly the courts did not deal explicitly with the question of
classification (though as always the issues are there, in the
background), the results suggest that these children were viewed as
being outside the market, for moral if not taxonomic reasons. In
the 1682 Chancery case Herring v. Walround, for example, a
“monstrous birth” (conjoined twin girls) was shown to the public
for money, and the exhibition continued even after the children
died. The Chancellor reportedly “most disliked these Doings” and
ordered the body (bodies?) buried forthwith. 28 Treating Domat’s
monster as a thing–even a thing not in commerce–would however
seem to be at odds with Domat’s remarks about the esteem of the
parents and the care that such children require, which point in a
different direction, towards the language of relationship and
obligation, and thus to the third branch of Gaius’ schema. While
the monster is not itself an obligation (though how do we
conceptualize obligations without in part reifying them?), it clearly
engages that aspect of the law. By its very nature the monster
embodies dependence on others (its parents, society more
generally), and so it elicits bonds of relationship and
interconnectedness that call for a situational understanding that is
at odds with the more ontological analysis characteristic of the
categories of persons and things.
The examples of the monster and the severed leg illustrate the
difficulty in isolating and circumscribing the physical world (not to
mention the world of human interactions) so as to make it fit neatly
into a single preordained category. Domat’s monster is neither a
person nor a thing nor an obligation, and yet it is all three at the
same time. Wherever we might put it, it reaches into (or holds
onto) the other categories, claiming aspects of all of them. Even
concentrating on the summa divisio of the paradigm and limiting
the choices to either a thinglike person or a personlike thing is
insufficient, since as Domat indicates the relations between such a
child and others are crucial to its nature. Moreover, the monster
simply points out in starker relief what is true also for everything
we subject to legal analysis: in different aspects and from different
points of view everything partakes of all three categories, and so
defies the neat categorization that Gaius’ schema as classically
conceptualized demands.
28. Herring v. Walround (1682), 2 Chan. Cas. 110, 22 E.R. 870 (England,
Ch.) (“A monstrous Birth shown for Money, a Misdemeanor”).
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I would like to turn now to a closer examination of Gaius’
schema and the function it and legal categories more generally
serve in the civil law. Gaius divided the world of private law into
persons, things, and actions, and in so doing he created the three
fundamental categories of the civil law. But by this he also–and
this is my point in what follows–necessarily posited the existence
of boundaries between the categories–points of contact where one
category gives way to another. Categories have a seductive effect,
however: like black holes, they tend to pull things towards their
centers, leaving their edges, as well as their interactions with their
neighbors, as ill-defined areas of discomfort. In what follows, I
want to turn attention away from the middles of the categories and
focus instead on the boundaries between them. In so doing, I hope
to shift our understanding of legal classification away from a
process of binary, either/or decisions that place material in the
appropriate pigeonhole and towards a more dynamic model that
emphasizes the interactions between categories such as “persons”
and “things.” I am particularly interested in the possibilities of
rethinking the category of persons, since I believe it has not been
given its due, at least in part because it tends to be on the losing
side of binary taxonomic decisions. Exploring the dynamic
interactions between categories can, I think, reclaim a space for the
person against encroachments by its neighboring categories, while
at the same time add dimensions to the concept of the person that
have been underemphasized or ignored in the law. Since the civil
law is an integrated system, rethinking persons necessarily
involves rethinking things and obligations, as we will see, though I
leave it to others to explore these implications.
I. BOUNDARIES
Gaius’ taxonomy privileges a view that something must fit into
one and only one of the categories, and distinct sets of rules are
engaged and different legal actions made possible depending on
where something is put. Since the system is exhaustive, Domat’s
monster, for instance, must be either a person, or a thing, or an
obligation. No fourth option exists (like the categories “others” or
“et cetera” beloved of common lawyers), 29 and no straddling of
boundaries is possible. This is not to say classificatory problems
29. See WADDAMS, supra note 7, at 11-12.
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do not exist. Roman jurists long ago pointed out difficulties–
Ulpian, for example, noted that the household partook of both
persons and things, depending on the point of view from which it
is examined. 30 More recently, we can point to the examples of the
corporation–which can be seen as a person in status, as a thing in
relation to its shareholders, and as a nexus of contracts
organizationally 31 –or of profitable biotechnological innovations
derived from the human body. 32
The logic of legal classification is still however largely driven
by an understanding of the boundaries between categories as clear
lines necessitating either/or choices–difficult choices, to be sure,
but choices nonetheless. We see this in the logic of civil codes,
which locate different issues in distinct books, and in legal
education, which in the civil law world usually mirrors the
structure of codes and treats persons, things, and obligations in
separate courses and in separate textbooks. The effect of this is to
keep the categories conceptually insulated from one another:
viewing them as boxes within which to file legal data puts the
emphasis on difference rather than on overlap and connection.
In the case of Gaius’ schema, the tendency is to view it
according to the structure of Gaius’ Institutes, and so as a series of
binary oppositions arranged in a linear fashion, first persons then
things and finally actions (now obligations):
Persons

Things

Obligations

This linear view creates two interfaces between categories, and
scholars have recently begun exploring their implications: the
30. Dig. 50.16.195.1, supra note 17:
Let us consider how the designation of ‘household’ is understood. And
indeed it is understood in various ways; for it relates both to things and
to persons: to things, as, for instance, in the Law of the Twelve Tables
in the words ‘let the nearest agnate have the household.’ The
designation of household, however, refers to persons when the law
speaks of patron and freedman: ‘from that household’ or ‘to that
household;’ and here it is agreed that the law is talking of individual
persons.
31. Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate
Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J.
COMP. L. 583 (1999).
32. E. RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS (1996).
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persons-things interface 33 and the things-obligations interface. 34
This sort of relational thinking is welcome, since it begins to make
Gaius’ static structure more dynamic, but the either/or binary
oppositions in this view are too limited to deal with the sort of
taxonomic mixing that cases like Domat’s monster bring up.
If we loop the linear paradigm around into a circle, we create a
new interface between persons and obligations, which gives us a
place to analyze issues such as the relationships raised in Domat’s
footnote mentioned earlier:

This does not fully solve our problem, however, since the
system still breaks down into a series of binary either/or pairs.
This third–and still shadowy–interface between persons and
obligations is important, even crucial to understanding the system,
since it brings into the analysis issues of relationship that are
otherwise left out. 35 What is needed is a model that incorporates
the multi-valence and fluidity of all three categories, a model that
33. Besides the other contributions to this workshop, see especially
Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?–Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972); Margaret Jane Radin, Property
and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); BAUD, supra note 9; Radhika
Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359 (2000); and
MARGARET DAVIES & NGAIRE NAFFINE, ARE PERSONS PROPERTY? LEGAL
DEBATES ABOUT PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY (2001).
34. E.g. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131
(1970); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001).
35. See the fascinating article by Catherine Labrusse-Riou beginning to
explore this interface: De quelques apports du droit des contrats au droit des
personnes, in ÉTUDES OFFERTES A JACQUES GHESTIN: LE CONTRAT AU DEBUT DU
XXIE SIECLE 499 (Gilles Gouveaux et al. eds., 2001).
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can account for the constantly shifting analytical alliances between
them.
I would like to suggest that we can approach a visualization of
the dynamic view of Gaius’ paradigm that I have in mind if we
think of the private law not as the usual spectrum, nor even as a
circle (with obligations linking back to touch persons), but rather
as a triangle, where classification takes place within the area
enclosed by the triangle, rather than along its perimeter:

Persons

Things

Obligations

This model, I think, makes it clear that Gaius’ schema
represents a closed system, embracing the private law. 36 At the
same time, I believe it provides a more realistic graphical
illustration of the interrelations between all three categories than
does the more familiar linear model.
Each point of the triangle, then, represents one of the
categories, either persons, or things, or obligations. As we move
towards the center of the triangle, we get a more and more
balanced mingling of all three categories–we might think of the
blending of three colors at the center, rather than sharp lines
dividing three zones.
Interactions primarily between two
categories take place close to the sides of the triangle, while
36. The ambiguities and difficulties of classification between public law and
private law are significant in themselves and require analysis, but are beyond the
scope of this article. It seems clear that an interface does exist between private
and public law (one thinks of the fluid boundary between delict and crime, or
between the private and public aspects of fundamental rights and freedoms),
though representing this interface graphically presents challenges (what is the
area outside the private law triangle: public law? non-law? both?).
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relatively unproblematic examples of each category would be close
to the triangle’s points. 37 For example, we might place things
without an owner (such as wild animals) at the extreme point of the
things category–though clearly things and so within the private
law, until occupied by an owner they do not interact with
persons. 38
I do not want to push this kind of structuralist modeling too far,
but I think it does offer at least two heuristic advantages. First, it
brings into play the third interface between persons and
obligations, and so it allows us to bring ideas of interaction and
relationship into our legal concepts of persons and things, rather
than isolating them from these ideas. Second, it makes it clear that
all three of the categories play a role in virtually any classificatory
decision: as I just indicated, it is extremely rare that something
will unproblematically belong to one and only one category,
without influence from the others.
In other words, this model can help move the process of legal
taxonomy away from the empiricism of simple either/or choices
and towards a rhetorical and normative process of constructive and
constitutive interaction between different areas of legal knowledge.
Though binary oppositions might be cognitively easier for the
mind to grasp, the addition of a third option–particularly one in
dynamic relation to the others–opens up additional analytical
nuances and possibilities. Our legal categories are fictions 39 –they
37. I do not want to suggest that moving towards the triangle’s points
moves us closer to essences or archetypes. All three categories–persons, things,
and obligations–are juridical constructions that work normatively to structure
legal problems and subject matter rather than as strictly empirical labels.
Instead, moving towards the points of the triangle reflects a decreasing intensity
of interrelations with the other categories. For an insightful example of the
analysis of the normative implications one of the categories–persons–see Ngaire
Naffine, Who Are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects,
66 MOD. L. REV. 346 (2003).
38. In passing, one might ask whether the other two points of the triangle–
persons untouched by things or obligations, and obligations untouched by
persons or things–are conceptually possible. Obligations, it would seem, are
not, since by definition they involve both persons and an object: see e.g. 1
ROBERT-JOSEPH POTHIER, TRAITÉ DES OBLIGATIONS in ŒUVRES DE POTHIER 79
(nouvelle édition 1821). By contrast, persons, or at least human persons, are
inextricably linked to other persons (if not to things), which gives rise to certain
natural obligations linked to status (as between parent and child).
39. See Yan Thomas, Fictio legis: l’empire de la fiction romaine et ses
limites médiévales, 21 DROITS 17 (1995), discussed in Alain Pottage,
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have a long pedigree in the civil law, of course, but they are
fictions nonetheless–and it is essential to ask what we are calling
on our fictions to do and how well they are doing it.
Reconceiving Gaius’ schema as interactive has important
implications for understanding the person in law, as it forces us to
shift our attention from ontological status (is something a person or
a thing?) to how it is positioned or embedded within a social
matrix of relationships–a concern central to the feminist critique of
traditional views of personhood in law. 40 At the same time, by
focusing on the interfaces between the categories and on the
interactions that take place at these zones of juncture, we can begin
to counter the colonization of one category by another, which is an
inevitable byproduct of binary taxonomy and clear boundaries
between categories. The category of persons has I think long
suffered encroachments by its neighbors, each of which deals with
matter more congenial to the liberal model of law: objects of
wealth on the one hand, and means of acquiring objects of wealth
on the other. I would like to turn now to look at these issues in the
context of the persons-things interface.
II. THE PERSONS-THINGS INTERFACE
The traditional view has been that there is (indeed, that there
must be) a clear boundary between persons and things, which
corresponds to the distinction between subject and object, being
and having, the self and the world. 41 Given the anthropocentrism
at the heart of liberal humanism, this boundary is regarded as
central to, even inherent in, the nature of human society. 42

Introduction: The Fabrication of Persons and Things, in LAW, ANTHROPOLOGY
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL: MAKING PERSONS AND THINGS 1, 1218 (Alain Pottage & Martha Mundy eds., 2003).
40. See especially Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy, 1 YALE J.
LAW & FEMINISM 7 (1989); Jennifer Nedelsky, Property in Potential Life?: A
Relational Approach to Choosing Legal Categories, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 343
(1993); and ROBERT LECKEY, CONTEXTUAL SUBJECTS: FAMILY, STATE, AND
RELATIONAL THEORY (2008).
41. See generally Pottage, supra note 39; and Alain Sériaux, La notion
juridique de patrimoine: brèves notations civilistes sur le verbe avoir, 1994
REV.TRIM. DR. CIV. 801.
42. See generally DAVIES & NAFFINE, supra note 33, at 2; Ross Poole, On
Being a Person, 74 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 38, 46 (1996); and DONALD R.
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Disagreement largely centers on the placement of this boundary
(particularly in areas like the status of embryos or fetuses 43 or
biotechnology 44 ) rather than on its existence. Conflict arises from
(or at least is exacerbated by) the fact that the nature and location
of this boundary engages so many different normative discourses.
Law, religion, science, ethics, and morality each address the basic
question of what is a person and what is a thing, but give widely
divergent answers to it.
In practice, however, the boundary between persons and things
blurs. In some contexts, human beings are effectively treated as
things (for example as objects of the power of the state or of
employers), 45 while sometimes certain things are (or conceivably
should be) treated as persons or parts of persons (such as human
body parts, 46 or objects with particular emotional connections to a
human being, 47 or certain animals, 48 or things of common benefit
like the environment 49 ). The problem is that in a system with a

KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 8 (1990). This is of course a hotly contested question, which has
inspired a vast literature. For one challenge to this anthropocentrism, see
CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL
PLURALISM (1987).
43. See e.g. Robert Kouri, Réflexions sur le statut juridique du foetus, 15
R.J.T. 193 (1980); Martine Herzog-Evans, Homme, homme juridique et
humanité de l’embryon, 2000 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 65; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost,
Rights of Embryo and Foetus in Private Law, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 633 (2002);
and Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to
Embryos and Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 159 (2005).
44. See e.g. GOLD, supra note 32; Alain Pottage, Our Original Inheritance,
in LAW, ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL: MAKING
PERSONS AND THINGS 249 (Alain Pottage & Martha Mundy eds., 2003).
45. See e.g. Anne Barron, Legal Discourse and the Colonisation of the Self
in the Modern State, in POST-MODERN LAW: ENLIGHTENMENT, REVOLUTION
AND THE DEATH OF MAN 107, 109 (Anthony Carty ed., 1990).
46. BAUD, supra note 9; and Stephen R. Munzer, An Uneasy Case Against
Property Rights in Body Parts, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 259 (1994).
47. Radin, supra note 33, esp. 959-61.
48. Alain Roy, Papa, Maman, Bébé et… Fido! L’animal de compagnie en
droit civil ou l’émergence d’un nouveau sujet de droit, 82 CAN. BAR REV. 791
(2003); and Simon Cushing, Against “Humanism”: Speciesism, Personhood,
and Preference, 34 J. SOC. PHIL. 556 (2003).
49. Stone, supra note 33; and Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have
Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals Reach? A Pluralist
Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985).
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clear boundary between persons and things, a choice must be made
for one category or the other, which amounts in most cases to a
choice between treating something as extrapatrimonial or
patrimonial, as outside or within the market.
Our liberal Western world grants property discourse
tremendous power to transform our view of what constitutes a
thing and in so doing to colonize other areas of law. Personhood
discourse, by contrast, has largely lacked countervailing power,
both because it has been less coherently theorized and because its
characteristic concerns are less easily translated into the language
of law. For this reason, the negotiation between the categories of
persons and things has generally taken place from the standpoint of
the latter. 50 John Austin argued a century and a half ago for the
logic of viewing persons as exceptions to universal reification
rather than seeing things as exceptions to universal agency, 51 and
the comparative historical fates of the law of property and the law
of persons bear this out. In cold instrumentalist logic, whatever
can be treated as a thing is treated as one, unless there are
compelling reasons to the contrary (which generally derive from
the anthropocentric bias just mentioned). 52 Even with the abolition
of slavery, the most egregious commodification of the human
being, the patrimonialization of aspects of the person–one thinks of

50. Compare C.B. Macpherson, Human Rights as Property Rights, in THE
RISE AND FALL OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND OTHER PAPERS 76, 84 (1985), who
argues that hitching other concepts (such as human rights) to the power of
property might be useful in establishing them.
51. 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF
POSITIVE LAW 686 (5th ed. by Robert Campbell, 1885): “The Law of Things in
short is The Law—the entire corpus juris; minus certain portions of it affecting
peculiar classes of persons, which, for the sake of commodious exposition, are
severed from the whole of which they are a part, and placed in separate heads or
chapters.”
52. An early critic of this was Louis Josserand, La personne humaine dans
le commerce juridique, D. 1932.CHRON.1, 4.
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privacy, 53 image, 54 body parts and genetic information 55 –has
worked towards the assimilation of persons into things. In
common-law jurisdictions this is perhaps unsurprising, as the
concept of the person in the common law has steadily atrophied,
which leaves the courts little choice but to designate as property
anything that has no more obvious category. 56 But even in the
civil law the power of property rights makes them a beacon for
litigants, and the extrapatrimonial is increasingly becoming
patrimonialized. 57
Boundaries constantly move, which means categories are fluid.
Given the central importance of both persons and property in
Western liberal and humanist ideologies, defining what happens in
the zone of interaction between the categories of persons and
things becomes crucially important.
It makes a profound
53. For an early discussion of privacy as a form of intangible property, see
Note, Modern Developments of the Jurisdiction of Equity, 7 COLUM. L. REV.
533, 534 (1907), cited in Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the
Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29
BUFF. L. REV. 325, 334 (1980). The recasting of certain aspects of privacy as a
form of property right continued in William L. Prosser’s influential article
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
54. In the United States, though there were earlier antecedents, the line of
cases interpreting the right to one’s image as a proprietary right begins with
Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), which established the “right of publicity” in
American law. See generally Eric H. Reiter, Personality and Patrimony:
Comparative Perspectives on the Right to One’s Image, 76 TUL. L. REV. 673
(2002).
55. GOLD, supra note 32. See also the famous decision in Moore v. Regents
of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. S.C. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 936 (1991).
56. See Eric H. Reiter, Gaius, le droit des personnes et la common law
anglo-américaine, in 2 PERSONNE ET RES PUBLICA 163 (Jacques Bouineau ed.,
2008).
57. An example is the legal status of clientele (particularly a physician’s
patients), which has been the object of vigorous debate in France. See Thierry
Revet, Clientèle civile, 2001 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 167; Judith Rochfeld, Les
ambiguïtés de la ‘patientèle’ ou comment une chose qui n’en est toujours pas
une peut désormais constituer licitement l’objet d’un contrat de cession…,
J.C.P. 2001.I 301.432; François Vialla, Un revirement spectaculaire en matière
de patrimonialisation des clientèles civiles, J.C.P. 2001.II 10 452.69. On the
patrimonial/extrapatrimonial distinction, see generally Grégoire Loiseau, Des
droits patrimoniaux de la personnalité en droit français, 42 MCGILL L.J. 319
(1997); and Reiter, supra note 54, at 681-705.
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difference in the character of a legal system whether classification
proceeds from the basis of the primacy of persons or the primacy
of things, and different justifications are required for each.
The problem with allowing the category of things–and more
particularly the concept of property–to set its own boundaries is
that property today is largely conceived in market terms: courts (if
not individuals) deal more comfortably with things considered as
wealth valued in monetary terms than with things considered as
unique objects valued subjectively. 58 This insulates the category
“things” from both the personhood concerns of the category
“persons” (which touch on subjective value) and from the
relational issues of the category “obligations” (which touch on
responsibility and duty), both of which potentially bring to our
analysis of things important concerns not captured in market
calculus. The ostensibly universal logic and language of the
market make property seem the great equalizer, a vulgate into
which virtually anything may be translated. The normative
implications of this process are too important to be accepted
uncritically.
Even our language for taking things out of the property system
presupposes evaluative market language as the norm. 59 The very
linguistic form of concepts like “extrapatrimoniality,” “not in
commerce,” and “inalienability” presents them as exceptions to the
predominant paradigms of “patrimony,” “commerce,” and
“alienability” respectively. The association between things and the
market is so close that it seems somehow perverse to say that there
might be things that are “not in commerce” yet still property. This
is particularly so with regard to the person and the rights closely
connected to personhood (such as privacy, bodily integrity, and so
forth–the extrapatrimonial personality rights of the civil law 60 ).
Though not all alienability need be market driven, 61 and though a
patrimony also theoretically contains things of value that are not
58. See generally Bernard Rudden, Things as Thing and Things as Wealth,
14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 81 (1994).
59. See Alain Pottage, The Inscription of Life in Law: Genes, Patents, and
Bio-Politics, 61 MOD. L. REV. 740, 765 (1998) (noting that “to create or defend
an exception is to concede the claims of the rule”).
60. See generally Adrian Popovici, Personality Rights—A Civil Law
Concept, 50 LOY. L. REV. 349 (2004).
61. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849
(1987).
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owned, the rhetorical power of property discourse within liberal
society is such that fine gradations are difficult to sustain against it.
Consider the popular notion of “identity theft.”62 The language
of property is more viscerally evocative in modern Western society
than alternative terms like “appropriation of personality” (which
itself still echoes property language) or “violation of personality,”
which conceptualize the problem (more naturally) as a personhood
rather than a property issue. The association with theft serves to
patrimonialize identity (itself a slippery concept) into an object of
property and thus to link it to ownership, the most powerful right
in the arsenal of the liberal legal world.
This subtle politics of labeling is closely related to the equally
subtle politics of taxonomy. If we reduce classification at the
interface between persons and things to a question of the scope of
property rights, we create a slippery slope whose bottom is the
position where anything to which the creativity of a marketdominated society can assign a value is brought within the property
regime to be subjected to the full panoply of broad legallyenforced rights of ownership. The category of persons hardly
stands a chance against this–it becomes little more than a
placeholder for things not yet propertized.
Allowing the persons-things interface to become a one-way
membrane that permits only ever-increasing commodification
misses the potential of the other kinds of conceptual exchanges that
might take place between persons and things. Categorization at the
persons-things interface is more than simply coming up with two
definitions, one for persons, another for things, and choosing the
proper pigeonhole in which to file something new. An interface
between categories means that the categories are related to one
another, mutually and on equal terms, and not simply as colonizercolonized. This allows us to see not just how aspects of the person
can function as things, but also how our concept of the person
depends on connections to certain things.
Pushing things further, persons and things are just part of the
analysis: questions of classification really involve all three parts of
the private law–persons, things, and obligations–working together
to set the terms of our interaction with the world and the degree of
62. E.g. Sean B. Hoar, Identity Theft: The Crime of the New Millenium, 80
OR. L. REV. 1423 (2001); and Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the
Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227 (2003).
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influence the world will have on us. Broadening the analysis
beyond a binary opposition–and away from the transactional
overtones of property discourse–allows us to enrich the personsthings interface with the relational concerns characteristic of the
third part of our triangle. I think this allows a better understanding
of the role things play in human relationships and the ways in
which personhood and market concerns interact in defining these
relationships. 63
The standard sites for discussing issues like these are with
respect to the human body and personality rights like privacy. 64
Both of these examples sit squarely in the liminal zone between
persons and things, since they are associated with the human being
but are detachable and so transactable in market terms. At the
same time, they touch on ideas of relationship, interconnection,
and responsibility associated with the language of obligations. A
stark binary choice–person or thing–is unsatisfactory. Market
discourse makes us uncomfortable in this context, since we are
generally unwilling to treat kidneys like automobiles, but at the
same time a kidney is no more a person than Buick is (unless we
are willing to get creative with the fiction of legal personality 65 ).
In a system where the category of persons is rigidly circumscribed
in opposition to things, the taxonomic possibilities for things like
kidneys or one’s image are lacking, and such things have nowhere
to go except somewhere along the property spectrum. And once
classed as things, the assumptions about the property institution
take over, and some degree of market commodification is the
result. 66
The civil law distinction between extrapatrimonial and
patrimonial rights perhaps gets closest to what I mean, since it
distinguishes between the personal aspects of rights (their
63. For interesting insights into this question, see Jennifer Nedelsky,
Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 1 (1993); and David
Lametti, The Concept of Property: Relations Through Objects of Social Wealth,
53 U.T.L.J. 325 (2003).
64. See the literature cited supra note 33.
65. Naffine, supra note 37 (on the different arguments and justifications
behind the idea of legal personality).
66. See Richard Gold, Owning Our Bodies: An Examination of Property
Law and Biotechnology, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1167, 1230-31 (1995). I am
more skeptical than Gold about the appropriateness of applying even a changed
property discourse to things intimately connected to the person.
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personhood qualities) and their public aspects (their value- or
market-oriented side). The problem, however, is that concepts like
extrapatrimoniality and “not in commerce” do not do full justice to
what is going on at the persons-things interface, since they already
assume both the language of property discourse and an either/or
view of classification. To address this problem of the insufficiency
of binary choices, various writers have made a case for
intermediate categories–examples include Jean-Pierre Baud’s idea
of “things without price,” or Gérard Farjat’s idea of “centers of
interest,” or Geoffrey Samuel’s work on “interests” in the common
law. 67 Such intermediate categories, these authors argue, could
encompass things like the human body or the family relationship or
even Domat’s monster that do not fit easily elsewhere.
Multiplying categories is not the answer, however, since it
simply adds new boundaries and thus creates new either/or
dilemmas. Nor is it feasible, I think, to abandon categories entirely
and adopt a more pragmatic, situational model of private law in the
manner of the common law, where categories are infinitely
expandable, overlapping, and non-exclusive (as in Halsbury’s
Laws of England 68 or the Canadian Abridgement 69 ). The civil law
comes with a structural history that has become part of the law
itself. This structure can be modified (an example is the
consolidation of family law from elements drawn from persons,
things, and obligations), but the traditional foundation based on
Gaius has proved resilient and of continuing utility.

67. BAUD, supra note 9, at 217-22; Gérard Farjat, Entre les personnes et les
choses, les centres d’intérêts: prolégomènes pour une recherché, 2002
REV.TRIM. DR. CIV. 221; and Geoffrey Samuel, The Notion of an Interest as a
Formal Concept in English and in Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW
BEFORE THE COURTS 263 (Guy Canivet, Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve
eds., 2004).
68. HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND (4th ed. 1973). The categories in
Halsbury, of which there is a growing list of more than 160, range from the
highly general (Contract, Tort, Real Property, Restitution) to the narrowly
defined (Agriculture, Animals, Auction, Aviation, Barristers). Overlap is
common: for instance we find both Tort and Negligence, Contract and Sale of
Goods, and so on.
69. CANADIAN ABRIDGEMENT (2d ed. 1992). As with Halsbury, here the
categories are numerous (about one hundred), of varying degrees of generality,
and frequently overlapping (Contract, but also Sale of Land, Insurance,
Employment Law, and so on).
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It seems to me more useful to explore the possibilities of the
idea of interfaces. By this I mean a zone where the categories
mingle and blend: where the linkages between personhood and
property can be articulated while resorting neither to full market
commodification nor to full legal subjectivity. An interface is not
simply a new either/or choice: it is a space where the answer is
“both,” a zone of interaction where either category alone would be
insufficient to deal with the complexities of the subject matter, and
would result in an unacceptable narrowing or distortion of what
was being categorized. This idea of interaction, however, points to
the relational ideas characteristic of the third area of our triangle–
the law of obligations–and indicates that the analysis around the
concepts of persons and things is more complicated than even a
dual persons-things interface alone can capture.
III. BRINGING IN THE PERSONS-OBLIGATIONS INTERFACE
The third category in Gaius’ schema has been the most
obviously fluid both in conceptualization and in content, which is
at least partly due to its role as the legal site for concepts that
mediate between self and society. 70 It represents links or
interactions between persons or things, and so, I would argue,
touches qualities of movement between categories, of moral
engagement, and of relationship.
This category embraces a wide variety of subject matter–Peter
Stein has called obligations the “joker in the pack of civil law
categories” 71 –and this is one reason why it is so difficult to pin
down. The definitional shifts surrounding this category over the
centuries are fascinating, and indicate a searching for a way to
generalize the different possible links between persons and
things: 72 “obligations” looks one way, putting the stress on
interpersonal relations, while “ways of acquiring property” looks
70. KELLEY, supra note 42 at 8 has described it as “the theoretical point
where self-consciousness becomes social consciousness and where the defining
faculty of human will, as expressed in language as well as behavior, becomes
essential both for social activity and for legal regulation.”
71. Stein, supra note 1 at 158.
72. ANDRÉ-JEAN ARNAUD, ESSAI D’ANALYSE STRUCTURALE DU CODE CIVIL
FRANÇAIS: LA RÈGLE DU JEU DANS LA PAIX BOURGEOISE 92 (1973) (making a
similar point with reference to the mixture of subjects found in Book 3 of the
French Code civil).
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another way, emphasizing the relations between persons and
things.
As I have suggested, the traditional linear model of Gaius’
paradigm is misleading, since it relates this third category only
with things, and not with persons. In law persons interact both
with other persons and with things: contracts of sale, lease, and
deposit, for example, involve things (and persons too, of course),
while contracts of mandate, partnership, and employment involve
persons, their status, and their interpersonal relationships much
more than their things. The element common to both is the
creation and governance of relationships.
Viewed broadly, then, this third category brings to the
statically conceived categories of persons and things relationships
and interactions of all kinds: from social or affective relationships
(such as aspects of family), to legal relationships (such as
employer/employee and aspects of parenthood or marriage), to
relationships with things (such as custodial obligations). These
various kinds of interactions, moreover, call attention to qualities
such as affect and power that are crucial to understanding how
legal systems actually function, but that are otherwise missing
from the schema. In short, if we view the category “persons” as
the realm of being and the category “things” as the realm of
having, this third category works with the others to emphasize the
intermediary states of becoming and getting. Brought into the
persons-things mix, this focus on process rather than product
brings into focus moral and ethical aspects of the law that
otherwise tend to remain hidden and so difficult to articulate or
conceptualize, and that work to change the terms of analysis of
both persons and things.
CONCLUSION
To return to the examples with which I began, I think we can
now see more clearly how both the leg in the barbeque smoker and
Domat’s monster challenge the static and linear view of Gaius’
schema. The leg, being too recognizably human to be clearly a
commodity, but at the same time too detached to be clearly a
person, fits neither category and so engages neither set of rules
unproblematically. As for monsters without human form, although
Domat clearly excludes such beings from the category of persons,
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we see that it is precisely the human qualities they do have
(particularly their parentage, but also any physical resemblance to
humans) that keep them from fitting clearly into the category of
things. Similarly, their lack of most of the usual formal attributes
of humanity keeps them out of the category of persons: only in
cases where such monsters have a sufficiently human form do they
become persons. 73 Their connection with each category–persons
and things–is however colored by their interactions: with their
parents especially, but also with society generally and with the
assumptions of others about their nature, their abilities, and their
origins. And it is these interactions, with their overtones of duty,
responsibility, and obligation, that really add complexity–but also
interest–to the problem of Domat’s monster.
Though Domat’s treatment of the monster would not be the
way we would discuss this issue today, his recognition of the
interplay between form, nature, and particularly community is an
excellent illustration of the issues that categorization in law must
engage. Taxonomy is a necessary evil in law, but how we do it is
anything but necessary and need not be evil. Categories shape the
material being categorized, and discrete, coherent, and bounded
categories invite us to view persons and things as themselves
discrete, coherent, and bounded, though the richness of human
experience says otherwise. Moving beyond the limitations of this
view of taxonomy and emphasizing instead fluidity and interaction
can help us embrace rather than avoid complexity and
multivalence in legal analysis, whether we are dealing with
intangibles like the right to privacy or very tangible things like legs
discovered in barbeque smokers.

73. This pre-modern emphasis on the formal rather than the moral or other
characteristics of humanity is interesting historically, though shocking in
modern ethical terms. It is however disquieting to compare the often alarming
rhetoric surrounding conjoined twins cited in DREGER, supra note 20.
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A paper read before the Philosophy Club, Loyola
University, New Orleans, December 3rd, 1959.
Unpublished.
1959. Changes in the Roles of Common Law, Equity, and Statute
in the Stuart Century, 46 RICE INSTITUTE PAMPHLET 98
(January, 1960).
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1960. Section on Persons, in the symposium “The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959 Term”, 20 LA.
L. REV. 211 (1960).
1960. Section on Civil Code and Related Subject Matter, in
“Louisiana Legislative Symposium, 1960 Regular
Session”, 21 LA. L. REV. 53 (1960).
1961. Section on Persons, in the symposium “The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1959-60 Term”, 21 LA. L.
REV. 289 (1961).
1961. Unsolicited Action on Behalf of Others in American and
English Law, in SCRITTI IN HONORE DI FILIPPO VASSALLI
(Rome, 1961).
1961. INTEGRATED LOUISIANA LEGISLATION ON PERSONS AND
THE FAMILY, LSU Bookstore, September 1961, at xiv, 142.
Supplement, 1964.
1962. READINGS IN LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW, LSU Bookstore.
Vol. I, 1962, at x, 1-180; Vol. II, 1963, at xii, 181-438.
1962. Section on Persons, in the symposium “The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1960-61 Term”, 22 LA. L.
REV. 309 (1962).
1962. Research in Law. Outline of a lecture before the National
Science Foundation’s Southern Science Training Program
for High Ability Secondary School Students, Louisiana
State University, August 2nd, 1962. Unpublished.
1962. Section on Civil Code and Related Legislation, in the
symposium “Louisiana Legislation of 1962”, 23 LA. L.
REV. 41 (1962).
1963. Section on Persons, in the symposium “The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1961-62 Term”, 23 LA.
L. REV. 247 (1963).
1963. Section on Marital Regimes, in the symposium “The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1961-62 Term”,
23 LA. L. REV. 309 (1963).
1963. Of Trusts, Human Dignity, Legal Science, and Taxes:
Suggested Principles for a Louisiana Trust Estates Law, 23
LA. L. REV. 639 (1963).
1963. Introduction to Anglo-American Real Property Law. Draft
texts of Chapter I (Delineation of Interests 1066-1535) and
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unfinished Chapter II (Development of Interests in Land
1066-1535). Spring 1963. Project abandoned.
Section on Persons and the Family, in the symposium
“Louisiana Legislation of 1964”, 25 LA. L. REV. 13 (1964).
Diritto Continentale e Common Law nel Loro Sviluppo
Storico, 23 LE CORTI DI BARI, LECCE, E POTENZA 878
(1964). Also published in LA MAGISTRATURA, Rome, July
and August, 1964, at 5.
Implications of the United States Constitution for Interstate
and International Conflicts of Laws and Jurisdiction. A
lecture delivered at the Facoltà di Giurisprudenza.
Universtà di Pavia, Italy. Spring 1964. Unpublished.
Unjust Enrichment in Anglo-American Law and Enrichment without Cause in Modern Romanist Laws. Lecture to
Naples Bar, 1964. Unpublished.
Section on Persons, in the symposium “The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-64 Term”, 25 LA.
L. REV. 291 (1965).
Section on Community Property, in the symposium “The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-64
Term”, 25 LA. L. REV. 317 (1965).
A Recent Discovery: A Copy of the “Digest of the Civil
Law” of 1908 with Marginal Source References in MoreauLislet’s Hand, 26 LA. L. REV. 25 (1965); and 7 LOUISIANA
HISTORY 249 (1966).
Section on Persons, in the symposium “The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-66 Term”, 26 LA.
L. REV. 459 (1966).
Section on The Community of Acquets and Gains, in the
symposium “The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1965-66 Term”, 26 LA. L. REV. 477 (1966).
Section on Trusts, in the symposium “The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-66 Term”, 26 LA.
L. REV. 487 (1966).
Natural Law and Respect for Law, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 500
(1967). A paper read at the 1966 International Congress of
Comparative Law, Uppsala, Sweden.
Memorandum (on Law School practices and curriculum) to
Dean Paul M. Hebert and faculty of the Louisiana State
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University Law School, November 15th, 1966. Published,
less Appendix, in ALAN WATSON, THE SHAME OF
AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 205 (2d ed. 2007).
Section on Persons, in the symposium “The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-66 Term”, 27 LA.
L. REV. 423 (1967).
Section on Matrimonial Regimes, in the symposium “The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-66
Term”, 27 LA. L. REV. 455 (1967).
The Civil Law and Its Study. A lecture delivered
September 4th, 1967, as part of an orientation program for
students entering the LSU Law School, later published in
CONTINENTAL AND AMERICAN LAW: INSIGHTS AND
CONTRASTS (Pascal, Pugh, and Yiannopoulos eds., 1971);
and entitled Louisiana Civil Law and Its Study, in 60 LA.
L. REV. 1 (1999).
Book Review, The Italian Legal System–An Introduction by
M. Cappelletti, J. H. Merryman, J. M. Perillo, 15 AM. J.
COMP. L. 829 (1967).
Observations on the Report of the Matrimonial Regimes
Committee of the Quebec Civil Code Reform Commission.
Prepared for the Commission. Unpublished.
Section on Persons, in the symposium “The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts, 1966-67 Term”, 28 LA. L.
REV. 312 (1968).
Section on Matrimonial Regimes, in the symposium “The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts, 1966-67 Term”,
28 LA. L. REV. 327 (1968).
Note, Tutorship after Separation of Parents, 16 LA BAR J.
267 (1968).
Legislation for Family Stability. A lecture at the First
Annual Meeting of the Family Relations Council of
Louisiana, 1962. Unpublished.
The Relevance of Philosophy to Law. Outline of a lecture to
Bahram Jamalpur’s Philosophy Seminar, Loyola
University, New Orleans, March 25th, 1969. Unpublished.
Principal Aspects of Louisiana Matrimonial Regime and
Succession Law, with Mention of Relevant Decisions and
Federal Income and Estate Tax Laws. Outline of Remarks
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at Louisiana State University Cooperative Extension
Services’ Home and Garden Week, August 20-21, 1969.
Unpublished.
Section on Matrimonial Regimes, in the symposium “The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-69
Term”, 30 LA. L. REV. 219 (1970).
Section on Conflict of Laws, in the symposium “The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-69 Term”,
30 LA. L. REV. 271 (1970).
Book Note, A Reprint of Mareau Lislet’s Copy of
a Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force in the Territory of
Orleans (1808), 30 LA. L. REV. 746 (1970).
Outlines of Discussions on I. Law and the Human Condition
and II. The Obligation to Obey the Law. The University
Methodist Church, 10 O’clock Discussion Group, Baton
Rouge, September 20th and 27th, 1970. Unpublished.
The Sources of Louisiana’s Civil Law–The Legend and the
Fact. Outline of address before meeting of the Foundation
for Historical Louisiana, November 11th, 1970.
Unpublished.
Appraisal of the Draft of a Proposed Civil Code for the
Republic of Vietnam, with Appendix detailing comments
and observations on particular articles. Prepared at request
of the U.S. State Department. Unpublished.
Louisiana Succession and Related Laws and the
Illegitimate: Thoughts Prompted by Labine v. Vicent, 46
TUL. L. REV. 167 (1971).
CONTINENTAL AND A MERICAN LAW: INSIGHTS AND
CONTRASTS. Co-editor with Pugh and Yiannopoulos
(prepared for LSU Institute of Continuing Legal
Education’s Rome Conference, July, 1971).
Section on Law in General, in the symposium “The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-70 Term”, 31
LA. L. REV. 185 (1971). With W. Thomas Tête.
Section on Matrimonial Regimes, in the symposium “The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-70
Term”, 31 LA. L. REV. 252 (1971).
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1971. Section on Conflict of Laws, in the symposium “The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-70 Term”,
31 LA. L. REV. 312 (1971).
1971. Section on Matrimonial Regimes, in the symposium “The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971
Term”, 32 LA. L. REV. 219 (1972).
1971. Section on Conflict of laws, in the symposium “The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971
Term”, 32 LA. L. REV. 295 (1972).
1971. Modern Continental Civil Law Contrasted with the AngloAmerican. Outline of a lecture for the Institute of
Continuing Legal Education, Louisiana State University
Law School. Unpublished.
1971. Modern Private Law: Contrasts of Philosophy, Substance,
and Form. Outline of a lecure given as part of a program
of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Louisiana
State University Law School, in Rome, Italy, July 29th,
1971. Published in CONTINENTAL AND AMERICAN LAW:
INSIGHTS AND CONTRASTS (Pascal, Pugh, & Yiannopoulos
eds., Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Louisiana
State University Law School, 1971).
1972. Book Note, A Reprint of Moreau Lislet’s Copy of A Digest
of Civil Laws Now in Force in the Territory of Orleans
(1808), 32 LA. L. REV. 495 (1972).
1972. The ERA, Women, Men, and Louisiana Law. A lecture at
Saint Alban’s Chapel, Louisiana State University, June
25th, 1972. Unpublished.
1972. Modern Civil Law and Modern Anglo-American Law.
Outline of a lecture. Occasion not recalled.
1972. Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza,
46 TUL. L. REV. 603 (1972).
1972. Book Review, Family Law and the Poor by of Jacobus Ten
Broek, 11 J. FAM. L. 795 (1972).
1973. A Report on the Reprint of Moreau-Lislet’s Copy of a
Digest of the Civil Laws, LOUISIANA HISTORICAL SOCIETY,
Series 2, Vol. 1, at 43 (1973).
1973. LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE xii, 389, 101
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(Appendices) (Claitor’s Publishing Division, Baton Rouge,
1973). Supplement, 1975. 2nd through 5th editions by
Katherine Spaht, 1979, 1982, 1986, 1991.
Book Review, French Law–Its Structure, Sources, and
Methodology by René David, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 609
(1973).
Section on Law in General, in the symposium “The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-72 Term”,
33 LA. L. REV. 169 (1973).
Section on Matrimonial Regimes, in the symposium “The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-72
Term”, 33 LA. L. REV. 219 (1973).
Section on Conflict of Laws, in the symposium “The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-72 Term”,
33 LA. L. REV. 276 (1973).
The Reciprocal Rights and Obligations of Louisiana
Husbands and Wives. Pamphlet distributed by the YWCA,
Baton Rouge, 1973.
Differentiation of Rights and Obligations on Basis of Sex.
Statement addressed to the Committee on Bill of Rights
and Elections of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention
of 1973, April 6th, 1973. Unpublished.
Section on Law in General, in the symposium “The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-73 Term”,
34 LA. L. REV. 197 (1974).
Section on Matrimonial Regimes, in the symposium “The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-73
Term”, 34 LA. L. REV. 255 (1974).
Section on Conflict of Laws, in the symposium “The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-73 Term”,
34 LA. L. REV. 319 (1974).
Section on Matrimonial Regimes, in the symposium “The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-74
Term”, 35 LA. L. REV. 303 (1975).
Section on Conflict of Laws, in the symposium “The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-74 Term”,
35 LA. L. REV. 377 (1975).
Updating Louisiana’s Community of Gains, 49 TUL. L. REV.
555 (1975).
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1975. [The Legal Position of the Unborn Child in the] United
States,
in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COMPARATIVE LAW,
Ottawa, Canada, October 3-4, 1975. University of Ottawa
Press, 1978, at 94-117.
1975. The Character and Sources of the Louisiana Civil Code.
Guest Column, THE SHREVEPORT JOURNAL, Shreveport–
Bossier City, Louisiana, July 2nd, 1975.
1975. The Spanish Character of the Louisiana Digest of 1808. A
paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American
Society for Legal History, November 8th, 1975.
1976. Section on Matrimonial Regimes, in the symposium “The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-75
Term”, 36 LA. L. REV. 409 (1976).
1976. Section on Conflict of Laws, in the symposium “The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-75 Term”,
36 LA. L. REV. 485 (1976).
1976. Science and Order–The Classical Medieval View. Lecture
delivered in Geography and Anthropology Series,
Louisiana State University (1976). Unpublished.
1977. Remarks at Funeral of Paul Macarius Hebert, 37 LA. L.
REV. vii (Supplement, 1977).
1977. Recollections of Paul Macarius Hebert, 23 LOY. L. REV.
309 (1977).
1977. Heirs, Creditors, and the Fisc under Louisiana Legislation,
23 LOY. L. REV. 313 (1977).
1977. Why I Oppose the ERA, 4 S. U. L. REV. 11 (1977).
1977. Interview of Robert A. Pascal by Max C. Marks, September
15th, 1977. Unpublished. Portions quoted in Max C.
Marks, article on Legal Education, THE CIVILIAN, Student
Newspaper, Louisiana State University Law School,
November, 1977.
1977. The Marriage Contract. A draft chapter of a once
contemplated book on Louisiana Matrimonial Regimes.
Unpublished.
1977. The Utilization of Private Express Trusts. Notes relevant to
two lectures in Shael Herman’s class in Trusts at the Tulane
University School of Law, October 11th, 1977.
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1978. Organization and Mode of Presentation of a New
Louisiana Civil Code. Memorandum to Alain Levasseur,
February 7th, 1978. Unpublished.
1978. The New Matrimonial Regimes Law. Outline of lecture to
Kiwanis Club, Baton Rouge, July 18th, 1978. Unpublished.
1978. Section on Matrimonial Regimes, in the symposium “The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-77
Term”, 38 LA. L. REV. 355 (1978).
1978. Louisiana’s 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Legislation, 53
TUL. L. REV. 105 (1978).
1979. Features of the 1978 Louisiana Matrimonial Regimes
Legislation. Outline of a lecture to Southern University
Law School’s Matrimonial Regimes class, February 7th,
1979. Unpublished.
1979. Outline of Remarks at Louisiana State University Business
Fraternity Meeting, on Matrimonial Regimes Legislation of
1978 and 1979, March 21st, 1979. Unpublished.
1979. Section on Law in General, in the symposium “The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-78 Term”,
39 LA. L. REV. 657 (1979).
1979. Section on Matrimonial Regimes, in the symposium “The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-78
Term”, 39 LA. L. REV. 697 (1979).
1979. Integrity: The First Element of Professionalism. Lecture at
Annual Meeting of Louisiana State University Department
of Landscape Architecture, November 3-9, 1979.
Unpublished.
1980. Louisiana’s Civil Law Tradition. Outline of address to
Southeast Louisiana Historical Association, Hammond,
Louisiana, February 28th, 1980. Unpublished.
1980. Section on Matrimonial Regimes, in the symposium “The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-79
Term”, 40 LA. L. REV. 571 (1980).
1980. The Sources of Civil Order According to the Louisiana
Civil Code, 54 TUL. L. REV. 916 (Mitchell Franklin
Celebration Issue, 1980).
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III. THE RETIREMENT YEARS
1980. Legislative Jurisdiction and Reason. A short statement on
the authority to delineate legislative jurisdiction and the
philosophical and theological criteria for doing so. October
1980. Unpublished.
1981. Book Review, Les Régimes Matrimoniaux au Québec by
Ernest Caparros, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 538 (1981).
1982. Commencement Address, Louisiana State University Law
School, May 22nd, 1982. Unedited paper. Unpublished.
1983. Interview of Robert A. Pascal by Nina Nichols Pugh,
as part of the Louisiana State University Law School
Living History Project. Unpublished.
1984. Louisiana’s Mixed Legal System, 15 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE
DROIT (OTTAWA) 341 (1984).
1984. Law as One of the Humanities. A lecture delivered in the
Honors Program in the Arts and the Humanities at
Louisiana State University, April 25th, 1984. Unpublished.
1986. Philosophical Foundations of Positive Law [Los
Fundamentos del Derecho Positivo], in TEORÍA GENERAL
DEL DERECHO–ESTUDIOS EN HOMENAJE A JULIO C. CUETO
RÚA (Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1986).
1987. Foreword to KILBOURNE, A HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA
CIVIL CODE, LSU Publications Institute (1987).
1988. Letter to the Editor, MORNING ADVOCATE (replying to
another opposing forced heirship). April 14th, 1988.
Unpublished.
1989. RCC Original Articles 1797, 1800-1804, and 1809
Revisited. Unpublished.
1989. Statement to the Louisiana Senate on a Bill to Amend the
Laws on Forced Heirship. June 1989. Unpublished.
1991. The Louisiana Succession Law Reforms of 1986–A
Friendly, Favorable Exegesis, 36 LOY. L. REV. 917 (1991).
1991. ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NATURE OF THE LAW AND OTHER
LEGAL WRITINGS xxiv, 119 (Robert Pascal, James Lee
Babin & John William Corrington eds., Louisiana State
University Press 1991).
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1991. Derivation and Principal Characteristics of Louisiana’s
Civil Law. An outline prepared for visiting African jurists.
February 25th, 1991.
1994. Book Review, The Louisiana Civil Code: A European
Legacy for the United States by Shael Herman, 54 LA. L.
REV. 827 (1994).
1995. Outline of Thesis on Forced Heirship–An Aspect of Family
Ownership of Wealth. Lecture to Loyola University Law
School classes on Successions, March 21st, 1995.
Unpublished.
1996. Punishment, Pardon, Parole, a letter to the Editor of THE
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), September 4th, 1996.
1998. Of the Civil Code and Us, The 26th John H. Tucker, jr.,
Lecture in Civil Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 301 (1998). Also
published in Spanish, translated by Adriana Correa, and
with Introduction by Francisco Reyes Villamizar, 33
REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO 25 (Colombia, 2004).
2001. Recollections of a Life Studying and Teaching Law. Written
for family and close friends. Unpublished.
2001. The Louisiana Civil Code–Why We Have It and Why We
Should Be Thankful for It? Outlines and papers for
students in Michael McAuley’s class in Legal Traditions at
the Louisiana State University Law Center, 2001-2003; and
a letter from William T. Tête in critique of the paper.
2004. Teaching Conflict of Laws. A memorandum to Michael
McAuley, July 20th, 2004. Unpublished.
2004. Teaching Legislative and Judicial Jurisdictions. A
memorandum to Michael McAuley, August, 2004.
Unpublished.
2004. Introduction to the Louisiana Civil Code. Unfinished
work. Unpublished.
2005. Modern Romanist Civil Law. Outline of lecture to
undergraduate students in the Honors Class conducted by
James Hardy (LSU Honors College) and Paul Baier (LSU
Law Center). February 1st, 2005. Unpublished.
2005. Legislative Jurisdiction to Determine the Measure of
Recovery for Civil Delict. A memorandum to Michael
McAuley. February 23rd, 2005. Unpublished.
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2006. A Summary Reflection on Legal Education (2006).
Published with a Foreward by Olivier Moréteau, in 69 LA.
L. REV. 125 (2008).
2008. Interview of Robert A. Pascal on Eric Voegelin by Barry
Cooper. Published in part in BARRY COOPER, VOEGELIN
RECOLLECTED 165-66 (2008).

